Philosophy and Psychiatry: A framework for investigating the concept of mental disorder

Luca Malatesti will argue that the aims and methods of investigating the concept of mental disorder should be examined within a methodological framework of conceptual revision. The talk is titled “A framework for investigating the concept of mental disorder” and is scheduled for December 13 at 14.00 CET to be held over Zoom, with a live audience at the Grand Hall of the Institute of Social Sciences (hybrid event).

In this talk, I argue that to make progress on the current and longstanding debate on the concept of mental disorder, we need to adjudicate on the aims of this debate and the methods to achieve them. I maintain that the aims and methods of the investigation of the concept of mental disorder should be examined within a methodological framework of conceptual revision.

Within this general framework, I then argue that in revising the concept of mental disorder, as applied to a condition characterized by a cluster of behaviors, inferred mental states, and personality traits, four desiderata should be satisfied. A mental disorder should involve (1) a unitary condition across the individuals that have it and (2) harmful (3) incapacities or limited capacities to align (4) with properly justified standards.

For instance, in this framework, a condition such as depression would count as a mental disorder insofar as it is a condition that is unitary insofar as it could potentially enable predictions, explanations, and treatment of all those who share it. Moreover, this condition should involve harmful incapacities or limited capacities to satisfy certain properly justified requirements concerning the appropriateness of certain behaviors, mental states, or personality traits in certain contexts. For instance, these could be justified requirements concerning when it is not appropriate to have extreme sadness or suicidal thoughts.

Furthermore, I show how desiderata (1)-(4) shape research projects aimed at clarifying the central notions involved in them: unitarity, incapacity, harm, and properly justified standards. To illustrate the different types of challenges that these projects should meet, I will focus on psychopathy as a case study.

Luca Malatesti is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rijeka (Croatia). Before that, he worked at the University of Hull (UK) as a Lecturer and Wellcome Trust Postdoctoral Fellow. He has co-authored The Methods of Neuroethics, 2024; he has co-edited Psychopathy: Its Uses, Validity and Status, 2022.