



PROMENE CHANGES

MEĐUNARODNA NAUČNA KONFERENCIJA

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

27–29. oktobar 2022. godine

27–29. October 2022

PROMENE

MEĐUNARODNA NAUČNA KONFERENCIJA

CHANGES

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

Izdavač

Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd 2022.

Za izdavača

dr Goran Bašić

ISBN: 978-86-7093-257-9

PROMENE CHANGES

MEĐUNARODNA NAUČNA KONFERENCIJA
27–29. oktobar 2022. godine
INSTITUT DRUŠTVENIH NAUKA, BEOGRAD

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE
27–29. October 2022
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, BELGRADE

PROGRAM I KNJIGA SAŽETAKA
PROGRAM AND BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

PROGRAMSKI ODBOR

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

- akademik Vladimir S. Kostić, Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, Beograd
Academician Vladimir S. Kostić, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade
- akademik Ivo Cvitković, Akademija nauka i umjetnosti BiH, Sarajevo
Academician Ivo Cvitković, Academy of Sciences and Arts of BiH, Sarajevo
- akademik Dragan Vukčević, Crnogorska akademija nauka i umjetnosti, Podgorica
Academician Dragan Vukčević, Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts, Podgorica
- prof. dr Sonja Novak, Institut za nacionalna pitanja, Ljubljana
Professor Sonja Novak, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana
- prof. dr Vesna Rijavac, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Mariboru
Professor Vesna Rijavac, Faculty of Law, University of Maribor
- prof. dr Goran Ilik, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Bitolju
Professor Goran Ilik, Faculty of Law, University of Bitola
- prof. dr Dejan Jović, Fakultet političkih znanosti, Sveučilište u Zagrebu
Professor Dejan Jović, Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb
- prof. dr Ružica Jakešević, Fakultet političkih znanosti, Sveučilište u Zagrebu
Professor Ružica Jakešević, Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb
- dr Suzana Ignjatović, Institut društvenih nauka
Dr. Suzana Ignjatović, Institute of Social Sciences
- dr Dijana Vukomanović, Institut društvenih nauka
Dr. Dijana Vukomanović, Institute of Social Sciences
- dr Milica Joković Pantelić, Institut društvenih nauka
Dr. Milica Joković Pantelić, Institute of Social Sciences
- dr Sanja Filipović, Institut društvenih nauka
Dr. Sanja Filipović, Institute of Social Sciences
- dr Vesna Lukić, Institut društvenih nauka
Dr. Vesna Lukić, Institute of Social Sciences
- dr Predrag Milidrag, Institut društvenih nauka
Dr. Predrag Milidrag, Institute of Social Sciences
- dr Goran Bašić, Institut društvenih nauka
Dr. Goran Bašić, Institute of Social Sciences

ORGANIZACIONI ODBOR
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

dr. Milica Joković Pantelić, dr. Marko Galjak, Nataša Jevtić,
Dijana Arsenijević, Pavle Pavlović, Dušica Kovačević

Dr. Milica Joković Pantelić, Dr. Marko Galjak, Nataša Jevtić,
Dijana Arsenijević, Pavle Pavlović, Dušica Kovačević

PROGRAM

Četvrtak, 27. oktobar 2022. godine

Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, Salon Kluba SANU, Kneza Mihaila 35, Beograd

OTVARANJE KONFERENCIJE

17.00

Vladimir S. KOSTIĆ, predsednik SANU

Predstavnik/ca Vlade Republike Srbije

Jovan BAZIĆ, Predsednik Upravnog odbora Instituta društvenih nauka

Goran BAŠIĆ, direktor Instituta društvenih nauka

VREME PROMENA

Moderator: Gojko Božović

17.30

Vesna GOLDSVORTI, London

Aleksa ĐILAS, Beograd

Darko SUVIN, Lucca

19.00

KOKTEL

Petak, 28. oktobar 2022. godine

Institut društvenih nauka, Kraljice Natalije 45, Beograd

LEVIJATAN I HOMO BALKANICUS

Moderatorica: Irena Ristić

9.00

Dejan JOVIĆ, Fakultet političkih znanosti, Sveučilište u Zagrebu

Šaćir FILANDRA, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Sarajevu

Srđan DARMANOVIĆ, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet Crne Gore

Ana CUPESKA STANISHKOVSKA, Pravni fakultet „Justinijan I“ Univerziteta u Skoplju

Ognjen PRIBIĆEVIĆ, Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd

Mitja ŽAGAR, Institut za manjinska pitanja, Ljubljana

DRŽAVA BLAGOSTANJA vs. NEOLIBERALIZAM

Moderatorka: Sanja Filipović

12.00

— **Marjan SVETLIČIĆ**, Fakultet društvenih nauka, Univerzitet u Ljubljani

Vančo UZUNOV, Biljana PETREVSKA, Pravni fakultet „Justinijan I“ Univerziteta u Skoplju

Fikret ČAUŠEVIĆ, Ekonomski fakultet, Univerzitet u Sarajevu

Josip TICA, Ekonomski fakultet, Sveučilište u Zagrebu

Gordana ĐUROVIĆ, Ekonomski fakultet, Univerzitet Crne Gore

Milica UVALIĆ, Odsek za političke nauke, Univerzitet u Peruđi

SVET OKO NAS

Moderator: Vladimir Mentus

15.30

— **Rastko MOČNIK**, Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Ljubljani

Slavo KUKIĆ, Ekonomski fakultet, Sveučilište u Mostaru

Rubin ZEMON, Centar za napredne studije, Skoplje

Suzana IGNJATOVIĆ, Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd

Hrvoje JURIĆ, Filozofski fakultet, Sveučilište u Zagrebu

Danijela VUKOVIĆ ČALASAN, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet Crne Gore

Subota, 29. oktobar 2022. godine

Institut društvenih nauka, Kraljice Natalije 45, Beograd

ŽIVOT JE TOK

Moderatorka: Milica Joković Pantelić

10.00

— **Čedomir ČUPIĆ**, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu

Lino VELJAK, Filozofski fakultet, Sveučilište u Zagrebu

Sonja TOMOVIĆ ŠUNDIĆ, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet Crne Gore

Petar ATANASOV, Institut za sociološka politička i pravna istraživanja, Skoplje

Renata SALECL, Institut za kriminološka istraživanja, Ljubljana

Zlatiborka POPOV MOMČINOVIĆ, Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Istočnom Sarajevu

ZAKLJUČENJE SKUPA

13.00

Izveštaji moderatora

Irena Ristić, Sanja Filipović, Vladimir Mentus,
Milica Joković Pantelić

Završna reč

Goran BAŠIĆ, direktor Instituta društvenih nauka

OBAVEŠTENJE

- Otvaranje Međunarodne naučne konferencije PROMENE održaće se 27. oktobra 2022. godine u Srpskoj akademiji nauka i umetnosti, u 17 sati, Kneza Mihaila 35, Beograd
<https://goo.gl/maps/YjuHbJmsY56UULUL9>
- Radni deo Konferencije, 28. i 29. oktobra, održava se u Institutu društvenih nauka, Kraljice Natalije 45, Beograd.
<https://goo.gl/maps/kt2vjBBfg5F6ygA29>
- Učesnici Konferencije su smešteni u hotelu „Mark“, Resavska 29, Beograd
<https://g.page/markhotelbelgrade?share>
- Mole se učesnici Konferencije da izlaganja ograniče na 20 minuta. Posle svake sesije sledi diskusija u trajanju od 30 minuta.

PROGRAM

Thursday, 27 October 2022

Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, SASA Club Lounge, Kneza Mihaila 35, Belgrade

CONFERENCE OPENING

5 PM

— **Vladimir S. KOSTIĆ**, SASA President

Representative of the Government of the Republic of Serbia

Jovan BAZIĆ, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Institute of Social Sciences

Goran BAŠIĆ, Director of the Institute of Social Sciences

TIMES OF CHANGES

Chair: Gojko Božović

5.30 PM

— **Vesna GOLDSVORTI**, London

Aleksa ĐILAS, Belgrade

Darko SUVIN, Lucca

7 PM

COCKTAIL

Friday, 28 October 2022

Institute of Social Sciences, Kraljice Natalije 45, Belgrade

LEVIATHAN AND HOMO BALKANICUS

Chair: Irena Ristić

9 AM

— **Dejan JOVIĆ**, Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb

Šaćir FILANDRA, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo

Srđan DARMANOVIĆ, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Montenegro

Ana CUPESKA STANISHKOVSKA, Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus, University in Skopje

Ognjen PRIBIĆEVIĆ, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade

Mitja ŽAGAR, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana

WELFARE STATE vs. NEOLIBERALISM

Chair: Sanja Filipović

12 PM

— **Marjan SVETLIČIĆ**, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana

Vančo UZUNOV, **Biljana PETREVSKA**, Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus, University in Skopje

Fikret ČAUŠEVIĆ, Faculty of Economy, University of Sarajevo

Josip TICA, Faculty of Economy, University of Zagreb

Gordana ĐUROVIĆ, Faculty of Economy, University of Montenegro

Milica UVALIĆ, Department of Political Science, University of Perugia

THE WORLD AROUND US

Chair: Vladimir Mentus

3.30 PM

— **Rastko MOČNIK**, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Ljubljana

Slavo KUKIĆ, Faculty of Economics, University of Mostar

Rubin ZEMON, Centre for Advanced Studies, Skopje

Suzana IGNJATOVIĆ, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade

Hrvoje JURIĆ, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb

Danijela VUKOVIĆ ČALASAN, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Montenegro

Saturday, 29 October 2022

Institute of Social Sciences, Kraljice Natalije 45, Belgrade

LIFE IS A COURSE

Chair: Milica Joković Pantelić

10 AM

— **Čedomir ČUPIĆ**, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade

Lino VELJAK, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb

Sonja TOMOVIĆ ŠUNDIĆ, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Montenegro

Petar ATANASOV, Institute of Sociological, Political and Juridical Research, Skopje

Renata SALECL, Institute of Criminology, Ljubljana

Zlatiborka POPOV MOMČINOVIĆ, Faculty of Philosophy, University of East Sarajevo

CLOSING CEREMONY

1 PM

Sessions' chairs' reports

Irena Ristić, Sanja Filipović, Vladimir Mentus, Milica Joković
Pantelić

Closing address

Goran BAŠIĆ, Director of the Institute of Social Sciences

**KNJIGA SAŽETAKA
BOOK OF ABSTRACTS**

SADRŽAJ | CONTENTS

LEVIJATAN I HOMO BALKANICUS | LEVIATHAN AND HOMO BALKANICUS

- 22 ■ Dejan JOVIĆ
PETEROSTRUKA TRANZICIJA U POSTJUGOSLAVENSKIM ZEMLJAMA: RAZARANJE PRETHODNE DRUŠTVENOSTI U KORIST PERMANENTNE NEIZVJESNOSTI
THE FIVEFOLD TRANSITION IN POST-YUGOSLAV STATES: THE DESTRUCTION OF EARLIER SOCIALITY FOR THE BENEFIT OF PERMANENT UNCERTAINTY
- 26 ■ Šaćir FILANDRA
BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA U POSTJUGOSLAVENSKOM RAZDOBLJU
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE POST-YOUGOSLAV ERA
- 32 ■ Srđan DARMANOVIĆ
CRNA GORA – TRODECENIJSKI SISTEM SA DOMINATNOM PARTIJOM I NJEGOVA PROMJENA
MONTENEGRO – THE THREE DECADES' SYSTEM WITH THE DOMINANT PARTY AND ITS CHANGE
- 36 ■ Ana CHUPESKA STANISHKOVSKA
MAKEDONSKI DEMOKRATSKI (DIS)KONTINUITET
MACEDONIAN DEMOCRATIC (DIS)CONTINUITY
- 40 ■ Ognjen PRIBIĆEVIĆ
IZNEVERENA OČEKIVANJA
BETRAYED EXPECTATIONS
- 48 ■ Mitja ŽAGAR
POMRAČENJE SVETLE BUDUĆNOSTI
THE BRIGHT FUTURE DIMED

DRŽAVA BLAGOSTANJA vs. NEOLIBERALIZAM | WELFARE STATE vs. NEOLIBERALISM

- 58 ■ Marjan SVETLIČIĆ
TRANZICIJA SA ASPEKTA DRŽAVE BLAGOSTANJA I LIBERALIZMA: SLUČAJ SLOVENIJE
TRANSITION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF WELFARE STATE AND LIBERALISM: THE CASE OF SLOVENIA

- 66 ■ **Vančo UZUNOV, Biljana PETREVSKA**
 GENERALNE PROMENE U EKONOMSKOM SISTEMU SEVERNE
 MAKEDONIJE U TOKU TRI DECENIJE SAMOSTALNOSTI
 GENERAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF
 NORTH MACEDONIA DURING THE THREE DECADES OF ITS
 INDEPENDENCE
- 70 ■ **Fikret ČAUŠEVIĆ**
 GLOBALNI EKONOMSKI POREDAK I ODRŽIVOST DRŽAVE
 BLAGOSTANJA
 GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE
 WELFARE STATE
- 78 ■ **Josip TICA**
 POLITIKE EKONOMSKOG RASTA IZMEĐU PROSJEKA I
 DISTRIBUCIJE
 ECONOMIC GROWTH POLICIES BETWEEN AVERAGE AND
 DISTRIBUTION
- 82 ■ **Gordana ĐUROVIĆ**
 TRI DECENIJE TRANZICIJE U CRNOJ GORI: EKONOMSKI
 ASPEKTI I PERIODIZACIJA
 THREE DECADES OF TRANSITION IN MONTENEGRO:
 ECONOMIC ASPECTS AND PERIODISATION
- 90 ■ **Milica UVALIĆ**
 EKONOMSKE PROMENE U REGIONU ZAPADNOG BALKANA
 I SRBIJI
 ECONOMIC CHANGES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS AND
 SERBIA

SVET OKO NAS | THE WORLD AROUND US

- 96 ■ **Rastko MOČNIK**
 TRANSFORMATIVNI PROCESI I NJIHOVI UČINCI
 TRANSFORMATIVE PROCESSES AND THEIR EFFECTS
- 100 ■ **Slavo KUKIĆ**
 ETNONACIONALIZAM – NAJKANCEROGENIJA PRIJETNJA
 BIH KAO DRŽAVI I DRUŠTVU
 ETHNONATIONALISM – THE MOST CARCINOGENIC THREAT
 TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AS A STATE AND SOCIETY

- 108 ■ **Rubin ZEMON**
SEVERNA MAKEDONIJA KAO ZEMLJA VELIKOG DRUŠTENOG
DIVERZITETA, KONTROVERZI I IZAZOVA
NORTH MACEDONIA A COUNTRY OF BIG SOCIAL DIVERSITY,
CONTROVERSIES AND CHALLENGES
- 116 ■ **Suzana IGNJATOVIĆ**
TRIDESET GODINA TRANZICIJE U SRBIJI IZMEĐU
RETRADICIONALIZACIJE I REFLEKSIVNE MODERNIZACIJE
THIRTY YEARS OF TRANSITION IN SERBIA BETWEEN
RETRADITIONALISATION AND REFLEXIVE MODERNISATION
- 124 ■ **Hrvoje JURIĆ**
HRVATSKA IZMEĐU EUFORIJE I EUTANAZIJE
CROATIA BETWEEN EUPHORIA AND EUTHANASIA
- 132 ■ **Danijela VUKOVIĆ ČALASAN**
KOHEZIVNOST U DOBA PLURALIZACIJE – IZMEĐU
RAZLIČITOSTI I JEDINSTVA
COHESIVENESS IN THE ERA OF PLURALISATION – BETWEEN
DIVERSITY AND UNITY
- ŽIVOT JE TOK | LIFE IS A COURSE**
- 142 ■ **Čedomir ČUPIĆ**
VREDNOSTI I PROMENE POLITIČKOG I DRUŠTENOG
PORETKA
THE VALUES AND CHANGES IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORDER
- 146 ■ **Lino VELJAK**
PROMJENE U VRIJEDNOSNIM ORIJENTACIJAMA U
HRVATSKOJ
CHANGES IN VALUE ORIENTATIONS IN CROATIA
- 154 ■ **Sonja TOMOVIĆ ŠUNDIĆ**
KRIZA POLITIČKE KULTURE U SAVREMENOM DRUŠTVU
CRISIS OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
- 158 ■ **Petar ATANASOV**
DRUŠTVENI KONFLIKT IZMEĐU DRŽAVE I DRUŠTAVA
SOCIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE AND SOCIETIES

- 166 ■ **Renata SALECL**
PRAVO NA APATIJU?
THE RIGHT TO APATHY?
- 170 ■ **Zlatiborka POPOV MOMČINOVIĆ**
VREDNOSTI U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI
VALUES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

LEVIJATAN I HOMO
BALCANICUS

LEVIATHAN AND HOMO
BALCANICUS

PETEROSTRUKA TRANZICIJA U POSTJUGOSLAVENSKIM ZEMLJAMA: RAZARANJE PRETHODNE DRUŠTVENOSTI U KORIST PERMANENTNE NEIZVJESNOSTI

U ovom izlaganju polazimo od teze o peterostrukoj tranziciji koja je zahvatila Jugoslaviju u zadnjim godinama prije njena raspada, te se nastavila u zemljama postjugoslavenskog prostora. Za razliku od ranijih tranzicijskih valova (latinoameričkih i južnoevropskih) koji su bili označeni kao „jednostruka“ ili „dvostruka“ tranzicija (ovisno o tome jesu li promjene bile političke ili i ekonomske), te paralelnog tranzicijskog vala u nekadašnjoj Istočnoj Evropi (u kojima se postavilo i pitanje tranzicije suverenosti/državnosti, te identitetske tranzicije), u slučaju bivše Jugoslavije peti je element tranzicije uključivao tranziciju iz mira u rat i potom iz rata u mir. Tako složena tranzicija je zapravo izrazito razorila bitne elemente postojeće (ali sada, nakon 1989. godine, navodno nemoguće, *politički nekorektne*) društvenosti, do razine *kaosa* i *anarhije*. Taj je kaos – barem djelomično – namjerno stvaran kako bi se razorili oni elementi postojećeg sistema koji su mogli ograničiti samovolju novih moćnih aktera. Antisistemsko djelovanje – za koje su postojale pretpostavke već u starom socijalističkom sistemu koji je sebe tretirao kao permanentnu tranziciju iz klasnog u besklasno društvo – nastavljeno je i intenzivirano nakon *nacionalnih revolucija* iz 1990. i 1991. U ovom izlaganju dajemo kratki osvrt na sadašnje stanje stvari u vezi s peterostrukom tranzicijom, a naročito iz perspektive odnosa aktera i struktura u postjugoslavenskim državama. Glavno istraživačko pitanje je: da li je neki do ovih pet procesa (politička, ekonomska, državna, identitetska i sigurnosna tranzicija) završen ili barem približno završen, ili su svi i dalje ostavljeni „otvorenima“, kao permanentni izvori daljnjeg antisistemskog djelovanja? Pred kraj izlaganja dovest ćemo u vezu ovu analizu s tezom o „stabilokratiji“, postavljajući pitanje: da li je *stabilokratija* opis stanja ili je politički program u kojem se namjerno proizvedena neizvjesnost „rješava“ autokratskim djelovanjem aktera – pri čemu pod akterima ne smatramo samo one „vidljive“ nego i one koji djeluju iz dubine sistema, ali svejedno antisistemski.

THE FIVEFOLD TRANSITION IN POST-YUGOSLAV STATES: THE DESTRUCTION OF EARLIER SOCIALITY FOR THE BENEFIT OF PERMANENT UNCERTAINTY

In this presentation, we start from the thesis of the fivefold transition that seized Yugoslavia in the final years before its dissolution, and then continued in the countries of post-Yugoslav region. Unlike earlier transitional waves (Latin-American and Southern-European) designated as “single”, or “twofold” transitions (depending on whether the changes were political, or also economic), and the simultaneous transition wave in Eastern Europe of the time (which involved the transition of sovereignty/statehood, and identity transition), in the case of former Yugoslavia, the fifth element of the transition involved transition from peace into war, and subsequently, from war into peace. Such a complex transition actually destroyed major elements of the existing (yet now, after 1989, supposedly impossible, *politically incorrect*) sociality, to the level of *chaos and anarchy*. This chaos was – at least partly – created on purpose in order to undermine those elements of the existing system that could have limited the highhandedness of the new powerful actors. Anti-systemic action – for which preconditions had already existed in the earlier socialist system which perceived itself as a permanent transition from class to classless society – continued and intensified after the national revolutions of 1990/91. In this presentation, we provide a short overview of the current condition when it comes to the fivefold transition, especially from the perspective of the relationships between actors and structures in post-Yugoslav states. The main research question is: Has any of these five processes (political, economic, statehood, identity and security transition) been completed, or at least nearly completed, or all of them have remained “open” still, as a permanent source of further anti-systemic action? In the final part of the presentation, we will connect this analysis with that of stabilitocracy, asking whether stabilitocracy is a way to describe the condition, or a political program where intentionally created suspense is solved through autocratic actions by actors – where these actors are not only those “visible”, but also those acting from within the depths of the system, but still anti-systemically.

Šaćir FILANDRA
Fakultet političkih nauka
Univerzitet u Sarajevu

BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA U POSTJUGOSLAVENSKOM RAZDOBLJU

Bosna i Hercegovina je i zbiljski i praktički uspješno prebrodila krizu i raspad jugoslavenske socijalističke zajednice. Tome se mnogi nisu nadali, s obzirom na dužu savremenu historiju njenog političkog, pa i vojnog osporavanja, a mnogi sa takvim rješenjem ni danas nisu sretni, imajući u vidu aktualnu nacionalističku ideologiju u zemlji koja sasvim otvoreno radi na defunkcionalizaciji države, sve do njenog rasturanja. Izvanjski legitimitet države danas je osiguran, njen suverenitet je podijeljen sa insitucijom međunarodne zajednice, Visokim predstavnikom, dok je njen ključni problem gradnja unutrašnjeg legitimiteta, emocionalnog i političkog. Pitanje je kada će se i kako, kojim snagama, na kojim principima te na kakvim političkim i civilizacijskim vrijednostima Bosna i Hercegovina konstituirati kao politička zajednica. Ko su akteri takve promjene, te odakle oni dolaze? Da li postoje društvene pretpostavke političkim promjenama u siromašnoj zemlji opterećenoj korupcijom i nepovjerenjem u njene institucije?

Bosna i Hercegovina se nakon sticanja državne neovisnosti našla na „vjetrometini“, usamljena i osamljena, izvan natkriljujućih institucionalnih okvira, imperijalnih i saveznih federalnih nekada, tako da danas u euroatlanskim integracijama priželjkuje svoju mirnu luku. Toga su svjesni i njeni osporavatelji koji neprestano posljednje tri decenije priječe njenu unutarnju konsolidaciju koja je pretpostavka evropskih integracija. Otvoreno bosansko pitanje, a otvorenim ga drže prije svega nacionalistički elementi iz Beograda i Zagreba, prerasta u političko i sigurnosno regionalno pitanje te posredno priječi demokratsku kosolidaciju Bosni okružujućih društava.

Politički život zemlje, ustrojen po formalnim principima liberalne demokratije, determiniran je ustavom zemlje koji sam po sebi, s obzirom na karakter i uvjete njegova nastanka, promovira etnokolektivističke umjesto individualnih političkih principa i vrijednosti, te je njegova nadogradnja nužan uvjet daljnjeg političkog razvoja. Istina, ni za minimalne nadogradnje ustava, koje bi ciljale na funkcionalizaciju zemlje i poboljšanje pretpostavki života građana i uvođenje principa građanske države, nema političkih uvjeta. Kao ključno pitanje postavlja se odnos općeg/zajedničkog/državnog i posebnog/etničkog. Budući da je bosansko pitanje izvan djelatnog dosega relevantnih međunarodnih faktora, budući da su njihovi napori za reformu zemlje propali prije petnaest godina, te da je proces proširenja Evropske unije na područje Zapadnog Balkana stao, ako ne i prestao, ideologije koje odnos općeg i posebnog nastoje riješiti u pravcu dalje i dublje podjele zemlje, jačanja etničkog u odnosu na političko, trenutno su u jakoj poziciji. Da je Bosna i Hercegovina još „krhka“ zemlja svjedoči i naglašen utjecaj međunarodnih geostrateških pomjeranja u svijetu koja se snažno reflektiraju na ponašanje političkih aktera u zemlji.

Šaćir FILANDRA

Faculty of Political Sciences
University of Sarajevo

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE POST-YOUGOSLAV ERA

Bosnia and Herzegovina has truly and practically overcome the crisis and dissolution of the Yugoslav socialist community. Many did not expect that, considering a longer contemporary history of the country's political, as well as military challenges, and many are not happy with such outcome either, even today, bearing in mind the present nationalist ideology in the country which quite openly works on defunctionalisation of the state, trying to dissolve it. External legitimacy of the state is now secured, its sovereignty divided with the international community institution of High Commissioner, while BiH's crucial problem is building of inner legitimacy, both emotional and political. The question is when and how, with what strengths, upon which principles and which political and civilizational values, Bosnia and Herzegovina would be constituted as a political community. Who are the actors in this change, and from where do they come? Are there social preconditions for political changes in a poor country burdened by corruption and mistrust in its institutions?

After gaining its state independence, Bosnia and Herzegovina was caught between a rock and a hard place, alone and lonely, outside of the overarching institutional frameworks, once imperial then federal, so today, it hopes for its peaceful harbour under the auspices of Euro-Atlantic integrations. This is also realised by its opponents, who have constantly, for three decades, obstructed its inner consolidation which is a precondition for the European integrations. The opened Bosnian question, and it indeed remains open primarily through dealings by the nationalist elements from Belgrade and Zagreb, becomes a regional political and security issue, implicitly preventing democratic consolidation of BiH's neighbouring societies.

The political life of the country is organised according to the formal principles of liberal democracy, yet it has also been determined by the state's constitution which in itself, bearing in mind the character and conditions of its adoption, promotes ethno-collectivist, instead of individual political principles and values, so its upgrading is a necessary precondition of future political development. In truth, there are no political conditions for even the tiniest upgrades of the constitution, aimed at making the country more functional and improving the citizen's lives by introducing the principles of civil state. Positioned as the crucial question is that of the relationship between general/common/state and separate/ethnic. Bearing in mind that the Bosnian question is outside the scope of action of the relevant international factors, since their efforts to make reforms to the country failed some fifteen years ago, and that the process of widening of the EU to the region of Western Balkans has been paused, if not indeed stopped, the ideologies that try to tilt the relationship between general and separate to-

wards a further and deeper division of the country and strengthen the ethnic at the expense of the political, have currently been in a strong position. That Bosnia and Herzegovina is still a “frail” state is also evidenced by the pronounced impact of international geostrategic movements in the world, which are strongly reflected in the behaviour of political actors in the country.

CRNA GORA – TRODECENIJSKI SISTEM SA DOMINANTNOM PARTIJOM I NJEGOVA PROMJENA

Od ukidanja jednopartijske vladavine 1990. godine Crna Gora je pune tri decenije imala tzv. *višepartijski sistem sa dominantnom partijom*. Vladavina dominantne partije – Demokratske partije socijalista (DPS) prošla je kroz barem dva distinktna perioda. Prvi je trajao od 1990. do 1997. godine i imao je sva obilježja *kompetitivnog autoritarizma*. To je period zaustavljene ili u najboljem slučaju usporene demokratske tranzicije. On se poklapa sa savezništvom DPS-a sa Miloševićevim režimom i njegovom partijom. U drugom periodu od 1997. do 2020. godine autoritarne karakteristike poretka su slabile (ne i sasvim nestale), ali Crna Gora nikada nije uspostavila poredak koji uobičajeno nazivamo liberalno-demokratskim.

U ovom periodu imali smo sistem koji bismo, u najboljem slučaju, mogli nazvati *izbornom demokratijom*. Kompeticija među političkim akterima je bila stvarna, nije bilo pokušaja uzurpacije izborne volje građana, transfer vlasti na lokalnim izborima je vršen rutinski, a u krajnjemu je tako bilo i nakon velikog izbornog preokreta u avgustu 2020. Izborna demokratija je oznaka za poredak u kojemu je politička kompeticija manje-više regularna, ali ga od liberalne demokratije razdvaja jedna ključna činjenica – izrazita slabost *vladavine prava*.

U ovom radu objasnićemo ovaj dugi period vladavine dominantne partije i razloge (faktore) njenog poraza nakon pune tri decenije. Takođe ćemo ispitati i osnovne karakteristike novonastale situacije nakon izbora od avgusta 2020. godine i naznake o političkom poretku koji je u nastajanju.

Ključne riječi: demokratska tranzicija, kompetitivni autoritarizam, izborna demokratija, liberalna demokratija, dominantna partija, Demokratska partija socijalista (DPS)

MONTENEGRO – THE THREE DECADES' SYSTEM WITH THE DOMINANT PARTY AND ITS CHANGE

Since the abolishment of the one-party rule in 1990, for three full decades, Montenegro had so-called *multiparty system with a dominant party*. The rule of the dominant party – Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) had at least two distinctive periods. The first lasted from 1990 to 1997 and had all the characteristics of *competitive authoritarianism*. This was a period of arrested, or at best slowed down democratic transition. It corresponded with the DPS's alliance with the regime of Slobodan Milošević and his party. In the second period, 1997–2020, the authoritarian characteristics of the order were weakening (but were not entirely gone), yet Montenegro never established the order that we usually call liberal democracy.

In this period, we had a system which we could, at best, call *elective democracy*. Competition among the political actors was real, there were no attempts to usurp the electoral will of the citizens, transfers of power at local elections were routine, and, finally, this was also the case after the great election turn around in August 2020. Elective democracy is the name for a system in which political competence is more or less regular, but it is distinguished from liberal democracy by a key characteristic – an extreme weakness of the *rule of law*.

In this paper, we will explain the second period in the dominant party's government, as well as the reasons (factors) of its defeat after three full decades. We will also examine the main characteristics of the situation that emerged after the elections of August 2020, and some indications of the political order in the making.

Keywords: democratic transition, competitive authoritarianism, elective democracy, liberal democracy, dominant party, Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS)

MAKEDONSKI DEMOKRATSKI (DIS)KONTINUITET

Ne postoji demokratija koja se može konsolidovati za sva vremena i demokratske trajektorije država širom sveta nemaju uvek linearnu progresiju – baš naprotiv: i stare, kao i mlade demokratije mogu se suočiti sa senkom totalitarizma, ili tzv. demokratskim nazadovanjem, autoritarnim populizmom, neliberalizmom, demokratskim diskontinuitetom, i drugim manifestacijama tenzija, deformacija, ili čak kontradikcija unutar demokratije. Ova vrsta društveno-političke (i fenomenološke) dinamike koja se vezuje za demokratiju dovodi nas do pretpostavke da „demokratizacija same demokratije“ može biti jedan od mnogih preduslova za njen suštinski napredak i zahtevati da o demokratiji razmišljamo kao o Deridinoj demokratiji koja će doći (*a venire*). U ovom duhu, Republika Makedonija (danas Severna Makedonija) kao tek jedna od šest zemalja naslednica SFR Jugoslavije, stekla je svoju nezavisnost mirnim putem bez umešanosti u tadašnje oružane sukobe, ali je imala sopstveni, specifični razvoj. Iako se izbegavanje rata u veoma napetoj situaciji koja je u regionu vladala devedesetih godina prošlog veka može legitimno okarakterisati kao veliki politički uspeh, prelazak države na demokratsko uređenje ipak nije tekao glatko, a demokratska trajektorija zemlje imala je određeni (dis)kontinuitet. Duboko ideološki i kulturno podeljeno makedonsko društvo često je komplikovalo demokratske procese, prolazeći kroz ozbiljne političke nestabilnosti, dok je istovremeno pokušavalo da održi politički kontinuitet, makar prividno. Ključne godine za makedonsku demokratsku državotvornost, iako problematične, ako imamo u vidu epizode diskontinuiteta (od kojih je najproblematičnija u vezi sa autoritarnim populizmom režima Gruevskog), vezuju se za četiri demokratski konstitutivna perioda i određene istorijske događaje: I ASNOM¹ 1945. (sa uspostavljanjem Prve republike kao Socijalističke Republike Makedonije); II Referendum o nezavisnosti 1991. i usvajanje *Ustava nezavisne Republike Makedonije* [Druga republika]; III Potpisivanje *Ohridskog okvirnog sporazuma* 2001. i konstituisanje multikulturno akomodativnog političkog sistema (Treća republika); IV *Prespanski sporazum* i konačno razrešenje spora oko imena sa Grčkom, kao i članstvo Severne Makedonije u NATO koje je usledilo.

¹ Skraćenica ASNOM odnosi se na Antifašističku skupštinu za narodno oslobođenje Makedonije (makedonski: Антифашистичко Собрание за Народно Ослободување на Македонија).

MACEDONIAN DEMOCRATIC (DIS)CONTINUITY

There is no such democracy that can be consolidated once and for all and democratic trajectories of states around the world do not always have a linear progression – quite the contrary: many old democracies, as well as those younger, can be faced with its totalitarian shadows or so-called democratic backslide, authoritarian populism, illiberalism, democratic discontinuity and other manifestations of inherent democratic tensions, deformations and even contradictions. This kind of socio-political (and phenomenological) dynamism associated with democracy, bring us to the supposition that “*democratization of democracy itself*” could be one of many preconditions for its substantive progress and invite us to think about democracy in Derridean terms, as of democracy to come (*a venire*). In that spirit, too, Republic of Macedonia (today North Macedonia) as only one, out of the six successor counties of SFR Yugoslavia, gained peaceful independence without being engaged in an armed conflict at the time, but it experienced its own specific developments. Although the war avoidance in the highly tense regional circumstances typical for the period of 1990s could be legitimately proclaimed as a major political success, the country’s transition to democracy, however, did not go smoothly, and its democratic trajectory had faced certain (dis)continuities. Being deeply divided ideologically and culturally, Macedonian society often complicated the democratic processes, challenged by serious political uncertainties, while at the same time, it was trying to keep the democratic continuity at least apparently. The key years of Macedonian democratic statehood embodiment, although hard to handle having in mind the discontinuity episodes (of which the most pronounced one is related to authoritarian populism exhibited under Gruevski regime), are related to four democratic constitutive periods linked to certain historical events: I. ASNOM¹ in 1945 (with the establishment of the first republic, as the Socialist Republic of Macedonia); II. The Independence Referendum in 1991 and the adoption of the *Constitution of independent Republic of Macedonia* (The Second Republic); III. Signing of the *Ohrid Framework Agreement* in 2001 and constituting multicultural accommodative political system (The Third Republic); IV. The *Prespa Agreement* and final resolution of the name dispute with Greece and consequent NATO membership of North Macedonia.

¹ abbr. ASNOM refers to the Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia (Macedonian: Антифашистичко Собрание за Народно Ослободување на Македонија).

IZNEVERENA OČEKIVANJA

Od rušenja autoritarnog režima u Srbiji 2000. ostvarene su značajne promene. Srbija se vratila u međunarodnu zajednicu, uspostavila sistem višepartijskog sistema, nema više političkih ubistava. U poslednjih nekoliko godina puno se ulaže u izgradnju infrastrukture; puteva i bolnica.

Međutim, propuštena je šansa da Srbija postane istinski demokratska zemlja. Postoje veliki demokratski deficiti u odnosu vlasti i opozicije, u domenu slobode medija, pravne države, a pre svega problem korupcije nije rešen. Prema ocenama kredibilnih međunarodnih agencija Srbija se svrstava u poludemokratske zemlje. Srbija ne ispunjava nijedan od dva najvažnija kriterijuma za normalno funkcionisanje višepartijskog demokratskog sistema: izbori nisu neizvesni, a ulozi su preveliki.

U prethodnih dvadeset godina Srbija je pokušala praktično sve da dostigne zapadne standarde demokratskog društva. Duže od jedne od decenije smo imali različite prozapadne vlade, probalo se sa politikom istorijskog pomirenja između partija ranijeg autoritarnog režima i novih demokratskih opcija. Nažalost, Srbija je dostigla neki svoj maksimum i teško može dalje bez radikalne promene međunarodnog položaja i statusa. Devedesetih godina ona je krenula u suprotnom smeru od praktično čitavog sveta, slično Albaniji nakon Drugog svetskog rata i trebaće još decenija da bi se vratila na pravi put.

Na sadašnje nepovoljno stanje u kome se nalazi uticali su pre svega njen krajnje nepovoljan geografski položaj, gde je ona oduvek bila predmet sukobljavanja velikih sila, poput današnjeg sukoba između Rusije i Zapada, kao i nerešen problem Kosova i Metohije, ali tu je problem i autoritarna politika Slobodana Miloševića koja je Srbiju unazadila gotovo čitav vek.

Najnovije zaoštavanje oko Ukrajine i napad Rusije na tu zemlju vratili su naš region u fokus velikih sila. Tako je Zapadni Balkan, umesto da je još pre dve decenije postao deo evroatlanskih integracija, ponovo postao poprište sučeljavanja i takmičenja velikih sila. Najveću odgovornost za ovaj neuspeh spoljne politike Zapada snosi EU u čijem je prevashodnom interesu bilo da što pre zaokruži svoj prostor učlanjenjem zemalja ZB. Geografski, istorijski, kulturno ovaj prostor je deo Evrope i EU je morala da spreči druge sile da uđu u „njeno dvorište“ i počnu da potkopavaju integracije i institucije Zapada. Potpuno neubedljivo i birokratski zvuči često ponavljana poruka Brisela da su integracije dvo-smerni proces i da Srbija i druge zemlje Zapadnog Balkana moraju isto tako da urade svoj deo posla kada su u pitanju suverenitet i stabilnost BiH, normalizacija odnosa između Beograda i Prištine, izgradnja pravne države, sloboda medija, odnos između vlasti i opozicije. Da su mogle i umele zemlje Zapadnog Balkana bi učinile više, ali nisu. Na to su uticali brojni razlozi počev od istorijskih i kulturoloških, ali ove zemlje su

iz mnoštva razloga ostale manje razvijene od vodećih zemalja EU i na njima je bilo da preuzmu inicijativu i uključe zemlje ZB u svoje članstvo. Nema nikakve sumnje da je to bio jedini put da se reše ne samo problemi ekonomske i demokratske nerazvijenosti nego i rešavanja problema Kosova i BiH.

S druge strane, Srbija je sledeći svoje interese kada su u pitanju problem Kosova, energetika, investicija u infrastrukturu i nabavka vakcine nakon izbijanja velike epidemije korona virusauspostavila bliske odnose sa Rusijom i Kinom.

Međutim, i pored interesa za saradnjom sa Rusijom i Kinom, Srbija mora voditi računa i o tome da Zapad područje Zapadnog Balkana smatra svojom interesnom zonom, što je i očigledno, kada se ima u vidu da su sve zemlje regiona Zapadnog Balkana na putu ka EU, a Albanija, Severna Makedonija i Crna Gora u NATO-u i da neće dozvoliti promenu takvog stanja bez nekog šireg dogovora sa Rusijom. Mimo tog dogovora promena postojećeg stanja je moguća samo uz upotrebu sile što bi imalo katastrofalne posledice po sve zemlje regiona. Događaji u Ukrajini su najbolji primer šta se dešava kada Rusija ili Zapad pokušaju da promene postojeće stanje na područjima koja imaju stratešku važnost bez prethodnog dogovora sa drugom stranom. Očekivano je da do takvog razvoja događaja neće doći, ali se u tom smislu mora i politički delovati, kako bi se održali dobri odnosi sa svim velikim silama i koliko je god moguće uvažile njihove sfere uticaja i interesi.

Ključne reči: strategija, demokratija, Srbija, EU, SAD, Rusija, Zapadni Balkan

BETRAYED EXPECTATIONS

Since the toppling of the regime in 2000, Serbia has undergone significant changes. It has since returned to the international community, instituted a multi-party system, and eradicated the phenomenon of political assassinations. In the past several years, infrastructure has been the subject of significant investments, e.g. roads, hospitals, etc.

However, Serbia missed its chance to become a genuinely democratic country. Significant deficiencies persist vis-a-vis democracy in Serbia, particularly in the relationship between the government and the opposition, media freedom, the rule of law, and above all, the issue of corruption, which remains unresolved. According to credible international agencies, Serbia is considered a semi-democratic country. Serbia does not meet either of the two main criteria for the normal functioning of the multi-party democratic system: elections are not unpredictable, and the stakes are too high.

In the past twenty years, Serbia has made virtually every effort to achieve the Western standards of a democratic society. Various pro-western governments were in power for over a decade, and attempts were made to reconcile the parties of the former authoritarian regime and new pro-democracy parties. Unfortunately, Serbia seems to have reached its maximum and can hardly go on without radically shifting its international position and status. In the 1990s, Serbia took a direction opposite to virtually the rest of the world, similar to what Albania did following World War II, and it will take decades before it gets back on track.

The roots of Serbia's current disadvantageous position should primarily be sought in its extremely unfavourable geographical position – serving as the stage for conflicts between great powers such as the ongoing conflict between Russia and the West – the unresolved issue of Kosovo and Metohija, and the authoritarian regime headed by Slobodan Milošević, which set Serbia back by nearly a century.

The latest escalation of conflict in Ukraine and Russia's aggression on the country has put our region back in the focus of great powers. As a result, instead of going through the Euro-Atlantic integration process two decades ago, the Western Balkans again serve as the scene of confrontation and feuding between the great powers. The EU, whose overriding interest was to allow the accession of the Western Balkans countries as soon as possible, bears primary responsibility for the failure of Western foreign policy. Geographically, historically, and culturally, this region is a part of Europe, and the EU has an obligation to prevent other powers from "trespassing" and undermining integration processes and institutions of the West. In that context, the message often heard in Brussels seems utterly unconvincing and bureaucratic: about the European integration being a two-way process and insist-

ing that Serbia and other Western Balkans countries must play their part when it comes to sovereignty and stability of BiH, normalisation of Belgrade-Priština relations, promotion of the rule of law, media freedom, and the relations between the government and the opposition. If the Western Balkans countries had been able to do more, they would have, but they didn't. The reasons for this, both historical and cultural, are numerous, leaving these countries at a lower level of development compared with leading EU countries, which is why it was up to the latter to take the initiative and admit the Western Balkans in the EU. There is no doubt that was the only way to deal with the issues of economic and democratic underdevelopment and the issues of Kosovo and BiH.

On the other hand, Serbia has pursued its interests regarding the issue of Kosovo, energy, investments in infrastructure, and purchase of vaccines amid the great epidemic of COVID-19, maintaining close relations with Russia and China.

While Serbia should protect its interests in working with Russia and China, it must keep in mind that the West sees Western Balkans as one of its areas of interest. With all Western Balkans countries on the EU path and with Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro in NATO, the West won't allow the present situation to change without some sort of a broader agreement with Russia. Apart from the said agreement, a shift in the current situation would be possible only by force, which would have catastrophic consequences for all countries in the region. The developments in Ukraine serve as the prime example of what happens when Russia or the West attempt to alter the situation in regions of strategic importance without prior agreement with the other side. Although it is to be expected that such a development of events will not occur, the situation nevertheless calls for political action to maintain good relations with all great powers and act in accordance with their respective spheres of influence and interests to the greatest extent possible.

Keywords: strategy, democracy, Serbia, EU, USA, Russia, Western Balkans

POMRAČENJE SVETLE BUDUĆNOSTI

U jednom sasvim drugačijem svetu, tokom devedesetih i ranih dveihljaditih, postojao je izvesni optimizam u pogledu budućnosti i nastupajućeg razvoja. Proglasivši pobjedu liberalne demokratije nakon pada Berlinskog zida, neki su govorili o kraju istorije kakvu smo poznavali. Mnogi su imali velika očekivanja da će se demokratizacija, inkluzija i demokratska participacija, kako pojedinaca, tako u makar nekim slučajevima i različitih manjina, zasebnih zajednica i grupa, širiti i razvijati. Tvrdili su da je budućnost svetla. Ipak, već tada, određeni naučnici koji su proučavali događaje u nekadašnjoj Jugoslaviji i Sovjetskom Savezu tokom kasnih osamdesetih, kao i raspad ovih država, detektovali su sve veću socijalnu distancu i eskalaciju etničkih i drugih sukoba koji su, naročito na postjugoslovenskom prostoru eskalirali kroz tragične ratove devedesetih. Naša upozorenja da ovi događaji i izvesni globalni trendovi, makar u određenim svojim karakteristikama, podsećaju na istorijske događaje tokom dvadesetih i ranih tridesetih godina prošlog veka koji su kulminirali razarajućim Drugim svetskim ratom, ignorisana su (u velikoj meri), a ponekad čak i ismevana. Isto su doživeli i naučnici koji su prikupljali sve jače i ubedljivije dokaze o problemima u vezi sa ekologijom/životnom sredinom, globalnim zagrevanjem i klimatskom krizom, i dokazali da su ih ljudi izazvali, ili makar doveli do njihove eskalacije, a naročito naša ekonomska aktivnost kojom se ovaj geološki period određuje kao antropocen. U svetu finansijskog kapitalizma i konzumerizma, koji su se sve više širili zemaljskom kuglom, stalni i neograničeni ekonomski rast, kao i povremeni prividni trijumfi demokratije (kao što je pad Miloševićevog režima u Srbiji), slavljani su i hvaljeni kao glasnici svetle budućnosti. Zanimajući sve veće probleme i krize, kao i sve naučne dokaze, vladajuće ekonomske i političke elite i dalje proglašavaju stalno rastuća tržišta, akcije, profite i potrošnju kao najznačajniji etalon uspeha i svetle budućnosti. Pa ipak, realnost 2022. je mnogo mračnija.

Nema sumnje da ekološki i klimatski uticaj ljudi pojačava globalno zagrevanje i pogoršava ekološke i klimatske probleme i krize, pa tako doprinosi i masovnom istrebljenju koje je pretnja za budućnost same ljudske vrste i život na Zemlji u celini. Bez obzira na sve samite, političke deklaracije, pravna dokumenta i planove, akcije, mi gotovo da ne činimo ništa na rešavanju ovih problema. Naučnici upozoravaju da čak ni najstroži standardi koji su dogovoreni, niti najradikalniji planovi koje su proglasile pojedine zemlje i međunarodna zajednica, neće zadržati globalno zagrevanje u ovom veku u okvirima zadatog cilja od $+1,5^{\circ}\text{C}$. Pored toga, najnovija istraživanja pokazuju da ograničenje globalnog zagrevanja na $+1,5^{\circ}\text{C}$ možda neće sprečiti određene kataklizmične promene i posledice koje prete, a potencijalno mogu i uništiti našu civilizaciju. Pa ipak, kao što vidimo, vladajuće elite i većina ekonomista, čak i u postkovid periodu, nastavljaju da kao rešenje nude (neograničen, ili delimično ograničen) ekonomski rast koji dominantno doprinosi

eskalaciji ekoloških i klimatskih problema i kriza. Oni kao da ignorišu narodnu mudrost da se problem ne može rešiti primenom istih alata i metoda koji su taj problem i izazvali, te da bi se samo budala odlučila za takav način rešavanja problema.

Kao što smo već pomenuli, poslednjih godina svet se suočio sa još jednom globalnom krizom – pandemijom virusa korona. Ova zdravstvena kriza sa brojnim i raznolikim zdravstvenim, društvenim, kulturnim i ekonomskim posledicama i implikacijama, ukazala je na ranjivost savremenog sveta, društava i našeg načina života. Bez sumnje su ljudska ekspanzija (urbanizacija, širenje naročito industrijske i monokulturne poljoprivrede koja ignoriše ekološke i druge posledice i ograničenja, ekonomska ekspanzija i neograničeni rast), hegemono ponašanje, zagađenje, konzumerizam i pohlepa (želja da se ima sve više i više naročito materijalnih dobara i da se uspostavi dominacija nad svetom prirode i životnom sredinom) koji za rezultat imaju smanjivanje i uništenje habitata divljih životinja, kao i intenzivirani kontakti/interakcije/konflikti sa divljim životinjskim vrstama i različiti načini života koji ne poštuju prirodu i divlje životinje, povećali verovatnoću za prenošenje patogeno, epidemija i pandemija između vrsta. I ponovo su elite i javnost ignorisali upozorenja naučnika i društvenih, a naročito ekoloških aktivista da su takve krize, uključujući smrtonosne pandemije, neizbežne ukoliko ne promenimo način života, stavove i ponašanje, i prihvatimo da predstavljamo integralni i ranjivi deo naše životne sredine, prirode i života.

Devedesetih godina prošlog veka i na početku novog milenijuma, većina optimista je verovala da se Hladni rat završio i ne bi mogli da zamisle veliki međunarodni rat u Evropi 2022. Na Zapadu je nakon Hladnog rata, makar deklarativno, Rusija smatrana za potencijalnog partnera, možda čak i saveznika. Usled entuzijazma zbog (formalnog) uvođenja kapitalizma i (političke, višepartijske) demokratije u Rusiju, oni nisu razumeli trendove i stvarni razvoj događaja u ovom složenom društvu, i ignorisali su ili (usled svojih specifičnih realnih interesa) tolerisali očigledne znakove autoritarizma i jačanje uloge i (gotovo apsolutne) moći Vladimira Putina (koji je sebe nedavno uporedio sa carom Petrom Velikim). Istovremeno, oni nisu obratili pažnju na njegova upozorenja da širenje NATO pakta smatra direktnom pretnjom po ruske interese i bezbednost, što je logična posledica njegovog stava/percepcije da je raspad Sovjetskog Saveza (kao naslednika Ruskog carstva) bio najveća istorijska greška i nepravda. U ovom kontekstu, ruska agresija i rat sa Ukrajinom deluju logično i možda se neće uskoro završiti. U svakom slučaju, ovaj rat dovodi, ili makar doprinosi jednoj velikoj globalnoj bezbednosnoj, političkoj, ekonomskoj, humanitarnoj, ekološkoj i klimatskoj krizi.

Napokon, iz perspektive Balkana i političkih događaja na njemu, moraju se posmatrati skorašnji i trenutni globalni i regionalni, politički i socijalni trendovi i događaji. Umesto dalje demokratizacije, inkluzije, političke i društvene participacije, razvoja i širenja ljudskih prava i

(osnovnih) sloboda, poslednjih godina (moguće čak i decenija, još od 9. septembra 2001) došlo je do pojave i konsolidovanja autoritarnih i totalitarnih tendencija i režima u različitim zemljama, ograničavanja i ukidanja ljudskih prava, povećanog socijalnog i političkog isključivanja, slabljenja demokratije i ljudskih prava takođe i u nekim tradicionalno demokratskim društvima, pojave i jačanja neliberalnih demokratija i režima, obnove nacionalizma i sve veće netolerancije, itd.

THE BRIGHT FUTURE DIMED

In a very different world, in the 1990s and early 2000s there was some optimism regarding the future and future development. Declaring the victory of liberal democracy after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, some spoke of the end of history that we had known before. Many had high hopes expecting that democratization, inclusion and democratic participation (of individuals as well as, at least in some cases, such as diverse minorities, distinct communities and groups) will expand and develop. The future seemed bright they claimed. Already at that point, however, some scholars studying developments in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union in the late 1980s and their dissolution detected growing social distance and escalation of ethnic and other conflicts that, particularly in the post-Yugoslav space exploded in tragic wars in the 1990s. Our warnings that these developments and some global trends at least in some characteristics resembled historic developments in the 1920s and early 1930s that culminated in the devastating WW II were (to a large extent) ignored, sometimes ridiculed. The same experiences were shared by scholars that gathered growing and compelling evidence of environmental/ecological problems, global warming and climate crisis and proved that they were caused or, at least escalated by the humanity and particularly our economic activities that determine this geological period as the Anthropocene. As beacons of the bright future, in the world of ever-expanding financial capitalism and global consumerism, permanent and unlimited economic growth as well as occasional seeming triumphs of democracy (such as the fall of Milošević's regime in Serbia) were celebrated and revered. Ignoring ever-growing problems and crises and regardless of all scholarly evidence that confirms the opposite, the ruling elites, both economic and political continue to declare ever-growing markets, stocks, profits and consumption the main yardsticks of success and bright future. However, the reality of 2022 is much dimmer.

There is no doubt that environmental and climate impacts of humankind increase global warming and worsen environmental and climate problems and crises thereby contributing to intensifying mass extinction that threatens the very future of humankind and life on Earth in general. Regardless of all summits, political declarations, legal documents and plans of action we hardly do anything to address these problems. Scientists warn that even the strictest standards agreed upon and the realization of the most radical plans proclaimed by individual countries and the international community will not limit the global warming in this century to the declared target of +1,5°C (degrees Centigrade). Additionally, the newest research shows that limiting the global warning to +1,5°C might not prevent certain cataclysmic changes and consequences that can threaten, possibly destroy our civilization. Still, the ruling elites and most economists continue to offer (unlimited or partially limited) economic growth that contributes

massively to the escalation of environmental and climate problems and crises also in the post-Covid-19 period as the present situation shows. They seem to ignore traditional wisdom that you cannot resolve problems by implementing the same tools and methods that (had) caused those problems in the first place and that only a fool would employ such a strategy.

As mentioned above, in the recent years, the world has experienced another global crisis, Covid-19 Pandemic. This health crisis with numerous and diverse health, social, cultural and economic consequences and implications has shown the vulnerability of the modern world, contemporary societies and our ways of life. No doubt, human expansion (urbanization, expanding, particularly industrial and mono-cultural agriculture that ignores environmental and other consequences limitations, economic expansion and unlimited growth), hegemonic behaviour, pollution, consumerism and greed (desire to have more and more particularly material goods and to dominate natural world and environment) that result in shrinking and destroyed habitats of wild-life, intensified contacts/interactions/conflicts with wild-life and different ways of life that fail to respect nature and wild-life increased the likelihood of (trans-species) transmission of pathogens, epidemics and pandemics. Again, the elites and public have ignored the warnings of scientists and some social, particularly environmental activists that such crises, including deadly pandemics are inevitable if we do not change our ways of life, attitudes and behaviour, acknowledging that we are an integral and vulnerable part of our environment(s), nature and life.

Most optimists in the 1990s and at the turn of Millennia believed that the Cold War had ended and could not have imagined a major international war in Europe in 2022. In the West after the Cold War at least declaratively Russia was considered a potential partner, possibly even an ally. Being enthusiastic about the (formal) introduction of capitalism and (political, multi-party) democracy in Russia they failed to understand the trends and actual developments in this complex society and ignored or (because of their specific real interests) tolerated the obvious signs of authoritarianism and strengthening of role and (almost absolute) power of Vladimir Putin (who recently compared himself to the Tsar Peter the Great). Simultaneously, they failed to pay attention to his warnings that he viewed the expansion of the NATO as a direct threat to Russia's interests and security, a logical consequence of his position/perception that the disintegration of the Soviet Union (as the successor of the Russian Empire) was the biggest historic mistake and injustice. In this context, the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine seems logical and might not be ended soon. In any case, it is or at least contributes to a major global security, political, economic, humanitarian, environmental and climate crisis.

Finally, from the perspective of the Balkans and political developments there, one should observe recent and current global and regional pol-

itical and social trends and developments. Rather than further democratization, inclusion, political and social participation, development and expansion of human rights and (basic) freedoms, recent years (possibly, already in recent decades after 9/11, 2001) have witnessed emergence and consolidation of authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies and regimes in different countries, limitation(s) and suspension of human rights, increased social and political exclusion, weakening of democracy and human rights also in some traditionally democratic societies, emergence and strengthening of illiberal democracies and regimes, revived nationalism and increasing intolerance, etc.

**DRŽAVA BLAGOSTANJA
vs. NEOLIBERALIZAM**

**WELFARE STATE vs.
NEOLIBERALISM**

TRANZICIJA SA ASPEKTA DRŽAVE BLAGOSTANJA I LIBERALIZMA: SLUČAJ SLOVENIJE

Slovenija je počela tranziciju kao najrazvijeniji i najotvoreniji deo privrede SFRJ od svih socijalističkih zemalja. Nova članica EU koja nije potpuno sledila liberalni model nego socijalno-preduzetnički kapitalizam izbegavajući politično oligarhični kapitalizam. Posledica gradualističke ekonomske/socijalne tranzicije, restriktivnijeg odnosa do stranog kapitala i zaostajanja u prilagođavanju na promene u svetskoj privredi su bile sporije strukturne reforme, i zaostajanje Slovenije u poređenju sa drugim zemljama tranzicije. Priča o uspehu se postepeno pretvarala u priču o zaostajanju. Jedan od razloga; osciliranje modela između socijalne države blagostanja (DB) i više liberalnog modela (LM) paralelno sa promenama od levo do desno orijentiranih vlada.

Jačanje liberalizma i erozije DB počelo je posebno u toku finansijske krize. Neki elementi te erozije bili su tranzicijsko specifični, dok su drugi uslovljeni sistemom i promenljivim stranačkim interesima. Pošto su vlade bile koalicijske, teško je govoriti o čistim modelima DB ili LM. U procesu tranzicije socijalističke ideje su se odbacivale, a najvatreniji komunisti prijašnjeg razdoblja pretvorili su se u najvatrenije liberalce/kapitaliste 19. stoleća.

Uprkos oscilacijama između DB (leve vlade) i liberalizma (desne vlade) se Slovenija po mnogim kriterijuma (nejednakost, Better life index, Indeksu ljudskog razvoja, Social Progress Index, inkluzivnosti, te međugeneracijske pravednosti) rangira među zemlje sa relativno visokom socijalnom zaštitom, dakle kao DB, iako je liberalizam (privatizacija, liberalizacija, deregulacija) imao jak uticaj. Izdaci za socijalnu zaštitu kao učešće u BDP (malo iznad OECD proseka), su počeli, posle prvih faza razvoja, rasti, da bi u razdoblju LM padali, a tokom krize opet bili u porastu. Od 2013. godine opet počinju padati.

Slovenija je među zemljama sa najmanjim nejednakostima u EU. To zamagljuje jer, paralelno sa opštim trendom erozije DB u svetu, u EU i skandinavskim zemljama, učešće kapitala u raspodeli profita raste, dok se učešće rada smanjuje. Po porezu na imovinu i kapital Slovenija je na repu OECD članica, ali na vrhu što se tiče doprinosa za socijalnu sigurnost. Posledica je percepcija, da razlike rastu, pre svega između najbogatijih i najsiriomašnjih. To je i posledica destandardizacije načina zapošljavanja (fleksibilnost, zapošljavanje za određeno vreme) i organizacije rada (funkcionalna, prostorska i vremenska fleksibilnost). Po prekarnosti mladih se Slovenija nalazi u vrhu EU. I položaj migranata/azilanata drastično se pogoršao. Stepem sindikalizacije se paralelno sa tranzicijom potepeno smanjivao; od 69% pre tranzicije je pao na 42,8% u 2012. godini.

Zadovoljstvo životom u Sloveniji je iznad proseka EU. Udeo onih koji preživljavaju sa manjim teškoćama pada. Međutim, Slovenija zaostaje za prosekom EU u pogledu očekivanog trajanja zdravog života. Po efikasnosti zdravstvenog sistema u gornjoj je grupi OECD. Za zdravstvo odvaja 8,5% BDP (prosek EU 9,9%). Međutim, učešće javnog zdravstva pada; sada 72% (skandinavske zemlje 84%). Po učešću iz sopstvenog džepa Slovenija je među zemljama sa najvišim postotkom (30%). Mnoge zdravstvene usluge su se privatizovale. Najpre je došlo do privatizacije stomatoloških usluga, a kasnije i mnogih drugih.

Slovenački penzijski sistem je, uprkos postepenom zaoštavanju kriterija, dosta ženerozan. Skoro nigde u Evropi se ne penzioniše ranije nego u Sloveniji. To ne važi u istoj meri za visine penzija (u 2022. godini 61,5% penzijske osnove poslednjih 24 godina za muške i 59,5 % za žene). Brojne reforme nisu uspele razrešiti pitanja održivosti sistema u odnosu na rastući *odnos zavisnosti*. Oko 2050. godine bi se broj penzionera mogao skoro izjednačiti sa brojem zaposlenih. Zbog toga OECD predlaže porast praga penzioniranja sa 60 sada na 62 godine i godine radnog staža sa sadašnjih 40 na 42. Slovenski socijalnotržišni model nema mogućnosti opstanka bez reformi penzijskog, zdravstvenog i sistema trajne brige, sa odlaganjem rezova u nasleđena prava i ne uzimajući u obzir starenje stanovništva.

Može se zaključiti, da se elementi DB i LM isprepliću u celom periodu tranzicije. Tako smo imali levo orijentirane vlade koje su znatno posezale po arsenalu liberalizacije i desne znatno koristeći arsenal državnog aparata kako u privredi tako i u suzbijanju protesta, dakle ljudskih prava. Demokratija se erodirala i bila često zloupotrebljena u cilju realizacije stranačkih interesa. Radilo se dakle o šizofrenoj kombinaciji liberalizma i jake države iz modela DB.

Najveći izazovi za budućnost su novi model razvoja koji bi inkorporirali dobre strane DB i efikasnost kapitalizma jer je postalo jasno da je postojeći individualistički kapitalizam u krizi. Jača se trend prema kolektivismu, skladno sa konfucijanskom logikom harmonije u ljudskim odnosima. Rešenja se traži u formi inkluzivnog, etičkog kapitalizma. Kriza i pandemija su pokazale kako su nužne javne usluge, kako automatizam tržišta sam ne može adresirati problem u tom volatilnom i kompleksnom VUCA svetu. Veliki je izazov, kako izbeći, da se takva ojačana uloga države ne bi zloupotrebjavala za eroziju demokratije i ljudskih prava.

Na dugi rok se u uslovima krize okoline, klime pa i pandemije postavljaju pitanja da li se strategije zelenog rasta, cirkularne, inkluzivne ekocentrične ekonomije, nultog ili strategije smanjivanja rasta, mogu razrešiti sve te krize i poboljšati kvalitet života stanovništva. Prevladava mišljenje, da su te mogućnosti u okviru postojećeg sistema profitne maksimalizacije i principa prvo rast, zatim briga za okolinu i klimu, ograničene. Ti principi naime nisu kompatibilni sa gornjim idejama novih strategija razvoja. U svakom slučaju je potrebno koncept DB modernizirati, proširiti uključivanjem prava na razvoj, na pristup prirod-

nim izvorima, energiji, hrani, vodi, transportu, infrastrukturi, zdravstvu, obrazovanju, naučnim dostignućima kao javnim dobrima. To implicira i jaču ulogu globalnog upravljanja na tim područjima.

Novi model bi morao biti sposoban reagirati na promene u svetu *ex ante*, a ne *ex post* kao što je bilo do sada. Svaka, pa i nova strategija, može se efikasno implementirati samo pod uslovom stručnosti kako politike kao i savetnika. Kvalitetno javno školstvo se dakle čini kao bitni element buduće DB jer je privatno do sada vodilo do erozije kvaliteta i bilo često zloupotrebjeno za stranačke interese. Kod mnogih vlada je do sada prevladao ekonomski voluntarizam. I akademici nisu (nismo) nevini jer se u naglašavanju prednosti slobodne razmene, uloge trga zaboravili na troškove slobodne razmene i nedostatke tržišta koje treba država korigirati politikom redistribucije. Potreban je dakle novi misaoni okvir i povratak na A. Smitha holistički, političko-ekonomski pristup društvu.

Ključne reči: gradualizam, javne usluge, nejednakosti, penzije, novi razvojni model, uloga države, oscilacije između modela

TRANSITION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF WELFARE STATE AND LIBERALISM: THE CASE OF SLOVENIA

Slovenia started its transition as the best developed and most open economy of the SFRY of all socialist countries, a new EU member that did not fully follow liberal, but rather social-entrepreneurship model of capitalism, thus avoiding politically oligarchical capitalism. The consequences of such gradual economic/social transition, a more restrictive attitude towards foreign capital and delays in adjusting to changes in world economy, included slower structural reforms and Slovenia's lagging behind in comparison to other transitional countries. The story of a success gradually turned into a story of falling behind. One of the reasons: oscillating between the model of social welfare state (WS) and a more liberal model (LM), simultaneously with the shift from left-oriented to more rightist governments.

Strengthening of liberalism and erosion of WS became especially prominent during the financial crisis. Some elements of the erosion were transition specific, while others were conditioned by the system and volatile party interests. Since governments were coalitional, it is hard to speak of pure models of WS or LM. During the process of transition, socialist ideas were cast away, while the most ardent communists of the earlier era turned into the most fervent liberals/capitalists from the 19th century.

In spite of oscillations between WS (leftist governments) and liberalism (rightist governments), according to many criteria (inequality, Better life index, human development index, Social Progress Index, inclusivity and intergenerational justice), Slovenia is ranked among the countries with relatively strong social protection, i.e. as WS, even though liberalism (privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation) had a strong influence. Social care expenses as a part in GDP (little above the OECD average) started to grow after the initial phases of the development, fell in the periods of LM, only to increase once again during the crisis. Since 2013, these have once again been on the decrease.

Slovenia is among the countries with the least pronounced inequalities in the EU. This conceals the real picture since, simultaneously with the general trend of WS erosion in the world, the EU and Scandinavian countries, the share of capital in the distribution of profit has been growing, while the share of labour is on the decline. According to the property and capital taxes, Slovenia is among the last OECD members, but near the top when it comes to social security. Consequentially, the perception is that disparities are on the rise, especially between the richest and the poorest. This is also a result of de-standardisation of the manner of employment (flexibility and part time employment) and organisation of labour (functional, spatial and temporal flexibility).

When it comes to the precariousness of youth, Slovenia is among the EU leaders. The position of migrants/asylum seekers has drastically deteriorated. The rate of unionisation has gradually decreased with the transition: from 69% before the transition, to 42.8% in 2012.

Satisfaction with life in Slovenia is above the EU average. The share of those who survive with minor difficulties is declining. However, Slovenia lags behind the EU when it comes to the expected duration of healthy life. According to the efficiency of healthcare system, Slovenia is in the top group of the OECD. 8.5% of GDP is allocated for healthcare (the EU average is 9.9%). However, the share of public healthcare is on the fall; now it is 72% (84% in Scandinavian countries). According to out-of-pocket participation, Slovenia is among the countries with the highest share (30%). Many healthcare services have been privatised, where dental health services were privatised first, followed by many others.

In spite of the gradual establishment of more and more strict criteria, Slovenian retirement system is quite generous. Almost nowhere in Europe are people retired earlier than in Slovenia. This is not quite so when it comes to the amount of pension (in 2022, 61.5% of the pension basis of the last 24 years for men, and 59.5% for women). Numerous reforms did not succeed in resolving the issue of sustainability of the system in relation to the growing *dependency ratio*. Around 2050, the number of pensioners might become almost equal to the number of employed. Thereby the OECD proposes an increase in the retirement threshold from 60 to 62 years of life, and from 40 to 42 years of service. Slovenian social market model would not be able to survive without reforms of pension, health and permanent care systems, with delaying cuts of inherited rights and not taking into account care for population.

It can be concluded that elements of WS and LM have been intertwined in the entire period of transition. Thus we had left oriented governments that significantly used tools of liberalisation, as well as right oriented substantially using the tools of the state apparatus, both in economy and in suppressing protests, i.e. human rights. Democracy has eroded and was frequently abused for the purpose of realisation of party interests. This was, in other words, a schizoid combination of liberalism and the strong state of the WS model.

The major challenges for the future include identifying a new model of development which would combine good sides of WS with the efficiency of capitalism, since it has become clear that the existing individualist capitalism is in crisis. The trend of collectivism is growing, in line with the Confucian logic of harmony in human relations. Solutions are sought in a kind of inclusive, ethical capitalism. The crisis and pandemic have demonstrated the necessity of public services, and that the automatism of the market cannot address problems in this volatile and complex VUCA world. To avoid this strengthened role of the state to be abused for the erosion of democracy and human rights represents a major challenge.

In the long run, in the conditions involving the crisis of environment and climate, as well as pandemic, the question is whether the strategies of green growth, circular, inclusive, eco-centric economy, zero growth, or strategies of decreasing growth, may resolve all those crises and improve the quality of life for citizens. An overwhelming opinion is that these possibilities, within the existing system of profit maximisation and the principle of growth-first and only then care for environment and climate, are limited. These principles, namely, are not compatible with the aforementioned ideas of new development strategies. In any case the concept of WS needs to be modernised, expanded by including the right to development, and involving the access to natural resources, energy, food, water, transport, infrastructure, healthcare, education, scientific achievements as to public goods. This also implies a stronger role of global governance in these fields.

The new model should be capable of reacting to changes in the world *ex ante*, rather than *ex post* as it has been the case by now. Every strategy, including this new one, could be effectively implemented only with the expertise of policies and advisors. A high quality public education thereby appears to be a significant element of the future WS, since private education has by now led to the erosion of quality and has often been abused to cater to party interests. In many governments so far, economic voluntarism has prevailed. Academia is not innocent either, since in emphasising the advantages of free exchange and the role of market, we forgot about the costs of free exchange and the flaws in the market that need to be corrected by the state through redistribution policy. We therefore require a new frame of thought and a return to A. Smith's holistic, political-economic approach to society.

Keywords: gradualism, public services, inequalities, new development model, role of the state, oscillations between models

GENERALNE PROMENE U EKONOMSKOM SISTEMU SEVERNE MAKEDONIJE U TOKU TRI DECENIJE SAMOSTALNOSTI

Osnovni predmet istraživanja ovog rada su generalni pravci reforme kroz koje je prošao ekonomski sistem Republike Severne Makedonije u toku poslednjih 30 godina. Naime, raspad prethodnog sistema početkom devedesetih godina 20. veka, koji je bio poznat kao socijalistički samoupravno-tržišni ekonomski sistem, izazvao je potragu za novim rešenjima.

Nakon sticanja nezavisnosti 1991. godine i konstituisanje tadašnje Republike Makedonije kao nezavisne i suverene države, tranzicija makedonskog političkog i ekonomskog sistema se intenzivirala. U osnovi, može se identifikovati nekoliko osnovnih promena u organizaciji i funkcionisanju ekonomskog sistema i u ekonomskoj politici, čijom je implementacijom u stvari i započela tranzicija ekonomskog sistema Republike Severne Makedonije. To su: reforma pravnog i institucionalnog okvira, makroekonomske reforme, mikroekonomske reforme, kao i strukturne reforme (i u tzv. „realnom“ i u finansijskom sektoru). Sve te promene koje su se desile u protekle tri decenije oblikovale su izgled sadašnjeg privrednog sistema Severne Makedonije. Pored toga, ekonomski sistem Severne Makedonije je reformisan i putem implementiranja takozvanih „pravila Evropske unije“.

Stilizovana prezentacija svih tih promena je osnovni predmet i cilj ovog našeg rada.

Ključne reči: tranzicija, ekonomski sistem, promene

GENERAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF NORTH MACEDONIA DURING THE THREE DECADES OF ITS INDEPENDENCE

The main subject of research in this paper are the general directions of reform that the economic system of the Republic of Northern Macedonia has taken in the last thirty years. Namely, the dissolution of the earlier system in early 1990s, known as the socialist self-management-market economic system, caused a search for new solutions.

After gaining independence in 1991 and constitution of what was then the Republic of Macedonia as an independent and sovereign state, the transition of the Macedonian political and economic system intensified. Basically, one could identify a couple of fundamental changes in organisation and functioning of the economic system and economic policy, the implementation of which had indeed initiated the transition of the economic system of the Republic of North Macedonia. These include: reform of institutional and legal framework, microeconomic reforms, as well as structural reforms (both in so-called "real" and in the financial sector). All these changes that occurred in the last three decades have shaped North Macedonian economic system of today. Additionally, the economic system of North Macedonia has also been reformed through implementing the so-called "EU Acquis".

A stylised presentation of all these changes is the main subject and purpose of this paper.

Keywords: transition, economic system, changes

GLOBALNI EKONOMSKI POREDAK I ODRŽIVOST DRŽAVE BLAGOSTANJA

U knjizi *The Future of Capitalism* Paul Collier na briljantan način fokusira problem savremenog kapitalizma na krizu temeljnih etičkih vrijednosti na nivou porodice, kompanije i vlade, odnosno društva u cjelini. Premda Collier u ovoj knjizi primarno analizira probleme u svojoj zemlji, Velikoj Britaniji, većina problema o kojima raspravlja u značajnoj mjeri može se primijeniti kako na zemlje razvijenog kapitalizma, tako i na srednje razvijene zemlje, uključujući i zemlje u tranziciji. Historija države blagostanja, odnosno socijalne države, duga je nešto više od stotinu pedeset godina. Veliki izazov konceptu države blagostanja i njenom ekonomskom sistemu nakon Drugog svjetskog rata uslijedio je već krajem šezdesetih, ali intenzivno u drugoj polovini sedamdesetih godina prošlog vijeka. Vlade Sjedinjenih Država i Velike Britanije tokom osamdesetih godina prošlog vijeka u potpunosti promovisu i provode mjere trgovinske i finansijske liberalizacije, kao ključne segmente njihovih ekonomskih politika. Premda je William Bill Clinton pripadao Demokratskoj stranci i kao kandidat ove stranke dva puta dobio izbore u SAD tokom devedesetih godina prošlog vijeka, ekonomske mjere koje je preduzeo krajem drugog mandata ukidanjem Glass-Steagal Act-a i potpisivanjem Commodity Futures Modernization Act-a stvorile su zakonsku osnovu za nekontrolisani rast trgovine finansijskim derivativima i neposredno su doprinijele nastanku jedne od najvećih finansijskih i ekonomskih kriza u svijetu u posljednjih stotinu godina. Sa druge strane, države zapadne Evrope, a posebno Njemačka, kao „domovina“ koncepta socijalne države, i Francuska, kao domovina modernog kapitalizma, uspijevale su kroz procese evropskih integracija i promociju temeljnih društvenih vrijednosti ovih zemalja, dobrim dijelom, barem za sada, održati koncepte države blagostanja.

Sa druge strane, u središtu zapadne Evrope i središtu Evropske unije smještena je mala zemlja, po broju stanovnika približne veličine kao Crna Gora, ali po bruto domaćem proizvodu po stanovniku vodeća u svijetu. Ta zemlja je, naravno, Luksemburg. Ova mala ekonomija je po akumuliranoj vrijednosti finansijskih sredstava, odnosno svim finansijskim tokovima u tu zemlju i iz te zemlje u inostranstvo, u apsolutnom iznosu treći najveći finansijski centar u svijetu, iza Sjedinjenih Država i Velike Britanije. Relativno, po iznosu ukupnog finansijskog „stoka“ u odnosu na ukupnu proizvodnju, Luksemburg nema premca u svijetu. Dakle, ova mala zemlja, koja je članica Evropske unije od samog početka osnivanja ove zajednice zemalja i njene prethodnice, Evropske ekonomske zajednice, u posljednjih trideset godina postala je jedan od tri najznačajnija globalna finansijska centra i „finansijski hub“ u koji se slijevaju i preko kog se vrši redistribucija velikog iznosa globalnih finansijskih tokova, kako iz Sjeverne Amerike ka Evropi i Istoku, tako i sa Istoka ka Evropi i Sjevernoj Americi. Luksemburg „duguje“ ovu svoju

poziciju fiskalnoj politici koja svoje temelje ima u učenju neoliberalne ekonomije i neoliberalnog koncepta. Ekonomija ponude, osamdesetih godina prošlog vijeka je intenzivno promovisan koncept, primjenjivan u ekonomskoj politici Ronalda Reagana. Posljedica ovog programa bila je, zbog snižavanja poreskih stopa i istovremene promocije programa poput Rata zvijezda, dvostruko veći javni dug Vlade Ronalda Reagana u odnosu na ukupni proizvod SAD, u poređenju sa početkom mandata. Ekonomska politika zasnovana na korištenju javnog duga kao kontra-cikličnog instrumenta nema ništa zajedničko sa neoliberalnim konceptom. Međutim, već spomenuta ekonomska politika Vlade Luksemburga ima izravne uzore u politici i neoliberalnom ekonomskom konceptu. Jedan od ključnih paradoksa, principa na kojima je razvijena Evropska unija, koncept solidarnosti, jednakosti mogućnosti i općenito promocije uravnoteženog i održivog ekonomskog rasta, bez stvaranja velikih razlika u društvu, fiskalnom politikom koju provodi Luksemburg, ali i Republika Irska, neposredno doprinosi intenzivnoj poreskoj konkurenciji u okviru same Evropske unije, a time, u značajnoj mjeri, dovode u pitanje dugoročnu mogućnost vođenja ekonomske politike na principima socijalne države. Politika oporezivanja u Luksemburgu, kako korporativnih tako i ličnih zarada, pogoduje najbogatijim pravnim i fizičkim licima – kako iz zemalja Evropske unije, tako i iz ostalih zemalja svijeta.

Jedan od najvećih problema globalnog ekonomskog i socijalnog poretka u kom živimo i djelujemo jesu, u stvari, velike nejednakosti. Globalne nejednakosti u bruto domaćem proizvodu, odnosno proizvodnji po stanovniku, veoma su velike. Međutim, razlike u pristupu globalnim finansijskim sredstvima i načinu kreiranja tih finansijskih sredstava su mnogo veće. Tim razlikama se posvećuje znatno manja pažnja, iako su one u samom temelju stvaranja globalnih nejednakosti u mogućnostima ostvarivanja dugoročno održivog ekonomskog rasta, odnosno ekonomskog rasta koji bi trebao omogućiti adekvatnu socijalnu zaštitu stanovništva i pristup obrazovanju, uporedo sa otvaranjem mogućnosti tranzicije na „ozelenjavanje“ ekonomija. Kobalt je jedan od ključnih elemenata na kojima počiva proizvodnja roba temeljnih za tranziciju na koncept „ozelenjavanja“ ekonomija. Zemlja koja je najveći svjetski proizvođač kobalta jeste jedna od najsiromašnijih zemalja u svijetu. Demokratska Republika Kongo, resursno globalno dragocjena, ne može da priušti uslove za vođenje politike države blagostanja. Očekivani životni vijek u ovoj zemlji je za dvadeset godina ispod očekivanog životnog vijeka u SAD i gotovo za četvrt vijeka ispod očekivanog životnog vijeka u zemljama Skandinavije.

Evropa, posebno zapadna Evropa, jeste najbogatiji kontinent, odnosno dio svijeta, u posljednjih pedeset godina. Koncentracija ukupnih svjetskih finansijskih sredstava iz različitih dijelova svijeta u zapadnoj Evropi je približno pedeset procenata. U Evropi živi približno desetina svjetskog stanovništva. Za razliku od Evrope, Azija je kontinent koji ima značajno veće učešće u globalnoj proizvodnji nego u koncentraciji finansijskih sredstava. Zahvaljujući Japanu, Kini, Južnoj Koreji, zemljama jugoistočne Azije i, u posljednje vrijeme, Indije i Bangladeša, ovaj kon-

tinent sve brže raste. Kina je postala druga najveća svjetska ekonomija, iza SAD i, zahvaljujući svom heterodoksnom ekonomskom modelu, postigla je izuzetne rezultate u ekonomskom rastu i smanjivanju siromaštva. Uporedo sa ovim procesom, Kina je zajedno sa SAD najveći svjetski zagađivač, mjereno ispuštanjem ugljičnog dioksida u atmosferu. Ove dvije zemlje su, istovremeno, i najveći svjetski kreatori likvidnih sredstava iz sektora bankarstva u sjeni. Ove dvije ekonomije su, također, i dva najveća svjetska kreditna centra i potencijalno dva najveća izvora globalnih finansijskih i ekonomskih poremećaja. Budućnost država zasnovanih na efikasnim socijalnim politikama će, prije svega, ovisiti o mogućnostima globalne kontrole i distribucije finansijskih izvora za finansiranje održivog ekonomskog rasta, efikasne energetske tranzicije i, posebno, efikasnih socijalnih programa.

Ključne riječi: država blagostanja, neoliberalizam, ekonomska nejednakost, finansijska nejednakost, održivost

GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE WELFARE STATE

In his book *The Future of Capitalism*, Paul Collier brilliantly focuses the problem of contemporary capitalism on the crisis of fundamental ethical values at the level of the family, the company, and the government, that is, society as a whole. Although Collier in this book primarily analyses the problems in his country, Great Britain, the majority of the problems he discusses can significantly be applied to the countries with developed capitalism as well as to those with medium development, including countries in transition. The history of the welfare state, or social state, has a little over 150 years. A great challenge to the welfare state concept and its economic system after World War Two was posed as early as the late 1960s and intensified in the late 1970s. In the 1980s, the governments of the United States and Great Britain fully promoted and implemented the measures of trade and financial liberalisation as key segments of their economic policies. Although William Bill Clinton belonged to the Democratic Party and as the candidate of this party won the USA elections twice in the 1990s, the economic measures he introduced at the end of his second term with abolishing the Glass-Steagall Act and signing Commodity Futures Modernization Act created the legal grounds for an uncontrolled growth of trade in financial derivatives and indirectly contributed to the emergence of one of the biggest world financial and economic crises in the last 100 years. On the other hand, Western European countries – and especially Germany as the “homeland” of the welfare state concept and France as the homeland of modern capitalism – have largely, so far at least, managed to maintain the welfare state concepts through the European integration processes and promotion of fundamental social values.

On the other hand, right in the middle of the Western Europe and the European Union there is a small country, whose population approximately equals that of Montenegro, but whose gross domestic product per capita makes it the world’s leading. That country, of course, is Luxembourg. The accumulated value of financial funds, that is, the total sum of all financial flow into and from this country make its small economy the world’s third largest financial centre, right after the United States and Great Britain. In relative terms, considering the amount of the total financial “stock” in comparison to the overall production, Luxembourg is unmatched. So, this small country, which is a European Union member ever since this association of countries was established, as well as a member of its predecessor, the European Economic Community, has in the last 30 years become one of the three globally most important financial centres and a “financial hub” into and through which large amounts of the global financial flow enter and are re-distributed, for instance, from North America to Europe and the East, and from the East towards Europe and North America. Luxembourg “owes” this

position to the fiscal policy which is based on the teachings of neoliberal economics and the neoliberal concept. The economy of supply, an intensely promoted concept in the 1980s, was implemented in Ronald Reagan's economic policy. Due to the reduction of tax rates and simultaneous promotion of programmes such as Star Wars, this programme resulted in the doubling of public debt as compared to the USA total product by the end of the term of Ronald Reagan's government. The economic policy based on using public debt as a countercyclical instrument has nothing in common with the neoliberal concept. However, the mentioned economic policy of the Luxembourg Government has direct models in the politics and neoliberal concept of economy. One of the main paradoxes of the principles on which the European Union was developed – the concept of solidarity, equal possibilities, and general promotion of a balanced and sustainable economic growth without creating major social disparities – directly contributes to the intensive tax competition within the European Union itself through the fiscal policy implemented by Luxembourg (as well as the Republic of Ireland), and hence significantly questions any long-term possibility of carrying out economic policies based on the social state principles. Luxembourg's tax policy, as regards both corporative and personal income, is favourable to the wealthiest legal entities and natural persons, from the European Union countries as well as the other countries around the world.

One of the greatest problems of the global economic and social order in which we live and act is, in fact, great inequality. Global inequalities in gross domestic product, that is, production per capita, are very large. However, differences in the access to global financial funds and ways of creating these financial funds are much bigger. These differences are given much less attention although they are at the very roots of the creation of global unequal possibilities of achieving sustainable economic growth in the long run, that is, the economic growth which should enable adequate social protection and access to education for citizens while at the same time opening the possibility of transitioning towards green economies. Cobalt is one of the key elements on which the production of goods crucial to the green economy transition rests. The country which is the world's greatest producer of cobalt is also one of the poorest countries in the world. Democratic Republic of the Congo, globally precious in resources, cannot afford the conditions to implement the welfare state policy. Life expectancy in this country is twenty years below the USA life expectancy and merely a quarter of the century below life expectancy in Scandinavian countries.

Europe, especially Western Europe, has been the richest continent, or rather part of the world, in the last 50 years. Approximately 50% of the world's total financial funds from various parts of the world is concentrated in Western Europe. Approximately one tenth of the world's population live in Western Europe. Unlike Europe, Asia is a continent with considerably larger participation in the global production than in the concentration of financial funds. Thanks to Japan, China, South Korea,

the countries of the Southeast Asia and, lately, India and Bangladesh, this continent is growing fast. China has become the world's second largest economy, after the USA, and thanks to its heterodox economic model it has achieved excellent results in economic growth and poverty reduction. In parallel to this process, China is the world's biggest polluter alongside the USA, measured by the carbon dioxide emission into the atmosphere. These two countries are at the same time the world's greatest creators of liquid funds in the shadow banking sector. These two economies are also the world's two greatest credit centres and potentially the two greatest sources of global financial and economic disturbances. The future of the states based on efficient social policies will above all depend on the possibilities of global control and distribution of financial sources for financing sustainable economic growth, efficient energy transition and, particularly, efficient social programmes.

Keywords: welfare state, neoliberalism, economic inequality, financial inequality, sustainability

POLITIKE EKONOMSKOG RASTA IZMEĐU PROSJEKA I DISTRIBUCIJE

Ekonomski razvojni modeli proizašli iz krize Keynesijanske ekonomije u sedamdesetim godinama prošlog stoljeća rezultirali su uspjesima u ekonomiji koji su se prvenstveno ogledali u stabilizaciji cijena i pokretanju ciklusa globalnog ekonomskog rasta. Implementacija socijalizma sa kineskim karakteristikama je također rezultirala povećanjem blagostanja milijuna ljudi na dalekom istoku, dok je tranzicijski model ekonomskog rasta baziran na washingtonskom konsenzusu pokrenuo ekonomske reforme koje su nakon početnog ekonomskog pada, unaprijedile ekonomsku situaciju u brojnim, ne svim zemljama istočne Europe. U prosjeku je ekonomski napredak u navedenom razdoblju bio snažan u velikoj većini zemalja, ako gledamo prosječne ekonomske veličine. Međutim, kada uđemo u analizu distribucije koristi od ekonomskog rasta proizašlog iz implementacije navedenih politika, gotovo u svim slučajevima, nezvezano za ideološki predznak, došlo je do koncentracije ekonomskih probitaka u gornjim dohodovnim decilima stanovništva. Isključenost velikog broja stanovnika od sudjelovanja u koristima od ekonomskog rasta, danas se očituje u brojnim društvenim, ekonomskim, a i političkim ograničenjima. Izazov za ekonomsku politiku 21. stoljeća trebao bi biti osmišljavanje uključivih politika ekonomskog rasta za stanovništvo u donjim percentilima dohodovne i imovinske distribucije. Prepoznavanje politika i ekonomskih pokazatelja koji su ključne determinante kreiranja navedenih divergencija biti će od presudne važnosti u navedenom procesu.

Ključne riječi: ekonomski rast, nejednakosti, ekonomska politika, inkluzija

ECONOMIC GROWTH POLICIES BETWEEN AVERAGE AND DISTRIBUTION

Economic models of development, which originated in Keynesian economics in the 1970s, resulted in economic successes that were primarily reflected in the stabilisation of prices and initiation of the cycle of global economic growth. The implementation of socialism with Chinese features also resulted in an increase of the welfare of millions of people in the Far East whereas the transition model of economic growth, based on the Washington Consensus, started economic reforms which, following the initial economic collapse, improved the economic situation in many countries (though not all) of Eastern Europe. On average, the economic progress in the said era was strong in a great majority of countries if we observe average economic magnitudes. However, embarking on an analysis of the distribution of benefit made from economic growth, created by the implementation of the said policies, shows that in nearly all cases, regardless of the ideological tone, the economic break-through was concentrated in the upper income deciles of the population. The exclusion of large numbers of the population from benefiting from the economic growth is today reflected in numerous social, economic, and political limitations. A challenge to the 21st-century economic policy should be in designing inclusive policies of economic growth for the population in the lower deciles of income and property distribution. Recognising the policies and economic indicators that act as key determinants in creating the said divergences will have crucial importance in the said process.

Keywords: economic growth, inequalities, economic policy, inclusion

TRI DECENIJE TRANZICIJE U CRNOJ GORI: EKONOMSKI ASPEKTI I PERIODIZACIJA

Tri decenije tranzicije crnogorske ekonomije obilježili su turbulentni događaji ukupnog postjugoslovenskog prostora. Raspad zajedničke države dogodio se u najgorem scenariju građanskog rata, koji je doveo do međunarodnog priznanja nekoliko novih država sa ovog prostora (Slovenija, Hrvatska, BJR Makedonija i BiH). Cijela decenija razvojnno se prepoznaje kao period tranzicione recesije, snažnog ekonomskog sunovrata i isključenja novoformirane SR Jugoslavije (1992.) iz međunarodnih ekonomskih odnosa. Za razliku od zemalja centralne i istočne Evrope, tranzicija na prostoru Zapadnog Balkana, nije prerasla u evro-integraciju.

Pogoršanje političkih odnosa 1999. godine uslijed NATO intervencije na Kosovu, te novi talas inflacije, uticali su i na opšte ekonomske prilike u najmanjoj bivšoj jugoslovenskoj republici. Donošenjem dvije dugoročno uticajne odluke (unilateralno uvođenje njemačke marke kao zvaničnog sredstva plaćanja i napuštanje jedinstvenog sistema carinske i spoljnotrgovinske politike SRJ), dolazi do sve većih razlika u vođenju ekonomske politike, a posebno u definisanju ključnih spoljnopoličkih i razvojnih prioriteta. Uz posredovanje međunarodne zajednice, formira se prelazni trogodišnji aranžman državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora (2003), koji nije zaustavio trend daljeg slabljenja ukupnih političkih veza.

Za razliku od političkih, ekonomske prilike su imale povoljan trend. Period od dekade tranzicione recesije do obnove nezavisnosti (2006.) prepoznajemo kao period postepenog ekonomskog oporavka, koji se ubrzava u prve tri godine tzv. ekonomskog buma. Mala, otvorena, eurizovana, servisno orijentisana i uvezno zavisna ekonomija, sa svojim liberalnim poreskim sistemom, a slabim kontrolnim mehanizmima, postaje atraktivna destinacija za mnoge investitore. Crna Gora realno dostiže svoj BDP iz 1990. tek 2007. godine. Taj se kratki period uzleta (2006–2008), sa prosječnom stopom rasta od 9%, prosječnim budžetskim suficitom od 3,5%, ubrzanom otplatom, te postizanjem minimalnog nivoa javnog duga (do 28% u BDP-u) i rekordnih 1000 eura SDI po stanovniku, završava izbijanjem globalne ekonomske krize, koja je Crnu Goru pogodila sa dvostrukim dnom (2009. i 2012. godine). U međuvremenu rastu troškovi neuspješnih privatizacionih aranžmana, kao i precijenjenih, a neostvarenih efekata mnogih stranih ulaganja, posebno u metalni sektor. Izostaje značajnija podrška rastu konkurentnosti sektora MSP u oblasti prerađivačke industrije, a nedovoljna su i ulaganja u sektor primarne poljoprivredne proizvodnje. Istovremeno, bio je ovo i period snažne liberalizacije spoljne trgovine, kada se ukidaju sva carinska ograničenja u trgovini CEFTA zemalja, skidaju mnoge necarinske barijere i robni uvoz dostiže nevjerovatnih 50% BDP-a, a deficit roba i usluga oko petinu BDP-a, što je gotovo dvostruko više od priliva SDI.

Sporazumi o slobodnoj trgovini zaključuju se i sa EU, EFTA, Turskom i Ukrajinom, dok se sličan aranžman sa Rusijom postepeno gasi, zbog pogoršanja političkih odnosa. Crna Gora izlaz traži u ubrzanju procesa evropskih integracija i otvara pregovore u junu 2012. godine, ali zbog izostanka mjerljivih rezultata u oblasti demokratskih reformi (posebno reforme pravosuđa i borbe protiv korupcije i organizovanog kriminala) i put ka EU se postepeno usporava, a prijeko potrebni strukturni fondovi EU, postaju sve udaljeniji.

Od 2013. godine, kada Crna Gora ulazi u period postepenog oporavka, produbljuju se strukturne disproporcije, a rast zaduženosti uzrokovan je ne samo rastom deficitnog finansiranja novog investicionog ciklusa kog simbolizuje prva dionica auto-puta, već i rastom javne potrošnje. Produbljuju se i regionalne razlike, gdje Indeks razvijenosti u odnosu na prosjek Crne Gore između najviše i najmanje razvijene opštine iznosi 157:28 (2018). Kreatori ekonomske politike u Crnoj Gori u ovoj predkovid razvojnoj fazi (2013–2019) ne kalkulišu moguće eksterne šokove, ne posvećuju se disperziji razvojnih sektora, smanjenju izloženosti i zavisnosti od eksterne tražnje, tako da je ostvareni prosječni rast BDP-a od 3,6%, uz dinamičan rast javnog duga do 77%, učinio zemlju krajnje nespremnom za novi eksterni šok. Vrijeme je pokazalo da smo ušli u period višestruke krize koja traje i danas.

COVID-19 nije zaobišao ni Crnu Goru. Samo par mjeseci od izbijanja pandemije, u martu 2020. godine, zemlja se našla u dubokoj zdravstvenoj i nadolazećoj ekonomskoj krizi. Preko noći ekonomski sektori u Crnoj Gori klasifikovani su kao zabranjeni ili ugroženi (najveći broj ekonomskih djelatnosti), te zaključani (turizam i putovanja). Preko svojih kapaciteta, „radio“ je samo javnozdravstveni sistem, snabdijevanje hranom, energijom i medicinskim materijalom, kao i neophodne državne institucije koje su obezbjeđivale red, poredak i bezbjednost svim građanima. Važnu ulogu imao je i medijski sektor.

Rapidno urušavanje ekonomskih performansi pratila je duboka politička kriza i skromna predizborna kampanja, koja je dovela do suštinske promjene vlasti na parlamentarnim izborima avgusta 2020. godine, te formiranja tzv. „apostolske vlade“ u decembru iste godine. Zbog specifičnosti svoje ekonomije i zaključavanja sektora turizma i putovanja, u 2020. godini, ukupni pad ekonomske aktivnosti ostvaren je na nivou od -15,3%, da bi se neočekivano dobrim oporavkom turističke sezone u 2021. godini, koji se bazirao na regionalnom, ruskom i ukrajinskom gostu, ekonomija povratila po stopi od 13%. „Apostolsku vladu“ obilježilo je populističko vođstvo ministarskog dua finansija i razvoja, koje se, uz snažnu podršku međunarodne zajednice, zadužuje u decembru 2020. godine emisijom eurobodova od 750 miliona eura (javni dug dostiže 105% BDP-a) i uvodi radikalne fiskalne reforme budžetom za 2022. godinu. U moru populizma i upitnih statističkih indikatora tržišta rada i budžeta, te hvalospjeva o kontraverznom programu „Evropa sad“ u decembru 2021. godine (kojim, između ostalog, Crna Gora, jedina u Evropi, u jeku zdravstvene krize, ukida direktne prihode Fondu zdravstva),

ostaće zapamćeni po dobroj hedžing transakciji prvih rata kineskog kredita, čime je značajno izbjegnuto valutni rizik i smanjen pritisak na javne finansije tokom perioda otplate.

„Apostolsku vladu“ pratila su nesaglasja od samog početka, te joj je izglasano nepovjerenje u januaru 2022. godine. Od 24. februara ove godine, agresijom Rusije na Ukrajinu, geopolitičke prilike u Evropi se usložnjavaju, što se reflektuje i na političke, bezbjednosne i ekonomske prilike u regionu, kao i u Crnu Goru, u fazi blokiranih ključnih institucija. Novi eksperiment tzv. „manjinske vlade“, kreće u aprilu 2022. godine. Iako sa ograničenim periodom trajanja od 12 do 24 mjeseca, uvodi ambiciozne ciljeve na tri ključna fronta: demokratske reforme sa fokusom na borbu protiv korupcije i organizovanog kriminala, dalje ekonomske reforme, te ubrzanje procesa evropskih integracija. I opet međunarodna zajednica daje podršku za najavljeno i započeto, iako svjesni visokih političkih tenzija i sveprisutne nestabilnosti. Crna Gora pokušava da se vrati na putanju održivog razvoja, što u uslovima zdravstvene, ekonomske, političke i geopolitičke krize predstavlja svojvrstan ekonomski i društveni izazov.

THREE DECADES OF TRANSITION IN MONTENEGRO: ECONOMIC ASPECTS AND PERIODISATION

Three decades of Montenegrin economic transition have been marked by turbulent events occurring in the entire post-Yugoslav region. The breakup of the country took place according to the worst imaginable scenario, against the backdrop of a civil war, which consequently led to the international recognition of several new countries in the region (Slovenia, Croatia, FRY Macedonia and BiH). In terms of development, the entire decade has been recognised as a period of transitional recession, severe economic downturn and the exclusion of the newly-formed FR Yugoslavia (1992) from international economic relations. Unlike in the countries of Central and Western Europe, the transition in the Western Balkans has never progressed to European integration.

The deterioration of political relations in 1999 resulting from the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and the new inflation surge, affected overall economic conditions in the smallest ex-Yugoslav republic as well. Two long-term influential decisions (unilateral introduction of the German Mark as an official means of payment and abandoning the unified system of customs and foreign trade policy of the FRY), led to greater discrepancies in economic policies, and in particular, in the definition of key foreign policy and developmental priorities. With the mediation of the international community, a transitional, three-year arrangement – the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003) was established, which failed to prevent further weakening of general political ties.

In contrast to the political circumstances, economic conditions reflected a favourable trend. The period between the decade of transitional recession and the restoration of independence (2006) was identified as a period of gradual economic recovery, accelerated in the first three years of the so-called economic boom. A small, open, euroised, service-oriented and import-dependent economy, with its liberal tax system and weak control mechanisms, was becoming an attractive destination for a number of investors. It was not before 2007 that Montenegro realistically reached its GDP from 1990. That short take-off period (2006-2008), with an average growth rate of 9%, an average budget surplus of 3.5%, fast-tracked the repayment and achievement of a minimum level of public debt (up to 28% of GDP) and a record amount of EUR 1,000 FDI per capita, ended with the outbreak of the global economic crisis, which hit Montenegro with a double-dip recession (2009, 2012). In the meantime, the costs of unsuccessful privatization arrangements, as well as the overestimated and unrealized effects of numerous foreign investments, especially in the metal sector, were on the rise. There was a lack of any noteworthy support to enhance the

competitiveness of the SME sector in the area of processing industry, and the investments in the sector of primary agricultural production were insufficient. Simultaneously, this was a period of strong liberalisation of foreign trade, when all customs restrictions on the trade of CEFTA countries were abolished, many non-tariff barriers were removed, and imports reached an incredible 50% of GDP, the deficit of goods and services was approximately one fifth of GDP, which was almost double the inflow of FDI. Free trade agreements were concluded with the EU, EFTA, Turkey and Ukraine, while a similar arrangement with Russia was gradually phased out, due to the deterioration of political relations. Montenegro saw a solution in the acceleration of the European integration process and opened negotiations in June 2012. However, due to the lack of measurable results in the field of democratic reforms (especially judicial reforms and fight against corruption and organized crime), the path to the EU was gradually slowed down, and much needed structural funds of the EU, were becoming more and more unattainable.

As of 2013, when Montenegro entered a period of gradual recovery, structural disproportions started to deepen, and the increased indebtedness was not only a direct consequence of the growing deficit financing of the new investment cycle, the symbol of which is the first section of the highway, but also of the increased public spending. Regional differences were also growing deeper, with the Development Index, in relation to the Montenegrin average, between the most and least developed municipalities was 157:28 (2018). During the pre-COVID development phase (2013–2019), economic policy makers in Montenegro failed to take into consideration possible external shocks and to focus on the dispersion of development sectors, the reduction of exposure and dependence on external demand, so that an average GDP growth of 3.6%, with a dramatic increase in public debt up to 77%, made the country exceptionally unprepared for a new external shock. Time has shown that, at that point, we entered a period of multiple crises that continues to date.

COVID-19 did not bypass Montenegro. Only several months into the outbreak of the pandemic, in March 2020, the country found itself in a deep health crisis, facing an imminent economic crisis. Overnight, economic sectors in Montenegro were classified as prohibited or endangered (the majority of economic activities), and consequently locked (tourism and travel). Through its own capacities, only the public health system, food, energy and medical supply, as well as the required state institutions that ensured law, order and security to all citizens, were 'operational'. The media sector also played an important role in the crisis.

The rapid collapse of economic performance was followed by a severe political crisis and a modest election campaign, which led to a fundamental change of government in the parliamentary elections of August 2020, and the formation of the so-called 'apostolic government'

in December of the same year. Due to the specificity of its economy and the locking of the tourism and travel sectors in 2020, the overall decline in economic activity was recorded, at the level of -15.3%. An unexpectedly good tourist season in 2021, which was based on the regional, Russian and Ukrainian guests, the economy recovered at a rate of 13%. The 'apostolic government' was characterised by the populist leadership of the ministerial duo of finance and development, which, with the strong support of the international community, in December 2020, was indebted with the issue of EUR 750m Eurobond (public debt reached 105% of GDP) and introduced radical fiscal reforms through the budget for 2022. Amidst a plenitude of populism and questionable statistical indicators of the labour market and the budget, and eulogies about the controversial Europe Now Programme in December 2021 (under which, among other things, Montenegro was the only European country who, in the midst of a health crisis, suspended direct income for the Health Insurance Fund), will be remembered for the smart hedging transaction of the first several instalments of the Chinese loan, thereby avoiding the currency risk and diminishing the pressure placed on public finances during the repayment period.

The 'apostolic government' was characterised by disagreements from the very beginning, and finally, it received a vote of no-confidence in January 2022. Since 24 February of this year, with Russia's aggression against Ukraine, geopolitical conditions in Europe have become even more complex, which is reflected in the political, safety and economic circumstances in the region, as well as in Montenegro, in the phase of blocked key institutions. A new experiment called 'minority government', started in April 2022. Although with a limited duration of 12 to 24 months, it introduced ambitious goals in three key fields: democratic reforms with a focus on the fight against corruption and organized crime, further economic reforms and the acceleration of the European integration process. Again, the international community supports the activities announced and those already under way, although it is aware of high political tensions and pervasive instability. Montenegro is trying to return to the path of sustainable development, which in the context of health, economic, political and geopolitical crisis, represents a specific economic and social challenge.

EKONOMSKE PROMENE U REGIONU ZAPADNOG BALKANA I SRBIJI

U mom izlaganju ću ukazati na ključne ekonomske promene u regionu Zapadnog Balkana tokom poslednjih dvadesetak godina, sa posebnim osvrtom na Srbiju. Prvo ću podsetiti na osnovne sličnosti i razlike između pojedinih zemalja u pogledu strategije tranzicije. I pored mnogobrojnih razlika, sve zemlje Zapadnog Balkana su primenile, ranije ili kasnije, neoliberalni model tranzicije, u skladu sa tzv. „Vašingtonskim konsenzusom“, uz uverenje da će minimalno uplitanje države u privredne aktivnosti biti i najsigurniji put ka uspostavljanju tržišne privrede. Ovakva strategija tranzicije će biti detaljnije ilustrovana na primeru Srbije, ukazujući na postignute rezultate kao i osnovne nedostatke modela tranzicije koji je primenjen posle političkih promena 2000. godine. Iako su u Srbiji u poslednjih dvadesetak godina sprovedene radikalne ekonomske reforme, često po uzoru na zemlje u Centralnoj i Istočnoj Evropi – uključujući odlučne mere makroekonomske stabilizacije, liberalizacija ekonomskih aktivnosti, spoljne trgovine i finansijskog sistema, i novi model privatizacije, dijametralno različit od prethodnih – niz važnih institucionalnih reformi je odložen ili zapostavljen. Imajući u vidu da su do 2001. godine ekonomske reforme tranzicije vrlo sporo napredovale, uz neprestano mešanje države u privredne aktivnosti, očekivalo se da će hiperliberalan model koji podrazumeva minimalnu ulogu države biti najsigurniji i najbrži put ka uspostavljanju funkcionalne tržišne privrede. Važna uloga u ovakvom modelu tranzicije je data stranim investitorima, u očekivanju da će doneti preko potreban kapital za modernizaciju preduzeća, nove tehnologije i menadžerske veštine, i time doprineti brzom restrukturiranju privrede. Ovakva iščekivanja su se samo delimično ostvarila, kako u Srbiji tako i u drugim zemljama Zapadnog Balkana. U stvarnosti, strategija tranzicije zasnovana na neoliberalizmu u Srbiji je sprovedena vrlo selektivno, uz mnogobrojne prateće probleme. Model društveno-ekonomskog razvoja doveo je do velikog stepena ekonomske zavisnosti Srbije (i celog regiona) od Evropske unije, dok se istovremeno nisu izgradile adekvatne institucije koje bi osigurale novo zapošljavanje, pravovremeno naplaćivanje poreza, podsticanje malih i srednjih preduzeća, radikalne reforme sistema obrazovanja. Neoliberalni model tranzicije doveo je do slabljenja mnogih državnih institucija. Zaboravljeni su problemi nasleđeni iz devedesetih – netransparentno privredno okruženje, nepoštovanje vladavine prava, neefikasno sudstvo, rasprostranjena korupcija, neefikasna državna administracija. Bez modernizacije ključnih državnih i nedržavnih institucija, mnoge institucije koje su neophodne za dobro funkcionisanje tržišne privrede su zapostavljene, uz direktne posledice na privredni razvoj. Nije slučajno da su upravo ove oblasti – vladavina prava, reforma državne administracije i ekonomsko upravljanje – tri oblasti koje je Evropska unija nedavno označila kao ključne prioritete u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana.

Ključne reči: tranzicija, privatizacija, liberalizacija, strategija razvoja, strane direktne investicije, liberalizam, uloga države

ECONOMIC CHANGES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS AND SERBIA

In my presentation, I intend to point out the key economic changes which took place in the Western Balkans during the last 20 years, with special reference to Serbia. First, I would like to remind everyone of the basic similarities and differences between individual countries with regard to the transition strategy. Despite numerous differences, all the Western Balkan countries applied, sooner or later, the neoliberal model of transition, in line with the so-called 'Washington Consensus', believing that minimal state interference in economic activities would be the safest way to establish a market economy. This transition strategy will be illustrated in more detail with the Serbian example, highlighting the achieved results as well as basic shortcomings of the transition model that was implemented after the political changes that occurred in 2000. Although radical economic reforms have been implemented in Serbia in the last twenty years, often following the example of Central and Eastern European countries – including decisive measures of macroeconomic stabilisation, liberalisation of economic activities, foreign trade and the financial system, as well as the new model of privatisation, diametrically opposite to the previous ones – a number of important institutional reforms have been postponed or neglected. Considering the fact that until 2001, the economic reforms of the transition progressed very slowly, with continuous state interference in economic activities, it was expected that a hyper-liberal model that implies a minimal role of the state would be the safest and fastest way to establish a functional market economy. An important role in this model of transition is entrusted to foreign investors, expecting that they will bring much-needed capital for the modernization of companies, new technologies and managerial skills, thus contributing to the rapid restructuring of the economy. Such expectations were only partially realized, both in Serbia and in other Western Balkan countries. In reality, the transition strategy based on neoliberalism was implemented very selectively in Serbia, with numerous associated issues. The model of socio-economic development led to a high level of economic dependency of Serbia (and the entire region) on the European Union, while at the same time, adequate institutions that would ensure employment, timely collection of taxes, incentives for small and medium-sized enterprises and radical reforms of the education system, were not created. The neoliberal model of transition led to the weakening of many state institutions. The issues inherited from the 1990s were forgotten – non-transparent economic environment, disrespect for the rule of law, inefficient judiciary, widespread corruption, inefficient state administration. Without the modernization of key state and non-state institutions, many institutions that are necessary for the proper functioning of the market economy are neglected, which has direct consequences for economic development. It is no coincidence that these areas in particular – the rule of law, state administration reform and economic management – are the three areas that the European Union recently identified as key priorities in Western Balkan countries.

Keywords: Transition, privatisation, liberalisation, development strategy, foreign direct investments, liberalism, the role of the state

SVET OKO NAS
THE WORLD AROUND US

TRANSFORMATIVNI PROCESI I NJIHOVI UČINCI

Analiza rata u Ukrajini dokazuje utemeljenost više relevantnih teza koje su u prošlosti predložili u okviru inače različitih teorijskih pristupa. Militaristička politika SAD i NATO pakta potvrđuje tezu o kraju sistemskog ciklusa akumulacije i o pratećem prelasku sa hegemonije na (vojnu) dominaciju (Wallerstein; Arrighi). Instantno i bezuslovno svrstavanje Evropske unije i Japana na stranu politike SAD (čak i protiv interesa vodećih zapadnoevropskih zemalja) potvrđuje tezu o kolektivnom imperijalizmu „trijade“ (Samir Amin). Politika Ruske federacije u prošlosti potvrđivala je tezu o subimperijalizmu (Marini), a vojna operacija u Ukrajini donela je nov element – protivrečje između subimperijalizma i imperijalizma – što zahteva dalju razradu ove teze. Kompradorska politika većine evropskih postsocijalističkih vladajućih grupa donosi značajne elemente za pozitivnu razradu inače nerazvijene hipoteze da je buržoaska nacionalna država već u „američkom“ sistemskom akumulacijskom ciklusu postala politička forma zavisnih društvenih formacija (Arrighi-Silver). Vojno-ekonomski antagonizam između RF i „trijade“ te ekonomski i latentno vojni antagonizam između „trijade“ i NR Kine potvrđuju tezu o kraju „američkog“ dugog ciklusa, ali sa druge strane otvaraju teorijski problem sa jakim političkim implikacijama: teorija neravnomernog i kombinovanog razvoja (Rosenberg; Desai) teorijski uspešno objašnjava razvoj pojedinih društvenih formacija i njihovu integraciju u svetski sistem – ali pokazuje i to da se u sadašnjem istorijskom momentu na razini svetskog sistema „kombinacija“ *ne ostvaruje*. U optimističkoj „wallersteinovskoj“ perspektivi to bi ukazivalo na momenat sistemske „bifurkacije“ – ili, drugim rečima, ukazivalo bi da su ostvareni objektivni uslovi za izlaz iz kapitalizma.

TRANSFORMATIVE PROCESSES AND THEIR EFFECTS

Analysis of the war in Ukraine proves the foundedness of several relevant theses which were proposed in the past within otherwise different theoretical approaches. The militarist policies of the USA and NATO pact confirm the thesis on the end of the systemic cycle of accumulation and the accompanying transfer from hegemony to the (military) dominance (Wallerstein; Arrighi). The instant and unconditioned alignment of the European Union and Japan with the USA politics (even against the interest of the leading Western European countries) confirms the thesis on the collective imperialism of the "triad" (Samir Amin). The politics of the Russian Federation in the past confirmed the thesis on subimperialism (Marini), and the military operation in Ukraine brought in a new element – contradiction between subimperialism and imperialism, which calls for a further elaboration of this thesis. The comprador politics of the majority of post-socialist governing groups has introduced significant elements to a positive elaboration of the otherwise underdeveloped hypothesis that the bourgeois national state became a political form of dependent social formations already in the "American" systemic cycle of accumulation (Arrighi-Silver). Military-economic antagonism between the RF and the "triad," as well as the economic and latently military antagonism between the "triad" and the People's Republic of China confirm the thesis on the end of the second "American" cycle, while on the other hand they open a theoretical problem with strong political implications: the theory of uneven and combined development (Rosenberg; Desai) explains in a theoretically successful way the development of certain social formations and their integration into the world system – but it also shows that in the present moment in history, at the level of the world system, the "combination" is *not realised*. From the "Wallersteinian" optimistic point of view, this should indicate a moment of systemic "bifurcation" – or, in other words, it should point out that objective conditions have been met for a departure from capitalism.

ETNONACIONALIZAM – NAJKANCEROGENIJA PRIJETNJA BIH KAO DRŽAVI I DRUŠTVU

Bosna i Hercegovina je u 2022. godini obilježila 30 godina svoga postojanja kao suverena i međunarodno priznata država. Sve to vrijeme, dakako, nije, a ta vrsta sudova se nerijetko daje čuti iz centrala etnonacionalističkih oligarhija, samo vrijeme svjedočenja o njoj kao propaloj državi koja je nemoguća bez aparata svjetskih centara moći koji je u životu održavaju. Sasvim suprotno, u 30 godina svoga života BiH je postala članica Ujedinjenih nacija, značajan dio tijekom rata uništenog je obnovljen, podignuti su novi gospodarski i ino kapaciteti, njezini mladi ljudi, sportaši, studenti, znanstvenici su postizali rezultate vrijedne divljenja i time postajali najmoćniji ambasadori svoje zemlje na svim svjetskim meridijanima.

Nažalost, svih 30 godina BiH je bila i jeste u ozbiljnim povijesnim iskušenjima, u borbama s civilizacijskim scilama i haribdama, u posrtanjima za koja su odgovorni oni koji imaju mandat da od nje prave evropsko društvo i državu, ali i silnici izvan nje koji bi je najradije uništili, a dijelovima njezina teritorija povećavali vlastiti.

O bosanskohercegovačkoj golgoti zbog njezine odluke da u evropsku budućnost krene kao suverena država najzornije svjedoči nametnuti joj rat koji ju je koštao preko stotinu tisuća ljudskih života, nekoliko stotina tisuća devastiranih ili potpuno uništenih obiteljskih, gospodarskih i javnih objekata, ali i totalnu demografsku devastaciju. Po nekim procjenama, preko 50% ukupne populacije je ili protjerano ili izbjeglo kako bi spasavalo vlastiti život. Najveći dio njih je završavao izvan granica BiH, a relativno najveći dio ih se ni do danas nije vratio svojim predratnim domovima. U prilog tome svjedoči i podatak da je BiH na vrhu svjetske liste zemalja po veličini dijaspore u odnosu na broj stanovnika.

Okončanje rata značilo je i olakšanje za obična čovjeka i nadu da bi se ponovo moglo živjeti kako se i živjelo – susjed sa susjedom, međusobno se pomažući, zajedno proživljavajući i dobro i zlo, zajedno obilježavajući i religijske blagdane i državne praznike. I mora se priznati da je prvih deset godina naslućivalo kako bi se to moglo i dogoditi.

No, takvo naslućivanje nije zasluga domaćih vlasti nego prakse svjetskih centara moći personificiranih kroz OHR i visoke predstavnike. Onog, pak, časa kad ti centri moći svoju pažnju s BiH pomjere prema drugim svjetskim žarištima, etnonacionalistima su otvorena vrata za ponovno vađenje ratnih sjekira i vraćanja politikama neostvarenih ratnih ciljeva. To je politika koja je obilježila zadnjih petnaestak godina i koja BiH sve snažnije gura u nova civilizacijska i povijesna iskušenja.

Nažalost, poticaji takvim trendovima, i to u sve otvorenijoj formi, dolaze i izvan BiH, od onih koji su je u zgarište i ljudsku klaonicu pretvarali i

prije 30 godina, ali i od aktera svjetskih geopolitičkih igara koji BiH vide kao prostor svoga geopolitičkog interesa.

Spletom okolnosti, onim što se događa u Ukrajini posebice, Washington i Bruxelles su upozoreni da će svoj angažman u BiH morati vratiti na razinu neposrednih postratnih godina. A signali s tih adresa, u zadnjih godinu dana naročito, sugeriraju da bi se takav zaokret mogao i dogoditi – da se, dapače, događa već danas.

Svim tim postratnim obratima, pa i onima kojima svjedočimo zadnjih nekoliko godina, posvećen je najveći dio naslovljenog rada.

Ključne riječi: BiH, suverenost, etnonacionalističke vlasti, svjetski centri moći, odnos susjeda prema BiH

ETHNONATIONALISM – THE MOST CARCINOGENIC THREAT TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AS A STATE AND SOCIETY

In 2022, Bosnia and Herzegovina marked the 30th anniversary of its sovereignty and international recognition as a state. All this time, indeed, is not, though this kind of assessments can often be heard from the headquarters of ethno-nationalist oligarchies, merely the time of witnessing it being a ruined state, impossible without the apparatuses of global power centres to that have been sustaining it. Quite the contrary: in 30 years of its existence, BiH became a UN member, a significant part of what had been destroyed in the war was renewed, new economic capacities have been built, its young people, athletes, students, scientists have been achieved impressive results, thus becoming the most influential ambassadors of their country all over the world.

Unfortunately, throughout these 30 years, BiH has endured serious historical challenges, being between Scylla and Charybdis of civilisation, its stumbling being caused by those very actors mandated to make it a European state and society, but also by the mighty from without, who would preferably destroy it and use its territory to enlarge their own.

The Calvary that BiH endured due its decision to head to its European future as a sovereign state is most keenly testified of by the imposed war, responsible for more than 100 thousand of human lives, hundreds of thousands of devastated, or completely ruined family, economic, or public buildings, as well as total demographic devastation. According to some estimates, more than 50% of the total population was either banished, or migrated in order to save their lives. The most of them ended outside the BiH borders, and relatively biggest portion of them have not returned to their pre-war homes to this day. This is also evidenced by the fact that BiH is near the top of the global list of countries with the biggest diasporas compared to their population.

Conclusion of the war meant relief for common people, as well as hope that they could once again live like they used to – neighbour with neighbour, helping each other and living together through good times and the bad, and celebrating together both religious and state holidays. And one must admit that the initial ten years indeed promised that this could be so.

However, such prospects were not facilitated by domestic authorities, but through the practice of the global centres of power embodied in the OHR and high commissioners. Yet, the very moment that these centres of power had shifted their attention from BiH to other global points of conflict, ethnonationalists saw their opportunities to once again draw out their swords and revert to the politics of unfulfilled war goals. This is the politics which has marked the last fifteen-odd

years, pushing BiH ever harder towards new civilizational and historical challenges.

Unfortunately, such tendencies are stimulated, more and more openly, from without BiH, by those responsible for the wastelands and abattoirs of 30 years ago, but also by actors in global geopolitical games who see BiH as a location of their geopolitical interest.

By force of circumstances, and especially the events in Ukraine, Washington and Brussels have been warned that they would need to return their engagement in BiH to the level comparable to the years immediately after the war. And the signals sent from these addresses, especially in the last year, suggest that this kind of a shift could indeed happen – that it is actually already happening today.

The majority of the paper is dedicated to all these post-war shifts, including those that we have been witnessing in the last couple of years.

Keywords: BiH, sovereignty, ethnonationalists authorities, global centres of power, attitude of neighbours toward BiH

SEVERNA MAKEDONIJA KAO ZEMLJA VELIKOG DRUŠTVENOG DIVERZITETA, KONTROVERZI I IZAZOVA

Tokom krvavog raspada Jugoslavije, makedonsko društvo je bilo opisivano kao „oaza mira“ jer je tokom devedesetih uspešno izbegavalo ratne konflikte, iako su „u vazduhu“ bile prisutne neke međuetničke tenzije, ali su postojale i određene fizičke razmirice između etničkih Makedonaca i etničkih Albanaca.

Nakon raspada Titove Jugoslavije, Socijalistička Republika Makedonija je otpočela proces izgradnje novog društvenog poretka, koji je doneo nove momente u odnosima između pojedinca i društva, ali i u odnosima između grupe i društva. Novoformirani politički pluralizam i višestranački sistem nisu odražavali društvenu podeljenost niti kanalisali različite društveno-kulturne i ekonomske interese građana. Etnička pripadnost i etnička polarizacija su značajno ojačale, posebno kroz uspostavljanje političkih stranaka zasnovanih mahom na etničkom identitetu. Tako je u makedonskoj politici naširoko promovisana etnizacija političkog sistema.

Pitanje visokog obrazovanja u oblasti albanskog jezika predstavljalo je najveću međuetničku raspravu devedesetih. Pitanje Kosova i rat 1999. godine doveli su do građanskog konflikta u Makedoniji 2001. godine, koji se završio takozvanim Ohridskim okvirnim sporazumom i transformacijom Republike Makedonije iz nacionalne u hibridnu državu i društvo. Etnički Makedonci žele da izgrade naciju-državu, etnički Albanci primenjuju binacionalnu politiku, a druge manje zajednice sanjaju o multikulturalnom društvu. Ohridski okvirni sporazum je doveo do sprovođenja takozvane politike deljenja moći i adekvatnog i pravičnog učešća u državnim institucijama i društvu.

Sa proglašenjem nezavisnosti na površinu je izašao takozvani spor oko imena Makedonija. Oспорavanje naziva države nije došlo samo od strane Grka već i Bugara, po osnovu etničkog identiteta, jezika i istorije Makedonaca, a i Srpska pravoslavna crkva je osporavala autokefalnost Makedonske pravoslavne crkve. S druge strane je u javnom diskursu bila živo prisutna debata o konfliktu između antičkog i slovenskog makedonskog identiteta, ili o kontinuitetu ove dve identitetske konstrukcije. Kulminacija je dostignuta projektom „Skoplje 2004“ i takozvanom „Antikvizacijom“, kada je veliki broj novih spomenika podignut u prestonici Republike Makedonije.

Etnički raznovrsno i verski podeljeno društvo Makedonije, uz stalnu opasnost od etno-političke i ekonomske nestabilnosti, predstavlja uzrok neprestane mobilnosti ljudi i emigracije. U potrazi za boljim životom, građani Makedonije su pronašli mnogo „alternativnih puteva“ za ostvarenje svoje potrebe za mobilnošću ili emigriranjem u zapadne

države Evropske unije, kao što su, na primer: dobijanje bugarskog državljanstva, traženje azila, otvaranje kompanija u zemljama članicama Evropske unije, itd.

Statistički podaci sa popisa iz 2021. godine govore da se ukupan broj stanovnika u zemlji smanjio za više od 10% u poslednjoj deceniji. Izvori iz Svetske banke navode da je više od pola miliona građana Severne Makedonije otišlo iz zemlje. Velika emigracija iz Makedonije tokom poslednje decenije utiče na društveni, kulturni, ekonomski i politički život Makedonije. Prazna sela i gradovi izgrađeni po uzoru na zapadnjačku arhitekturu promenili su društveno-kulturne mikrosisteme i habitus naroda i uspostavili „nove tradicije“, posebno kada je reč o običajima vezanim za životni ciklus (rođenje, venčanje i smrt). Identitetski konflikti uspostavljaju nove granice i nove kolektivne kulturne modele.

Nakon velikih izazova koje je postavio spor oko imena sa Republikom Grčkom, kao i nesporazuma sa Republikom Bugarskom u vezi sa istorijom, Republika Severna Makedonija se sada suočava sa unutrašnjim društvenim problemom. Da li će se razvijati, kao i do sada, u etničkoj demokratiji koja je dovela do velikih podela u društvu, na svim nivoima i po svim osnovama, ili kao jedno integrisano i kohezivno društvo? Iako se Ohridskim okvirnim sporazumom ustavno garantuje multikulturalni normativni okvir u cilju očuvanja multikulturalnog karaktera društva, Sporazum kao takav nije dovoljan za obezbeđivanje društvene kohezije, to jest, integracije u društvu. Potpuna implementacija svih ostalih normativnih rešenja iz zakonskog sistema (obaveze preuzete po međunarodnim sporazumima) jeste neophodan preduslov za veću pokrivenost svih marginalizovanih i ranjivih kategorija ljudi koji trpe isključivanje iz društva i nemaju dovoljnu zaštitu. Pokušaj Republike Severne Makedonije da stvori nacionalnu strategiju za razvoj koncepta jednog društva i interkulturalizma jeste pionirski sistemski pokušaj države da usmeri društvene procese u pravcu integracije i kohezije. Implementacija ove strategije treba da predstavlja početak eliminacije svih linija podele po etničkim osnovama.

NORTH MACEDONIA A COUNTRY OF BIG SOCIAL DIVERSITY, CONTROVERSIES AND CHALLENGES

In the processes of bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia, Macedonian society was described as "peace oasis", since it successfully avoided the war conflicts of 1990s, even though some inter-ethnic tensions were present "in the air", as well as some physical altercations between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians.

After the collapse of Tito's Yugoslavia, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia entered into the process of building a new social order, which brought new moments in the relations between the individual and the society, but also in the relations between group and society. The newly formed political pluralism and multi-party system, did not reflect the social division and channelize the different socio-cultural and economic interests of the citizens. Ethnic affiliation and ethnic polarization have strengthened significantly, especially through the establishment of political parties based mainly on ethnic identities. Thus, in Macedonian politics, the ethnicization of the political system was widely promoted.

An issue of high education in Albanian language was the biggest inter-ethnic dispute in the 1990s! The Kosovo issue and the war in 1999 had had their effect on the civil conflict in Macedonia in 2001, which finished with the so-called Ohrid Framework Agreement and transformation of the Republic of Macedonia from national to hybrid state and society. Ethnic Macedonians want to build nation-state, ethnic Albanians are implementing bi-national politics, while other, smaller communities are dreaming of multicultural society. The Ohrid Framework Agreement resulted in implementation of the so-called Power Sharing policies and adequate and just participation in state institutions and society.

With proclamation of the independence, the so-called name dispute concerning the name of Macedonia was brought to the surface. But opposition was not only by Greeks, concerning the name of the state, but also Bulgaria about the ethnic identity, language and history of Macedonians, as well as by Serbian Orthodox Church, concerning the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. On the other hand, the debate concerning the conflict between Ancient Macedonian and Slavic Macedonian identity, or continuity between these two identity constructions were very much present in the public discourse. Culmination was achieved with a project "Skopje 2004" and the so-called "Antiquization", when a big number of new monuments were erected in the capital of the Republic of Macedonia.

Its ethnically diverse and religiously divided society, supplemented with permanent danger of ethno-political and economic instability, is a source of continuously human mobility and emigration. Asking for better life, citizens of Macedonia found a lot of "alternative ways" to realize their need for human mobility, or emigration to the Western EU, as are for example: getting Bulgarian citizenship, asylum seeking, establishing companies in the EU member states, etc.

Statistical data from the census in 2021 show that the total population of the country has decreased by more than 10% in the last decades. Sources from the World Bank are saying that more than half a million citizens of North Macedonia leave or emigrated from the country, The great emigration in the last decade from Macedonia has had an influence on social, cultural, economic and political life in Macedonia. Empty villages and towns with new western architecture models, changed the socio-cultural micro-systems, as well as the habitus of people, and established "new traditions", especially in the customs related to the life cycle (baby-birth, wedding and death). Identity conflicts are establishing new boundaries and new collective cultural models.

After the great challenge concerning the name dispute it had with the Republic of Greece, as well as the misunderstandings imposed by the Republic of Bulgaria regarding history, the Republic of North Macedonia, is facing an internal social problem. Will it still develop as it has until now, as an ethnic democracy, which has led to great divisions in the society at all levels and on all bases, or as one integrated and cohesive society? Although with the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the multicultural normative framework has been constitutionally guaranteed with the preservation of the multicultural character of the society, yet as such, it is not sufficient to ensure social cohesion, that is, integration in the society. Full implementation of all other normative solutions from the legal system (obligations assumed by international agreements) is required, as a prerequisite to having greater coverage of all marginalized and vulnerable categories of people who suffer the exclusion from the society and insufficient protection. The attempts of the Republic of North Macedonia involving the national strategy for the development of the concept of One Society and interculturalism, represent a pioneering, systematic attempt by the state to direct the processes in the society towards integration and cohesiveness. Implementation of this strategy should begin to eliminate all the divisions based on ethnicity.

TRIDESET GODINA TRANZICIJE U SRBIJI IZMEĐU RETRADICIONALIZACIJE I REFLEKSIVNE MODERNIZACIJE

Tokom poslednjih trideset godina menjao se sociološki pristup društvenoj tranziciji u Srbiji. Na početku tranzicijskog perioda, istraživači su se oslanjali na nasleđenu paradigmu „društvenog razvoja“ i ideološku orijentaciju egalitarizma, pa su se bavili raznim oblicima nejednakosti, od klasne strukture društva do rodnih i porodičnih nejednakosti (Popović et al. 1991). Tranzitološki meta-teorijski okvir zatim je doneo linearnu perspektivu o očekivanim društvenim promenama koje su izostale („blokirana“ tranzicija). Zatim je nakon desetak godina dominantni okvir postala konsolidacija, paradigma „gubitnika i dobitnika“, a istražuju se socijalni kapital, strategije, resursi, rizici (Bolčić, 1995; Bolčić, Milić, 2002; Milić, 2004; Tomanović, 2006; Vujović, 2008).

U različitim teorijskim okvirima se pominje pitanje modernizacije i retradicionalizacije kao distinkcija društvene tranzicije i postsocijalizma. U slučaju Srbije, retradicionalizacija se posmatra u kontekstu situacionih faktora (ratovi, dezintegracija državnog okvira, ekonomski pad, izolacija), a povezuje se i sa autoritarnošću (Flere, 1991) i repatrijarhalizacijom (Milinkov, 2014; Blagojević, 1993). To implicira da se nakon „prve“ (socijalističke) modernizacije javljaju pred-modernizacijski obrasci društvenih institucija i identiteta, odnosno, da se zemlja „zaglavila“ u stanju prve modernizacije i ne može da pređe u fazu tzv. „druge modernizacije“, koju odlikuje refleksivnost, individualizacija, gubljenje značaja kolektivnih identiteta i tradicijskih normi (Bek, Gidens). Ovde ćemo pokušati da pokažem da treba nijansirati dualizam tradicija-modernizacija, odnosno da pored retradicionalizacije postoje efekti selektivne socijalističke modernizacije i naznake refleksivne modernizacije.

Na proces retradicionalizacije dosta ubedljivo ukazuju sledeće društvene pojave: desekularizacija i jačanje religijskih organizacija, pad učešća žena u politici, jačanje kolektiviteta kroz etničke identitetske odrednice, familizacija mreže socijalne sigurnosti, porodične strukture koje odražavaju objedinjavanje resursa kroz stambenu i finansijsku filijalnu solidarnost. Istraživanja pokazuju da je retradicionalizacija nastupila kao rezultat procesa devedesetih, i to snažno, brzo i sveobuhvatno u mnogim slojevima društvenosti. U periodu kraja osamdesetih, nasleđe socijalizma je još uvek bilo prisutno. Istraživanje iz 1989. pokazuje da je religija percipirana kao najmanje važna u republikama gde je veoma brzo došlo do rata na osnovu različite religijske pripadnosti. Najmanje se sumnjalo u održivost etnički „mešovitih“ brakova upravo u područjima gde se etnička pripadnost smatrala razlogom za sukob. Ujedno je verska pripadnost supružnika bila najmanje bitna u tim republikama SFRJ.

Ipak, najveći deo onoga što se označava kao retradicionalizacija u Srbiji spada u tzv. značenjski-konstituišuće tradicije (*meaning-constitutive*

traditions) (Gross, 2005). Za razliku od regulativnih tradicija (*regulative traditions*) koje sa procesom modernizacije opadaju, ove forme prvenstveno na simboličkom nivou daju smisao. Kada je reč o Srbiji, najveći deo „vraćanja“ ili rekonstrukcije tradicije spada u ovu kategoriju, od etničkih identifikacija, rodni i porodičnih institucija. U segmentu heteronormativnih intimnih i porodičnih odnosa, regulativne tradicije nestaju još u predtranzicijskom periodu u najvećem delu ondašnjeg društva. Ogromna većina ispitanika SFRJ (osim Kosova) navela je 1989. godine da njihova porodica nije imala uticaj na izbor bračnog partnera. Može se prigovoriti da su u Srbiji retradicionalizacija očitava u relativno stabilnim stopama bračnosti i razvoda, uz vrednovanje formalnog braka i spor porast kohabitacija, što predstavlja odstupanje od Druge demografske tranzicije. Međutim, opstajanje institucije braka danas kao preferirane forme počiva na prednostima u odnosu na kohabitaciju, odnosno vanbračnu zajednicu (koja u Srbiji nema sve praktične prednosti kao brak), dok ritualni elementi (venčanje, obredi prelaza i religijska komponenta) imaju identitetski, estetski i sentimentalni aspekt. Drugi primer značenjsko-konstitutivne tradicije jeste desekularizacija, uprkos jačanju verskih organizacija u periodu tranzicije i konsolidacije (ulazak verske nastave u javno obrazovanje, saradnja sa političkom sferom). Istraživanje iz 1989. pokazuje određenu matricu uverenja specifičnu za dominantnu pravoslavnu religiju u Srbiji. Tako je manje od polovine vernika verovalo u boga, zagrobni život, postojanje duše, raj, pakao. Stepenski disonance najizraženiji je bio kod pravoslavnih vernika u odnosu na druge denominacije i nastavio se u kasnijem periodu. Odnos prema reproduktivnim pravima pravoslavnih vernika pokazuje „liberalniji“ odnos koji opstaje i tokom perioda pomenute retradicionalizacije, o čemu govore podaci iz nekoliko talasa Svetske studije vrednosti (WVS) tokom devedesetih i početkom dveihiljaditih.

Paralelno sa retradicionalizacijom, opstaju efekti selektivne socijalističke modernizacije. Na primer, stavovi o egalitarnim rodnim odnosima opstali su kroz uverenja o potrebi ekonomske samostalnosti žena, obrazovanju i principijelnoj ravnopravnosti učešća u javnom životu. Međutim, neke asimetrične rodne matrice su opstale kroz period socijalizma i kasnije. Nasleđe socijalizma vidi se u uverenju da žene treba da idu ranije u penziju nego muškarci, uprkos realnom trendu koji ide ka izjednačavanju granice za penziju (Ignjatović et al. 2010). Selektivnost socijalističke modernizacije pokazuje nagli pad učešća žena u politici nakon uvođenja višepartijskog sistema i tek postepeni porast zahvaljujući merama baziranim na kvotama za manje zastupljen pol, uz sve probleme formalizma i nedostatka „supstantivne reprezentacije“ (Čičkarić). Zanimljivo je da su upravo zemlje sa visokim nivoom rodne egalitarnosti u društvu pred početak tranzicije, imale najbolji ishod tranzicije u drugim domenima kao što je ekonomska tranzicija (Slovenija).

Refleksivna modernizacija je treći proces koji se odvija paralelno sa retradicionalizacijom i efektima prve socijalističke modernizacije. U raznim teorijskim okvirima ideja „druge modernizacija“ podrazumeva

detradicionalizaciju, smanjenje značaja „kulturnih kodova i pravila“ (Bauman), individualizaciju i refleksivnost, individualizovano upravljanje rizicima sopstvenog „životnog projekta“. (Gidens, Bek, Bek-Gernšajm). Iako parcijalno i u specifičnim uslovima, u Srbiji postoje procesi koji pripadaju refleksivnoj modernizaciji. Na primer, nizak fertilitet i odlaganje rađanja jesu aspekti “Druge demografske tranzicije” koji pripadaju refleksivnoj modernizaciji, a njeno dejstvo se opire populacionoj politici i različitim intervencijama za rešavanje niskog fertiliteta. Novija istraživanja pokazuju da životni tok mladih u Srbiji ima neke odlike refleksivne modernosti, uprkos familizmu, krizi i drugačijim rizicima. Odnosno, „hronična društvena kriza“ stvara drugačije rizike u odnosu na društva razvijene modernosti (Tomanović, 2021). Usled nedovoljno izgrađenih institucija, na rizike se odgovara odlaganjem odluka ili pribegava „prečicama“ putem dostupnog socijalnog kapitala, što stvara jednu posebnu varijantu refleksivne modernizacije. Konačno, klasna identifikacija gubi svoj značaj nezavisno od lokalnih ekonomskih specifičnosti (proces fragmentacije radničke klase, slabljenja sindikata), što predstavlja takođe aspekt refleksivne modernizacije.

THIRTY YEARS OF TRANSITION IN SERBIA BETWEEN RETRADITIONALISATION AND REFLEXIVE MODERNISATION

Over the past thirty years, the sociological approach to transition in Serbia has shifted. At the beginning of the transition period, researchers relied on the paradigm of “social development” of the past and the ideological orientation of egalitarianism, tackling different forms of inequality, from the social class structure to gender and within-family inequalities (Popović et al. 1991). Transitological meta-theoretical framework then brought a linear perspective regarding the expected social changes which failed to occur (“blocked” transition). Some ten years later, consolidation took over as the dominant framework with the “losers and winners” paradigm, giving way to research into social capital, strategies, resources, and risks (Bolčić, 1995; Bolčić, Milić, 2002; Milić, 2004; Tomanović, 2006; Vujović, 2008).

Various theoretical frameworks refer to the issue of modernisation and retraditionalisation as a distinction between social transition and post-socialism. In the case of Serbia, retraditionalisation is seen through the prism of situational factors (wars, disintegration of state structures, economic decline, isolation), authoritarianism (Flere, 1991) and repatriarchalization (Milinkov, 2014; Blagojević, 1993). Said approach implies that the pre-modernisation patterns in social institutions and identities emerged following the “first” (socialist) modernisation, leaving the country “stuck” at the stage of the first modernisation, unable to move on to the so-called “second modernisation” stage, characterised by reflexivity, individualisation, a decline in the significance of collective identities and traditional norms (Beck, Giddens). In this paper, we will try to show that the dualism of tradition vs modernisation should be nuanced, i.e., that retraditionalisation exists in parallel with the effects of selective socialist modernisation and reflexive modernisation.

The following social phenomena indicate the process of retraditionalisation quite convincingly: desecularisation and strengthening of religious organisations, a decline in participation of women in politics, strengthening of collectivity through ethnic identity determinants, familiarisation of social safety nets, family structures involving the pooling of resources through housing and financial filial solidarity. Research suggests that the retraditionalisation was a result of various processes that occurred throughout the 1990s, sweeping quickly and forcefully through multiple layers of sociability. In the late 1980s, the legacy of socialism was still tangible. Research conducted in 1989 shows that the republics that perceived religion as the least important were the ones where the war caught on quickly under the premise of religious affiliation. The viability of ethnically “mixed” marriages gave the least cause for concern precisely in areas where ethnic affiliation was con-

sidered a reason for conflict. Moreover, the spouse's religious affiliation was considered the least important in said republics of the SFR Yugoslavia.

Still, most of what is labelled as retraditionalisation in Serbia belongs to the so-called *meaning-constitutive traditions* (Gross, 2005). Unlike regulative traditions, which decline simultaneously with modernisation, these forms of tradition offer meaning mainly at the symbolic level. When it comes to Serbia, the "return" or reconstruction of tradition belongs mainly to this category, from ethnic identification to gender and family institutions. In the heteronormative intimate and family relations segment, regulative traditions disappear as early as the pre-transitional period in most of the society of the time. In 1989, a vast majority of respondents in the SFRY (excluding Kosovo) said that their family did not influence the choice of their spouses. One may object that retraditionalisation in Serbia is reflected in relatively stable marriage and divorce rates, placing value on formal marriage and a slow increase in cohabitation, revealing a deviation from the Second demographic transition. However, the survival of the institution of marriage as the preferred form rests on its advantages over cohabitation, i.e. extramarital union (which in Serbia does not have all the practical advantages of marriage). In contrast, the ritual elements (wedding, rites of passage, and the religious component) take on identity, aesthetic, and sentimental aspects. Another example of meaning-constitutive traditions is seen in desecularisation, despite the strengthening of religious organisations during the transition and consolidation period (introduction of religious classes in public education, cooperation with the political sphere). The 1989 research reveals a particular pattern of beliefs specific to Serbia's dominant, Orthodox religion. The research shows that less than half of respondents believed in God, the afterlife, the existence of the soul, heaven, hell, etc. The degree of dissonance was the most prominent among Orthodox believers compared with other denominations, and it remained prominent later on. Orthodox believers' attitudes towards reproductive rights reveal a more "liberal" stance, which persisted throughout retraditionalisation, as suggested by the data from several World Values Surveys (WVS) conducted in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Simultaneously with retraditionalisation, the effects of selective socialist modernisation persist. For instance, attitudes towards egalitarian gender relations have persisted through beliefs about the need for women's economic independence, education, and principled equality regarding participation in public life. However, certain asymmetric gender patterns remained intact throughout socialism and later on. The legacy of socialism is reflected in the belief that women should retire at an earlier age than men, despite the marked trend of equalising the retirement age for women and men (Ignjatović et al. 2010). The selectivity of socialist modernisation reveals a marked decline in the participation of women in politics following the introduction of the multi-party system and merely a gradual increase in women's par-

ticipation due to measures involving quotas for the underrepresented gender, pestered with the issue of formality and the lack of “substantive representation” (Čičkarić). Interestingly, the countries which accounted for a high degree of gender equality in the society before the transition were the ones where the transition yielded the best results in other areas, such as economic transition (Slovenia).

Reflexive modernisation is the third process coinciding with retraditionalisation and the afterglow of the first socialist modernisation. In various theoretical frameworks, the idea of “the second modernisation” implies detraditionalisation, diminishing importance of “cultural codes and rules” (Bauman), individualisation and reflexivity, individualised risk management of one’s own “life-project” (Giddens, Beck, *Beck-Gernsheim*). Even though partially and in specific conditions, processes inherent to reflexive modernisation still occur in Serbia. For instance, low fertility rates and childbirth postponement are considered aspects of “the second demographic transition” and are part of reflexive modernisation, with its effects seen in the resistance against the population policy and various interventions aimed at tackling low fertility. Recent research suggests that the life course of young people in Serbia has certain features of reflexive modernity, despite familism, crises, and various risks. In other words, “chronic social crisis” involves different risks compared to societies of late modernity (Tomanović, 2021). Due to underdeveloped institutions, risk response involves delayed decisions or resorting to “shortcuts” using the available social capital, creating a separate variant of reflexive modernisation. Finally, the significance of class identification is diminishing regardless of local economic characteristics (processes of working-class fragmentation, weakening of trade unions), which is also one of the aspects of reflexive modernisation.

HRVATSKA IZMEĐU EUFORIJE I EUTANAZIJE

Kao prilog raspravi o društvenim, ekonomskim, političkim i vrijednosnim promjenama u društvima nastalim na postjugoslavenskom prostoru, ovo izlaganje fokusira se na Hrvatsku, i to na posljednjih petnaest godina koje su na političkom, ekonomskom, i društvenom nivou bile obilježene procesom ulaska Republike Hrvatske u Organizaciju sjevernoatlantskog ugovora (NATO) i Europsku uniju (EU) ili, drugačije (i preciznije) rečeno, ulaskom NATO-a i EU u Hrvatsku. Naime, taj proces je diktirao ne samo sistemske i strukturne promjene u sferi „visoke politike“ i makroekonomije, nego i cjelokupnu društvenu dinamiku. Stoga najprije treba prikazati i analizirati rečeni kontekst, jer bi „hrvatsko iskustvo“, osim za razumijevanje situacije u samoj Hrvatskoj, moglo također biti korisno za analizu aktualnih i predviđanje budućih procesa u drugim postjugoslavenskim zemljama, posebno onima koje još uvijek nisu dijelom NATO-a i/ili EU.

Usprkos dominantnim „eshatološkim“ narativima o tzv. „euroatlantskim integracijama“, koji izvire iz svojevrstne „metafizike tranzicije“, očito je da se u periodu prije i poslije pristupanja Republike Hrvatske NATO-u (2009) i EU (2013) ni u kojem aspektu ne može govoriti o pravolinijskom društvenom razvoju, pogotovo ne o pravolinijskom razvoju u pozitivnom smislu, nego samo o izmjeničnom jačanju i slabljenju određenih socijalnih tendencija na mikro i mezoplanu (npr. po pitanju demokratizacije kao oslobađanja prostora za raspravu i djelovanje građana i građanki mimo utvrđenih instancija Države i Kapitala), te o dijalektici obećanja i razočaranja na makroplanu, što autor ovog priloga (u svojoj knjizi *Euforija i eutanazija: akutni zapisi o kroničnim problemima*, 2019) tumači kao dijalektiku konstantno podgrijavane socijalne euforije, s jedne strane, i sistematskog eutanaziranja društva i društvenosti, te zajednice i zajedničkosti, s druge strane.

S obzirom na globalizacijske trendove, uključujući „euroatlantske integracije“, potrebno je uzeti u obzir i globalni političko-ekonomski model čije se djelovanje vrlo dobro može pratiti i na primjeru Hrvatske. Radi se o koaliciji birokratsko-partitokratsko-militarističke politike i neoliberalističko-kapitalističke ekonomije, kojima ideološki i praktički asistiraju redukcionistička tehnoznanost i manipulativni masovni mediji. Njihovo sve eksplicitnije djelovanje čini opravdanim, ako ne i nužnim, deskripciju i analizu tog modela kao eksplanatorni okvir za razne socijalne fenomene s kojima se suočavamo ne samo na svjetskom i europskom nego i na hrvatskom nivou.

U naznačenom okviru razmatra se nekoliko međusobno povezanih tema, čije skupno sagledavanje može doprinijeti sklapanju mozaika koji bi učinio jasnijim socijalna gibanja u drugih petnaest godina postojanja Republike Hrvatske.

Kao prvo, neizbježno je ukazati na ono što je obilježilo prethodni period (od početka devedesetih godina 20. stoljeća nadalje), a to su: osamo-

staljenje Republike Hrvatske i užurbano raskidanje s jugoslavenskim i socijalističkim nasljeđem na svim razinama; rat i njegove katastrofalne materijalne i druge posljedice; ekstremni etnonacionalizam skupa s historijskim revizionizmom i poticanjem ili toleriranjem nasilja prema „drugacijima“; implicitno i eksplicitno suzbijanje demokratskih inicijativa, pogotovo onih koje su dolazile s lijeve strane političkog spektra; kriminogena i kriminalna privatizacija, te nastanak nove „društvene elite“ usko povezane s političkom oligarhijom; deindustrijalizacija, proletarijacija, nezaposlenost i prekarizacija; klerikalizacija društvenog života, i tako dalje.

Kao drugu temu ističemo poslijeratnu težnju k „normalizaciji“ u svrhu približavanja „Europi“ i „Zapadu“, pri čemu je teško otkloniti dojam da je donedavna frazeologija „Jugoslavije, samoupravljanja i socijalizma“ samo zamijenjena frazama o EU/NATO-u, tržišnom gospodarstvu i kapitalizmu. Deklaracije o „suverenoj i samostalnoj Hrvatskoj“, nakon oslobađanja Hrvatske i hrvatskog naroda od podređenog položaja u jugoslavenskoj federaciji (i osobito od velikosrpske hegemonije), tako su se vrlo brzo istopile zbog vrela čežnje za „Europom“ i „Zapadom“, da bi se Hrvatska *de facto* pretvorila u koloniju EU i NATO-a, iako je u tim asocijacijama Republika Hrvatska nominalno ravnopravna članica.

Kao treće, identificiranje „Europe“ i „Zapada“ s kapitalizmom (poželjno onim „s ljudskim licem“, iako je stvarnost neprestano govorila drugačije) obesnaživalo je otpor antisocijalnim i dehumanizirajućim značajkama kapitalizma, tako da je korak po korak učvršćivana predodžba o kapitalizmu kao „najboljem od svih mogućih svjetova“ ili čak jedinom, bez alternative, što je ne samo na političkom nego i na socijalnom planu rezultiralo tzv. „neoliberalnim konsenzusom“, odnosno rezigniranim pristajanjem na pseudodemokratske i antidemokratske implikacije (neoliberalnog) kapitalizma.

Kao četvrto, a s prethodnim itekako povezano, treba razmotriti ulogu ljevice u opisanim zbivanjima. Premda su određeni otpori „euroatlantskim integracijama“ ili barem zahtjevi za njihovim propitivanjem dolazili s ljevice, kao i otpori manje ili više „divljem“ kapitalizmu (što je u jednom periodu dovelo i do bujanja direktnodemokratski i antikapitalistički orijentiranih inicijativa i pokreta usmjerenih ponajviše na problematiku ekologije, urbanih prostora, rada i obrazovanja), danas takvo nešto pronalazimo samo u tragovima, u određenim enklavama koje su javno jedva vidljive. Stoga treba istražiti u kojoj je mjeri na taj, smatramo, negativan razvoj utjecalo odustajanje od kritičkog stava spram globalnog političko-ekonomskog sistema, uključujući kritiku kapitalizma kao takvog, te fokusiranje na palijativne mjere koje se tiču određeni društvenih grupa, u kojoj mjeri tzv. „mejnstrimiziranje“ (na primjer, pretvaranje građanskih inicijativa i pokreta u političke partije i njihov ulazak u oficijelnu političku arenu), a u kojoj mjeri, što također može biti hipoteza, novije informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije koje su nekoć snažni „ulični aktivizam“, „rad u bazi“, plodonosnu socijalnu konfrontaciju i direktnu akciju velikim dijelom preselile u virtualnu sferu,

gdje se utapaju u neefikasnoj „postmodernističkoj“ kakofoniji.

Kao peto, ističemo gibanja na desnici u Hrvatskoj u posljednjih petnaestak godina. Tradicionalno je hrvatska desnica u ideološko-političkom smislu bila svjetonazorski konzervativna i nacionalistička (a povremeno i šovinistička), ali je u ekonomskom pogledu bila ukorijenjena u kršćansko-katoličkim socijalnim pogledima seljaka i radnika, te je bila mnogo bliža socijalističkim stavovima i politikama, nego onim kapitalističkim. Tokom devedesetih godina je, zbog nekih prethodno opisanih trendova, u ideološkom smislu, rasla zbrka na tom planu, a u posljednje vrijeme može se uočiti ideološka konsolidacija, i to zbog sve većeg utjecaja američkog tipa neokonzervativizma, koji promovira nekoliko hrvatskih građanskih pokreta, nevladinih organizacija i političkih partija, a koji spaja neoliberalne ekonomsko-političke poglede, kršćanske fundamentalističke poglede na seksualnost, reprodukciju i porodicu, te čitav spektar isključujućih stavova koji se tiču zapadnjačko-kršćansko-bjelačko-patrijarhalne supremacije. Oni su ne samo postigli zavidan stupanj organizacije i koordinacije nego su također „hakirali“ metode i vizualne identitete koji su do sada bili svojstveni ljevičarskim inicijativama i organizacijama, vješto ostvarujući načela „kulturne hegemonije“ s paralelnom političkom borbom. Za Hrvatsku je to novost, pa je stoga to posebno interesantan fenomen koji treba tretirati ne samo s obzirom na Hrvatsku nego i komparativno, dakle, u vezi sa sličnim gibanjima u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama i nekim europskim zemljama, primjerice, s onima u Njemačkoj (politička partija AfD – *Alternative für Deutschland*, te pokreti kao što su PEGIDA i Querdenker).

Naposljedku, kao šesto, nastojat ćemo navedene trendove učiniti plastičnijim koristeći tri primjera koja se odnose na vitalne sfere društva, a to su: znanost i obrazovanje, javno zdravstvo, te poljoprivreda. U njima, naime, možemo konstatirati i točke otpora galopirajućim političko-ekonomskim i antisocijalnim trendovima, kao i rapidnu degradaciju javne sfere, a time i perspektiva demokra(tiza)cije u Hrvatskoj.

Ključne riječi: Hrvatska, Organizacija sjevernoatlantskog ugovora (NATO), Europska unija (EU), politika, ekonomija, društvo, civilno društvo, demokracija, demokratizacija, ljevica, desnica, neokonzervativizam, javno zdravstvo, znanost i obrazovanje, poljoprivreda

CROATIA BETWEEN EUPHORIA AND EUTHANASIA

As a contribution to the discussion on social, economic, political, and value changes in the societies created in the post-Yugoslav space, this speech focuses on Croatia in the last 15 years, which have politically, economically, and socially been marked by the process of the Republic of Croatia's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) or, put differently (and more precisely), by NATO's and EU's accession to Croatia. Namely, this process dictated not only systemic and structural changes in the "high politics" and macro-economy sphere but also the overall social dynamics. Therefore, the said context should first be presented and analysed because the "Croatian experience" might not only be useful for understanding the situation in Croatia itself but also for analysing the current and predicting the future processes in other post-Yugoslav countries, especially those that are still not part of NATO and/or the EU.

Despite the dominant "eschatological" narratives about the so-called "Euro-Atlantic integrations," which derive from a kind of "the metaphysics of transition," it is obvious that as concerns the period before and after Croatia's accession to NATO (2009) and the EU (2013) no straight-line social development can be spoken about, especially not in positive terms – one can only speak about the alternating strengthening and weakening of certain social tendencies at micro- and mezzo- level (e.g., regarding the question of democratisation as liberating the space for discussion and citizens' activity outside the established instances of the State and Capital), and the dialectics of promise and disappointment at macro-level, which the author of this contribution (in his 2019 book titled *Euforija i eutanazija: akutni zapisi o kroničnim problemima/Euphoria and Euthanasia: Acute Notes on Chronic Problems*) interprets as the dialectics of constantly warmed up social euphoria on the one hand and a systemic euthanasia of society and sociality, as well as community and commonality, on the other.

Considering the trends of globalisation, including the "Euro-Atlantic integrations," the global political-economic model should also be taken into consideration, whose application can rather well be observed in the example of Croatia. It is a coalition of bureaucratic-partocratic-militaristic politics and neoliberal-capitalist economy, assisted ideologically and practically by reductionist techno-science and manipulative mass media. The constantly more explicit resort to these makes justified, if not necessary, the description and analysis of the model as an explanatory framework for various social phenomena that we face not only globally or in Europe, but also in Croatia.

Within the stated framework, several mutually related themes are considered, which, when observed jointly, might contribute to

assembling the mosaic that would clarify the social movements in the second fifteen years of the Republic of Croatia's existence.

First, pointing out what marked the previous period (since the beginning of the 1990s) is inevitable, and this includes: independence of the Republic of Croatia and its speedy riddance of the Yugoslav and socialist heritage on all levels; the war and its catastrophic material and other consequences; extreme nationalism joined with historical revisionism and the encouragement or tolerance of violence against those who are "different"; implicit and explicit suppression of democratic initiatives, especially those from the left side of the political spectrum; criminogenic and criminal privatisation, and the creation of the new "social elite," closely related to the political oligarchy; de-industrialisation, proletarianization, unemployment, and precarity; clericalisation of social life, and so on.

The second topic refers to the post-war tendency towards "normalisation" with the purpose of approaching "Europe" and "the West," whereby it remains difficult to shed away the impression that the thus far used phrases focusing on "Yugoslavia, self-management, and socialism" were merely replaced with those about the EU/NATO, market economy, and capitalism. Declarations on the "sovereign independent Croatia" after its liberation and the liberation of the Croatian people from the subordinate position in the Yugoslav federation (and especially from the great-Serbian hegemony) melted away so very fast into the burning desire for "Europe" and "the West" that Croatia de facto transformed into a colony of the EU and NATO although it is nominally an equal member of these associations.

Third, identifying "Europe" and "the West" with capitalism (preferably with "a human face," although reality kept pointing out otherwise) weakened resistance to anti-social and dehumanising features of capitalism as "the best of all worlds" or even the single one, without an alternative, which not only politically but also socially resulted in the so-called "neoliberal consensus," that is, the resigned acceptance of pseudo-democratic and anti-democratic implications of (neoliberal) capitalism.

Fourth, and undoubtedly related to the former: the role of the left in the described events should be considered. Although certain resistance to the "Euro-Atlantic integration," or at least demands for questioning it, did come from the left, as did resistance to the more or less "wild" capitalism (which at a certain point led to a proliferation of directly democratic and anti-capitalist initiatives and movements, directed mostly towards environmental problems, urban spaces, labour and education), today we can only find traces of it, in certain enclaves which barely have any public visibility. Therefore, it needs to be investigated to what extent what we consider to be such negative development was influenced by the renunciation of the critical stance towards the global political-economic system, including the criticism of capitalism as such, and focus on the palliative measures pertaining to certain

social groups; to what extent it was influenced by the so-called “mainstreaming” (e.g., turning citizens’ initiatives and movements into political parties and introducing them to the official political arena); and to what extent – which can also be a hypothesis – the recent information and communications technologies, which largely moved the formerly strong “street activism,” “onsite work,” fruitful social confrontation and direct action to the realm of the virtual, where these were submerging in inefficient “postmodern” cacophony.

Fifth, we should point out the rightist movements in Croatia in the last fifteen years. Traditionally, the worldviews of the Croatian right were ideologically and politically conservative and nationalistic (sometimes also chauvinist), but they were economically rooted in the Christian-catholic social views of peasants and labourers, and therefore much closer to socialist stances and policies than capitalist. In the 1990s, due to some of the previously described trends, an ideological confusion grew in this respect, and an ideological consolidation has been noticeable lately due to the ever greater influence of the American type of neo-conservatism, which is promoted by several Croatian citizens’ movements, non-governmental organisations, and political parties, and which brings together neoliberal economic-political views, Christian fundamentalist views on sexuality, reproduction, and family, and a whole spectrum of excluding attitudes regarding the Western-Christian-white-patriarchal supremacy. They have not only achieved an enviable level of organisation and coordination but also “hacked” the methods and visual identities so far typical of leftist initiatives and organisations, deftly realising the principles of “cultural hegemony” alongside the political struggle. This is new to Croatia, and it is therefore an interesting phenomenon which should be treated not only as regards Croatia but also comparatively, that is, in relation to the similar movements in the United States of America and some European countries, for example, Germany (AfD political party – Alternative für Deutschland, and movements such as PEGIDA and Querdenker).

Sixth and last, we shall try to illuminate the mentioned trends using three examples which refer to the vital spheres of society, and these are: science and education, public health, and agriculture. Namely, we can use these to locate the points of resistance to the galloping political-economic and anti-social trends, as well as the rapid degradation of the public sphere, hence also prospects of democracy/-tisation in Croatia.

Keywords: Croatia, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU), politics, economics, society, civil society, democracy, democratisation, left wing, right wing, neo-conservatism, public health, science and education, agriculture

KOHEZIVNOST U DOBA PLURALIZACIJE – IZMEĐU RAZLIČITOSTI I JEDINSTVA

Savremena društva pluralizovana su u različitim dimenzijama i različite forme pluralizacije zahtijevaju različite političko-pravne odgovore. Pluralizacija, sa jedne strane, stavlja u prvi plan izazov kohezivnosti u savremenim društvima u kojima mora postojati određen stepen balansa između onoga što je različito i što svoju različitost želi da očuva i onoga što je zajedničko u jednoj političkoj zajednici i što pomaže da društvo ostane na okupu. Ovo posebno važi za demokratska društva u kojima, bez obzira na stepen konsolidacije, poštovanje različitosti predstavlja samu njihovu suštinu. Odnos prema različitom drugom u etnokulturnom smislu može postojati u rasponu od potpunog prihvatanja pa do potpunog odbacivanja i potenciranja razlike do isključivosti koja ostavlja malo ili nimalo prostora za ono što je zajedničko. Etnokulturno pluralna društva koja su pod dominacijom ideologije etnonacionalizma, kao što je slučaj sa društvima Balkana, pa i crnogorskim, i u kojem istovremeno postoji visok stepen politizacije i instrumentalizacije etnokulturnih identiteta, nekonsolidovana demokratija, autoritarna politička kultura i visok stepen podijeljenosti u različitim dimenzijama, nalaze se u riziku od slabljenja društvene kohezije zasnovane na vrijednostima i dimenzijama koje čine suštinu demokratskih poredaka.

Svijet oko nas uvijek sagledavamo i prema njemu se odnosimo polazeći od sopstvenog vrjednosnog sistema. Takođe, eventualna korekcija određenih stavova i promjena vrjednosnog okvira zavisi od naše spremnosti da ga preispitamo i eventualno promjenimo. Nepostojanje svijesti o određenim pojavama u društvu koje uključuju način na koji doživljavamo različitog drugog primjetna je. Na primjer, duboko ukorijenjeni i istorijski prisutni antiromizam u Crnoj Gori. Bez razumijevanja koliko je zapravo antiromizam ukorijenjen u Crnoj Gori, nema ni govora o smanjivanju etničke distance i prihvatanja etnokulturno *najrazličitijeg drugog* od strane članova ostalih etnokulturnih zajednica. Isključivo u društvu u kojem postoji potpuno sljepilo za rasnu diskriminaciju i nedostatak makar i minimalne introspekcije u tom smislu, može se dogoditi kampanja u kojoj su na fotografijama koje predstavljaju etnokulturne zajednice u Crnoj Gori Romi predstavljeni u odijelima radnika komunalnog preduzeća, dok su pripadnici ostalih zajednica predstavljeni u narodnim nošnjama. Ovaj nedavni događaj ogolio je svu ograničenost politika integracije koje ne uzimaju u obzir ovaj najdublji sloj stereotipa, predrasuda i rasne diskriminacije prema Romima u Crnoj Gori. U ovom slučaju, istorijski ukorijenjena *etnoekonomija* u kojoj se podrazumijeva da Romi uglavnom obavljaju najmanje plaćene i poslove koji su najmanje atraktivni za ostatak populacije, nastavlja da dominira. Umjesto sagledavanja problematičnosti navedene situacije u kojoj jedna etnokulturna zajednica nema ni kapaciteta ni mogućnosti da izađe iz začaranog kruga najmanje plaćenih poslova, što istovremeno dovodi u pitanje domete primijenjenih mjera i mehanizama u njenoj integraciji,

na djelu je upravo suprotno. Činjenica koja se tiče ekonomskog položaja Roma doživljava se kao imanentna Romima na način da postaje dio njihovog identiteta i u tolikom stepenu da zamjenjuje etnokulturna obilježja.

Stvaranje povoljnijeg ambijenta za individualne identitetske specifičnosti, poštovanje prostora slobode i prava svakog da se samodefiniše onako kako želi kao i razumijevanje i prihvatanje činjenice da je identitet dinamična kategorija – zadaci su koji stoje pred crnogorskim društvom u budućem periodu i neizostavan su dio njegove socijalizacije i demokratizacije.

Ključne riječi: Identitet, vrijednosti, etnokulturne zajednice, Romi, Crna Gora

COHESIVENESS IN THE ERA OF PLURALISATION – BETWEEN DIVERSITY AND UNITY

Modern societies are pluralised in their different dimensions, and different forms of pluralisation require different political and legal responses. Pluralisation, on the one hand, puts to the fore the challenge of cohesiveness in modern societies, where a certain balance needs to be stricken between what is different and wants to preserve its difference, and what is common in a political community and helps the society to remain unified. This is especially characteristic for democratic societies where, regardless of the level of consolidation, respect for diversity makes their very essence. Relationship towards a different other in the ethno-cultural sense, ranges from complete acceptance to complete rejection and emphasising the difference to the point of exclusion, which leaves little or no space for what is common. Ethno-culturally plural societies dominated by the ideology of ethno-nationalism, as is the case with Balkan societies, including Montenegro, where high levels of politicisation and instrumentalisation of ethno-cultural identities simultaneously exist with unconsolidated democracy, authoritarian political culture and a high level of division in different dimensions, are at risk of their social cohesion, based on the values and dimensions which make the essence of democratic systems, being weakened.

We perceive the world around us and form our attitude towards it based on our own value system. Also, potential adjustment of certain attitudes and changes in the value framework depend on our readiness to reconsider and eventually change it. There is a noticeable lack of awareness concerning certain social phenomena, including the way in which we perceive different other, for example, the deeply rooted and historically present Antigypsism in Montenegro. Without understanding of the level of Antigypsism in Montenegro, there is no way for the ethnic distance to be decreased and for the most different other in the ethno-cultural sense to be accepted by the members of the remaining ethno-cultural communities. Only in the society with utter blindness for racial discrimination and the lack of even slightest introspection can witness a campaign where, in the photographs presenting different ethno-cultural communities, Roma are represented wearing uniforms of a waste management company, while members of the remaining communities are in their national costumes. This recent incident exposed all the limitations of integration policies that do not take into account the most profound level of stereotyping, prejudices and racial discrimination against Roma in Montenegro. In this case, the historically rooted *ethno-economy* which assumes that Roma mainly perform the least paid jobs and the jobs that the remaining population finds the least attractive, continues to be dominant. Instead of considering the problematic situation where an ethno-cultural community

has neither the capacity, nor possibility to leave the vicious circle of the least paid jobs, which simultaneously puts into question the scope of the measures and mechanisms utilised in its integration, what does happen is quite the reverse. A fact that concerns Roma's economic position is perceived as being immanent in Roma, thus becoming a part of their identity to such extent that it replaces their ethno-cultural characteristics.

Creation of an environment more conducive to individual identity characteristics, respect of the freedom and rights of everyone to self-define in the way they want and understanding and acceptance of the fact that identity is a dynamic category – these are all tasks lying ahead of the Montenegrin society in the future period, making an unavoidable part of its socialisation and democratisation.

Keywords: identity, values, ethno-cultural communities, Roma, Montenegro

ŽIVOT JE TOK
LIFE IS A COURSE

VREDNOSTI I PROMENE POLITIČKOG I DRUŠTVENOG PORETKA

Smisao promena za ljudski život. Promene političkih i društvenih poredaka – istorijski pristup. Promene u strateškim sistemima države: političkom, ekonomskom, socijalnom i vrednosnom sistemu. Politički pristupi promenama vrednosti i vrednosnog sistema. Bitne društvene i državne oblasti, sistemi i institucije koje bi trebalo da svoju stabilnost zasnivaju na vrednostima i vrednosnom sistemu: obrazovanje, zdravstvo, mediji, pravosudni sistem i državne i javne institucije i službe. Slom socijalističkog i samoupravnog sistema u Jugoslaviji i Srbiji i posledice po vrednosti i vrednosni sistem. Ideološki i politički pluralizam i vrednosti. Kriza vrednosnog sistema. Nacionalizam i vrednosti. Pragmatizam i vrednosti. Vrednosni vakum u Srbiji. Urušavanje moralnih vrednosti i moralnog delovanja i ponašanja. Uloga medijske propagande i jeftine zabave u urušavanju moralnih vrednosti i moralnog ponašanja u poslednje tri decenije u Srbiji. Urušavanje profesionalizma i integriteta pojedinaca i institucija. Kriza i urušavanje čovečnosti. Da li ima izlaza i koji su mogući putevi i načini prihvatanja vrednosti kao orijentira za razvoj ličnog, društvenog i političkog života u Srbiji?

THE VALUES AND CHANGES IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORDER

Meaning of change in human life. Changes of political and social orders – historical approach. Changes in the strategic systems of a state: political, economic, social and value system. Political approach to changes in values and value system. Significant social and state fields, systems and institutions that should have their stability founded on values and value system: education, healthcare, media, justice and state and public institutions and agencies. Breakdown of the socialist and self-government system of Yugoslavia and Serbia, and its consequences on the values and value system. Ideological and political pluralism and values. The value system crisis. Nationalism and values. Pragmatism and values. Value vacuum in Serbia. Degradation of moral values and moral agency and behaviour. The role of media propaganda and cheap entertainment in the degradation of moral values and moral behaviour in the last three decades in Serbia. Degradation of professionalism and integrity of individuals and institutions. Crisis and degradation of humanity. Is there a way out and what are the possible avenues and modes of accepting values as a landmark in developing personal, social and political life in Serbia?

PROMJENE U VRIJEDNOSNIM ORIJENTACIJAMA U HRVATSKOJ

Na temelju analize relevantnih istraživanja provedenima u poljima sociologije, socijalne psihologije i politologije (počevši od 1986.) te komparacije nalaza ranijih istraživanja s nalazima recentnijih i recentnih istraživanja mogu se izvesti sljedeći zaključci u pogledu promjena do kojih se na planu vrijednosnih orijentacija došlo u Hrvatskoj.

Unatoč socijalističkoj modernizaciji (započetoj 1945) i političkoj liberalizaciji do koje dolazi krajem osamdesetih godina prošlog stoljeća vrijednosne orijentacije u hrvatskom društvu bile su u godinama raspada Jugoslavije determinirane nasljeđenom dominantnom patrijarhalnom, autoritarnom, etnocentričkom i tradicionalističkom sviješću (što po svoj prilici ne odudara od stanja u drugim jugoslavenskim republikama).

Novija istraživanja potvrđuju da su vrijednosne orijentacije i dalje u značajnoj mjeri obilježene predmodernom socijalnom i vrijednosnom strukturom, ali je primat kolektivnih tradicionalističkih vrijednosti (zasnovanih na patrijarhalizmu, autoritarizmu i etnocentrizmu, te dodatno potaknut procesima retraditionalizacije, što se kvantitativno očituje u jednom nalazu prema kojemu je autoritarnost oslabila za 8,6%, a kolektivistički etatizam za 13,9%, dok je etnocentrizam porastao za 22,6%) nadopunjen prihvaćanjem liberalizma u sferi privrede, kao i određenim jačanjem elemenata individualističkih vrijednosti razvijenih zapadnih zemalja (ali u značajnoj mjeri se individualizam očituje u formi radikalnog – individualnog ili obiteljsko-plemenskog egocentrizma). Autoritarnost je zastupljena među glasačima svih stranaka (u rasponu od 39,05% do 54,19%), u svim dobnim (u rasponu od 56,33% među najstarijima do 47,78% među mlađima od 30 godina) i obrazovnim skupinama (u rasponu od 58,79% među onima bez završene osnovne škole do 43,53% među onima s visokom stručnom spremom). Indikativni su nalazi jednog istraživanja iz 2005. prema kojemu se 69,1% ispitanika u potpunosti slaže s tvrdnjom da je narod bez vođe kao čovjek bez glave, 66,9% izražava suglasnost s tvrdnjom kako je prirodnije da žena obavlja većinu kućnih poslova, a 49,7% s tvrdnjom da interes kolektiva mora biti iznad interesa pojedinca; međutim, samo 27,0% ispitanika posve se slaže s uvjerenjem da pretpostavljene treba slušati čak i kad nisu u pravu (što odbacuje 61,7% ispitanika), a 33,8% prihvaća stav da sudstvo treba služiti vlasti (pri čemu taj stav odbacuje 51,3% ispitanika).

Vrijednosne polarizacije zbivaju se u sljedećim suprotnostima: nacionalizam (etnocentrizam) – modernizam (liberalizam), etatizam (kolektivizam) – individualizam, klerikalizam – laicizam, autoritarnost – demokratizam, u odgovoru na pitanje treba li Hrvatska biti katolička država, itd. te u vrijednosnoj trijadi samoostvarujuće (samoaktualizirajuće), konvencionalne (tradicionalističke) i utilitarno-hedonističke vrijedno-

sne orijentacije. Mogući indikator vrijednosne polarizacije hrvatskog društva predstavljaju rezultati istraživanja stavova hrvatskih građana o ulozi odabranih historijskih ličnosti iz 2007. godine, gdje ocjene što su dane o tim ličnostima koreliraju s vrijednosnim orijentacijama, pa ispitanici među čijim vrednotama dominiraju etnocentrizam, autoritarizam, bračni/rodni tradicionalizam, odbacivanje neograničene slobode govora i uvjerenje u primat kolektiva nad individuom pozitivno ocjenjuju Antu Starčevića (takvih je u tom istraživanju bilo 63,5%), Franju Tuđmana (48,9%) i Antu Pavelića (16,9%) dok Josipa Broza Tita (55,7%) i Stjepana Mesića (55,2%) pozitivno ocjenjuju ispitanici koji u većoj mjeri odbacuju spomenute autoritarno-konzervativne vrijednosti.

Antiteza tradicionalizma i modernizma rezultira i elementima (postmoderne?) socijalne i vrijednosne anomije, koja se prvenstveno zasniva na nerazrješivoj kontradikciji između jačanja vrijednosti individualnog bogaćenja na jednoj i zahtjeva što ih postavljaju logika moderne tržišne ekonomije kao i nužnost očuvanja društvenog morala na drugoj strani. Tomu doprinosi evidentirani porast nepovjerenja mladih spram društvenih struktura.

Optimistički konotirani rezultati istraživanja vrijednosnih orijentacija mladih koji ukazuju na određeno smanjivanje prihvatanja tradicionalističkih (etničko-religijskih) vrijednosti među mladima (uz porast osjećaja nepravde zbog materijalnih nejednakosti u društvu), nadalje istraživanja koja upućuju na procese vrijednosne detradicionalizacije i individualizacije, te posebno istraživanja koja dokazuju primat samostvarujuće vrijednosne strukture među srednjoškolskom omladinom (pri čemu je prisutnost te strukture snažnija od prisutnosti konvencionalne ili tradicionalističke strukture i izrazito zastupljenija od utilitarno-hedonističke strukture) relativiziraju se nalazima drugih istraživanja koja indiciraju da se među današnjim adolescentima smanjuje stupanj optimističkog viđenja budućnosti te se širi konfuzija identiteta i uloga, zasnovana na izostajanju odgojne uloge obitelji, škole i medija (pri čemu se demokratsko izjednačava s permisivnim), što rezultira primatom težnje za dokoličarenjem (uključujući i provođenje slobodnog vremena u lutanju trgovačkim centrima) kao i jačanjem konzumerističkih vrijednosti.

CHANGES IN VALUE ORIENTATIONS IN CROATIA

Based on the analysis of relevant research carried out in the fields of sociology, social psychology, and political science (since 1986), as well as a comparison between the findings of previous and more recent research, the following conclusions can be made as regards the changes that happened in Croatia in terms of value orientations:

Despite socialist modernisation (began in 1945) and the political liberalisation that took place in the late 1980s, value orientations in Croatian society were in the years of the breakup of Yugoslavia determined by the inherited dominant patriarchal, authoritarian, ethnocentric, and traditionalist consciousness (which does not by any means differ from the state in the other Yugoslav republics).

More recent research has confirmed that value orientations are still considerably marked by pre-modern socialist and value structure, though the primacy of collective traditionalist values (based on patriarchalism, authoritarianism, and ethnocentrism, and additionally instigated by the re-traditionalisation processes, which is quantitatively presented in a research result which shows that authoritarianism has weakened by 8.6% and collectivist etatism by 13.9%, whereas ethnocentrism has increased by 22.6%) is complemented by the acceptance of liberalism in the sphere of economy as well as by certain strengthening of the elements of individualist values of the developed Western countries (though individualism is to a significant extent reflected in the form of radical-individual or family/tribe-based egocentrism). Authoritarianism is present among the voters of all parties (ranging from 39.05% to 54.19%), ages (ranging from 56.33% in the case of the oldest ones to 47.78% in the case of those under 30), and education levels (ranging from 58.79% among those without elementary school to 43.53% among those who graduate from a university). The results of a 2005 research study are indicative, according to which 69.1% of the interviewees agree completely with the statement that a people without a leader is like a man without a head, 66.9% express their agreement with the statement that it is more natural for women to do the majority of the household chores, and 49.7% with the statement that the collective interest has to be above the individual interest; however, mere 27.0% of the interviewees agree completely with the belief that superiors should be listened to even when they are not right (this is rejected by 61.7% of the interviewees), and 33.8% accept the claim that the judiciary should serve the government authorities (this is rejected by 51.3% of the interviewees).

Value polarisations occur in the following binaries: nationalism (ethnocentrism) – modernism (liberalism), etatism (collectivism) – individualism, clericalism – laicism, authoritarianism – democratism, as well

as in replying to the question of whether Croatia should be a catholic state, etc., and in the value triad of self-fulfilling (self-actualising), conventional (traditionalist) and utilitarian-hedonistic value orientation. A possible indicator of the value polarisation of the Croatian society can be found in the research results regarding the attitudes of Croatian citizens to the role of the chosen historical personages in 2007, where the marks given to these personages correlated with value orientations, and those interviewees whose values were dominated by ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, marital/gender traditionalism, rejection of the unlimited freedom of speech and belief in the supremacy of the collective over the individual gave positive marks to Ante Starčević (63.5% of them in the said research), Franjo Tuđman (48.9%), and Ante Pavelić (16.9%), whereas Josip Broz Tito (55.7%) and Stjepan Mesić (55.2%) were positively marked by those interviewees who largely rejected the listed authoritarian-conservative values.

The antithesis of traditional vs. modern also results in some elements of (postmodern?) social and value anomy, which is primarily based on the irresolvable contradiction between the strengthening of the value of individual wealth-acquisition on the one hand, and on the other, the demands set by the logic of modern market economy as well as the necessity of preserving social morality. The evident increase of young people's lack of confidence in social structures contributes to this .

Optimistically connoted results of research into the value orientations of the youth, which indicate a certain decrease in the acceptance of traditionalist (ethno-religious) values among young people (alongside the rising sense of injustice regarding material inequalities in society), as well as the research pointing out the processes of value de-traditionalisation and individualisation, and especially the research proving the primacy of the self-actualising value structure among high-schoolers (whereby this structure is more strongly present than the conventional or traditionalist structure and markedly more represented than the utilitarian-hedonistic structure), are made relative by the results of other research, which indicate that today's adolescents have a reduced degree of optimism as regards the future, and that confusion is widespread as regards identity and roles, based on the lack of the educational role of the family, school, and media (whereby the democratic is made equal to the permissive), which results in the primacy of the desire for idleness (including leisure time spent in wandering the malls) and the strengthening of consumerist values.

KRIZA POLITIČKE KULTURE U SAVREMENOM DRUŠTVU

U radu se analiziraju promjene u vrijednosnim obrascima političke kulture u modernim političkim zajednicama. U savremenom društvu i krizi koja se sve više dinamizuje i usložnjava, zahvatajući različite segmente od ekonomskog do pravnog i političkog sistema, uočljive su značajne izmjene u političkoj kulturi pojedinaca i grupa, njihovim vrijednostima, stavovima, uvjerenjima, ubjeđenjima, koji određuju njihovo političko ponašanje. Dominiraju antivrijednosti, nihilizam, volja za moć, strah i strepnja, emocionalnost, izolacija, hermetičnost, gubitak povjerenja u stvarne političke promjene, bezalternativnost, neovarvarizam, ideologija novca koja je samom sebi svrha, inetersnost, moć i površni hedonizam kao najbitniji elementi današnjice. U balkanskim društvima, demokratska retorika zamjenjuje korjenite promjene i duhovnu samosvjest epohe koja se više ne utemeljuje na univerzalnim, već relativnim vrijednostima.

Ključne riječi: politička kultura, promjene, vrijednosti, stavovi, uvjerenja, simboli, univerzalizam, relativizam

CRISIS OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

The paper analyses changes in the value patterns of political culture in contemporary political communities. In contemporary society and more and more accelerated and complex crisis which grips different segments, from economic to legal and political system, one can identify significant changes in the political culture of individuals and groups, their values, attitudes and beliefs which determine their political behavior. The dominant ones include anti-values, nihilism, hunger for power, fear and anxiety, emotionality, isolation, estrangement, loss of faith in real political changes, lack of alternatives, neo-barbarism, ideology of money being purpose unto itself, interests, power and superficial hedonism as the most important elements of the present moment. In Balkan societies, democratic rhetoric replaces thorough changes and spiritual self-awareness in the era no longer based on universal, but rather on relative values.

Keywords: political culture, changes, values, attitudes, beliefs, symbols, universalism, relativism

DRUŠTVENI KONFLIKT IZMEĐU DRŽAVE I DRUŠTAVA

Koliko društava postoji na Balkanu? Državne granice se gotovo mogu prepoznati, ali ko određuje granice između društava? Da li na Balkanu živimo u jednom društvu ili u nekoliko društava? U koliko zemalja postoji više od jednog društva? Da li su neka društva podeljena državnim granicama? Dozvolite mi da na osnovu navedenog otvorim neka važna pitanja koja se tiču poređenja Bosne i Makedonije.

Nažalost, **nacionalizam** je i dalje dominantna balkanska ideologija. I dalje ima moć da izazove političke procese unutar država kao i između država. U međuvremenu su, poslednjih godina, političke sile na Balkanu „uspele“ da se transformišu u moderne političke stranke, ali i da brane samo svoj „nacionalni interes“. Pokušaji da se izgradi drugačiji model države, koji ne korespondira sa nacionalnim mitovima, bili su osuđeni na propast. Društveni konflikti postoje u izobilju i u njima se prepliću politika i etnicitet.

Razmatranja o Bosni

Moja nedavna istraživanja o Bosni i Hercegovini, u kontekstu identifikovanja društvenih konflikata, bila su usredsređena na dva nivoa: društveno-politički i društveno-kulturni. Kroz ovu analizu različitih faktora uticaja, izdvojio sam par snažnih faktora povezanih sa postojanjem društvenih konflikata koji danas utiču na položaj Bosne i Hercegovine: beskrajnu **politizaciju etniciteta** i procese **političke dezintegracije** koji opstruiraju društvenu integraciju unutar države.

Beskrajna **politizacija etniciteta** je najuticajniiji negativni proces ili faktor bitan za stabilnost društva. Ova politizacija neprestano proističe iz tri stanovišta i manifestuje se u vidu zasebnih etničkih nacionalizama. Zapravo postoje tri slična, ali ipak različita zasebna nacionalizma: većinski bošnjački, manjinski hrvatski i paradržavni srpski. Ova tri nacionalizma su konstantno u konfliktu, na centralnom i regionalnom nivou, i obično ih koristi većina političkih stranaka u manipulativnim pristupima u okviru „političke“ borbe. Političke elite su uglavnom dominantne, i one opstruiraju i sprečavaju veću integraciju društva, ne dozvoljavajući smanjenje etničkog monopola i moći.

Procesi **političke dezintegracije** se manifestuju kroz političku borbu, ali za tri različite ideje. Bošnjačke političke elite se trude da obezbede veću centralizaciju države, za razliku od trenutnog položaja entiteta. Srpske političke elite zagovaraju Bosnu i Hercegovinu zamrznutim Dejtonskim sporazumom, u kojoj će Srbi iz Republike Srpske živeti u svom „vlastitom“ delu. Hrvatske političke elite zagovaraju zasnivanje trećeg entiteta, ili barem zadržavanje trenutne situacije u kojoj imaju udela i

uticaja u politici. Državne političke elite imaju moć da utiču na sudbinu države i oblikuju je. Nedavni pokušaji da se smanji uticaj etničkih faktora u političkom modelu naišli su na žestoki otpor mnogih političkih stranaka. Političke stranke se svesrdno trude da zadrže privilegije i sačuvaju lične interese.

Najmanje dva od tri konstitutivna naroda koja u Bosni danas žive ne „osećaju je“ kao svoju zemlju.

Razmatranja o Makedoniji

Situacija u Makedoniji je u nekim pogledima slična ili simbolična. Najveće sličnosti u makedonskom društvu mogu se identifikovati u vezi sa prvim društvenim konfliktom: beskrajnog **politizacijom etniciteta** između Makedonaca i Albanaca. Drugi društveni konflikt, tačnije, politička dezintegracija, manje je izražen, verovatno usled različitih pristupa izgradnji mira i procesima izgradnje nacije. U Makedoniji takođe etnicitet više dolazi do izražaja u svakodnevnoj realnosti, a manje u zakonima, barem u poređenju sa Bosnom. Ipak, i tri decenije nakon sticanja državne nezavisnosti, vladajuće strukture kao da ne žele da pronađu integrativni model za društvenu integraciju. Bez rešenja ovog problema, Severna Makedonija neće biti ni severna ni demokratska, a kamoli stabilna država.

Kad govorimo o promeni, u regionu se godinama pokazuje kako nije moguće promeniti stvari, posebno ako status kvo radi u prilog **korumpiranim elitama**, koje kroz nacionalizam i populizam konstantno dobijaju sve veće privilegije. Ako veliki segmenti društva nisu zadovoljni, tj. građani i važne političke strukture, onda su moguće političke turbulencije i konflikti. Ali kada su samo građani nezadovoljni, iako oni predstavljaju veliku većinu, šanse za promenu su male. Posebno zbog toga što građani, kada je u pitanju njihov porodični život, ne žele tenzije, političke prevrate, ulične proteste, itd.

U periodu između 2015. i 2017, SDSM je, kao levičarska politička stranka, nakon opšteg nezadovoljstva izazvanog decenijom autoritarnog režima stranke VMRO-DPMNE, počela da stvara novu **multietničku političku većinu** kroz slogan „jedno društvo za sve“. Nažalost, tokom 2018. i 2019. polako je počela da se udaljava od ove ideje. Ili se vođstvo SDSM-a uplašilo ovog „istorijskog“ zadatka i velike promene u politici, ili nije shvatilo koji su potencijali koncepta „jednog društva za sve“ ili šta sve takav smer političke promene može da donese. Međutim, intenzitet političkog života i grozničava politička borba uticali su na razvoj. Uveren sam da je hipotetičko stvaranje novih multietničkih političkih većina, barem na neko vreme, dobra šansa za državu i društvenu integraciju.

Postoje dva moguća pravca razvoja makedonskog društva, koja zavise od unutrašnje situacije u zemlji, ali i od regionalnog političkog kontek-

sta. Prvi pravac je uvećanje i ojačavanje političke većine u zemlji. Ova većina ne mora biti niti je nužno mononacionalna. Ona treba da bude „jedno društvo za sve“. Drugi pravac je sličan belgijskom/bosanskom modelu federalne države, ali sa strogim etničkim granicama i potpunom separacijom dva etnička dela. Ovo je način da se stvore mono-etnički prostori i paralelni životi: etničke zajednice, isključivi jezici u obrazovanju, itd. U ovom slučaju, štetu će pretrpeti manje zajednice, u kojima postoji identitetski rascep između Makedonaca i Albanaca, koji često iz pragmatičnih razloga naginju ovom ili onom bloku na osnovu verskih ili drugih sličnosti.

Zaključak ove sociološke analize je da samo društvene strukture mogu da upravljaju promenom i da su građani danas nemoćni da to učine sami, a posebno zbog toga što izbori ne dovode do promena. Građani će svakako doprineti boljoj integraciji društva, ukoliko je ona moguća, jer će im to omogućiti razvoj i prosperitet. Izbor se svodi na „jedno društvo za sve“ ili federalnu državu. Čvrsto sam uveren da je većina građana za prvu opciju jer se druga već pokazala kao loša.

SOCIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE AND SOCIETIES

How many societies are there in the Balkans? The borders of states are almost recognized, but who determines the borders of societies? Do we live in the Balkans in one society or several societies? In how many countries is there more than one society? Are some societies divided by state borders? Therefore, let me try to open important issues in by comparing the cases of Bosnia and Macedonia.

Unfortunately, **nationalism** is still the dominant Balkan ideology! It still has the power to provoke political processes within, as well as between states! Meanwhile, in recent years, political forces in the Balkans have 'managed' to transform into modern political parties, but also to defend only their 'national interest'. Attempts to build a different model of state that does not correspond to national myths were doomed to failure. Social conflicts abound and exist, intertwining the politics and ethnicity.

Bosnian reflections

My recent research on Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the context of identifying social conflicts, focused on two levels – socio-political and socio-cultural. Through this analysis of different influential factors, we distinguished a couple of strong factors related to the existence of social conflicts that today affect Bosnia and Herzegovina's position – the endless **politicization of ethnicity** and **political disintegration** processes that obstruct social integration within the state.

Endless **politicization of ethnicity** is the most influential negative process or factor for the stability of a society. This politicization is continuously emanated from three standpoints and manifested as particular ethnic nationalisms. In fact, there are three similar but still different relational nationalisms: the majoritarian Bosniak, minority Croatian and para-state Serbian. These three nationalisms are constantly in conflict, both centrally and regionally, generally used by the majority of political parties through manipulative approaches within the framework of the 'political' struggle. Political elites dominate most of the time and obstruct and prevent greater integration of society, not allowing the decrease of ethnic monopoly and power.

Political disintegration processes manifest themselves through political struggle, but for three different ideas. Bosniak political elites are pushing for bigger centralization of the state, as opposed to the current entity position. Serbian political elites are advocating for the frozen Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Serbs from the Republic of Srpska would live in their 'own' entity. Croatian political elites

are advocating for their own third entity, or at least to maintain the current situation where they have their share of influence in politics. State political elites have the power to influence and shape the fate of the state. The latest attempts to reduce the influence of ethnic factors in the political model are fiercely opposed by many political parties. The political parties work hard to retain privileges and personal interests.

In Bosnia of today, at least two out of the three constitutive peoples living in it, do not 'feel it' as their own.

Macedonian reflections

The situation in Macedonia is in some instances similar or symbolic. The biggest similarities in the Macedonian society are identified in relation to the first social conflict – the endless **politicization of ethnicity** between Macedonians and Albanians. The second social conflict, namely the political disintegration, is less pronounced probably because of different approaches to the peacebuilding and nation-building processes. In Macedonia, too, there is more pronounced ethnicity in everyday reality, but this is less reflected in the laws, at least compared to Bosnia. Still, three decades after the independence of the state, the governing structures do not seem to want to find an integrative model for social integration. Without a solution to this issue, North Macedonia will be neither northern nor democratic, much less a stable state.

Speaking of change, it has been seen in the region for years that it is impossible to change things, especially if the status quo works in favour of the **corrupted elites** who, through nationalism and populism, are constantly gaining ever greater privileges. If large segments of society are not satisfied, i.e. citizens and important political structures, then political turbulence and political conflicts are possible. But when only the citizens are dissatisfied, even though they are in huge majority, then the chances for change are slim, especially since citizens in terms of their family life, do not want tensions, political coups, street protests, etc.

In the period 2015–2017, the SDSM as a leftist political party, after the general dissatisfaction with the decade of the authoritarian regime of the VMRO-DPMNE, began to create a new **multiethnic political majority** through the slogan 'one society for all'. Unfortunately, in 2018–2019 they slowly started to withdraw from this idea. Either the SDSM leadership was scared of this 'historic' task and a big change in politics, or they did not realize what the potentials of the concept of "one society for all" are, or what that line of political change could bring. However, the intensity of political life and the hectic political struggle influenced the development. I am convinced that the eventual creation of new multiethnic political majorities is, at least for a while, an opportunity that would be good for the state and social integration.

There are two possible lines of development of the Macedonian society that depend on the internal situation in the country, but also the regional political context. The first line is to increase and strengthen the political majority in the country. This majority does not have to be, or is not necessarily mono-national. It should be 'one society for all'. The second line is similar to the Belgian/Bosnian model of federal state, but with strict ethnic boundaries and complete separation between the two ethnic sections. This is a way of creating mono-ethnic spaces and parallel life – ethnic communities, exclusive languages of education, etc. In this case, the smaller communities will be damaged, as they are identity torn between Macedonians and Albanians, who often for pragmatic reasons lean towards one or another bloc along religious or other lines.

This sociological analysis concludes that only social structures can manage change and citizens today are powerless to do it themselves and especially because the elections do not breed change. Citizens will certainly contribute to a more integrated society, if such thing exists, because it will enable them to develop and prosper. The choice is between the 'one society for all' and the federal state. I strongly believe that the majority of the citizens would be for the former option, since the latter is already perceived as being bad.

PRAVO NA APATIJU?

Apatija nije samo reakcija na autoritarizam; ona je u velikoj meri povezana sa modusom vivendi neoliberalne ideologije. Stoga ne iznenađuje što slušamo o sve većem sagorevanju i saosećajnom zamoru. U ovom predavanju biće predstavljene mnogobrojne nijanse apatije, koje možemo primetiti u neoliberalizmu. Predavanje će pokazati kako nove tehnologije doprinose apatiji, pružiti analizu tipova apatije koje možemo naći u postsocijalizmu, i ispitati koja je vrsta apatije postojala u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Tokom predavanja ćemo se osvrnuti i na apatiju u vezi sa ruskim napadom na Ukrajinu. Zaključna razmatranja će pružiti osvrt na ideju „prava na apatiju“, koja je sredinom 20. veka bila prijemčiva nekim američkim političkim teoretičarima, a koja u naša neoliberalna vremena dobija nove interpretacije.

THE RIGHT TO APATHY?

Apathy is not only a response to authoritarianism; it is very much linked to the *modus vivendi* of the neoliberal ideology. Thus, it is unsurprising that we hear about increased burnout and compassion fatigue. The lecture will present many shades of apathy that we can observe in neoliberalism. It will show how new technologies contribute to apathy, analyse the types of apathy we find in post-socialism, and question what kind of apathy existed in the former Yugoslavia. The lecture will also address apathy related to the Russian attack on Ukraine. In conclusion, the talk will address the idea of the »right to apathy«, which was fashionable in the mid 20 century among some American political theorists and is becoming reinterpreted in our neo-liberal times.

VREDNOSTI U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

Vrednosti su kompleksan fenomen, predstavljaju dispozicije ličnosti i važan element društvene svesti ljudi. Vrednosti su uvek u korelaciji sa iskustvima i nasleđem iz prošlosti, okvirima sadašnjosti i težnjama i projekcijama ka poželjnoj budućnosti. Vrednosti su stoga nešto nasleđeno, proživljeno, propitkivano i željeno. U radu će se u kontekstu Bosne i Hercegovine (BiH), i triju vrednosnih orijentacija, koje s jedne strane predstavljaju određene vrednosne sisteme i ujedno su prediktor vrednosti, pokušati ukazati na ovu dinamiku, i na načine na koje se ukršta „staro“ i „novo“ u vrednosnom ogledalu.

BiH je postsocijalističko i postkonfliktno društvo koje karakteriše dinamična promena vrednosti s jedne i tzv. povratak u tradicionalne vrednosne obrasce s druge strane. Ovi faktori, posebno urušavanje nekadašnjeg sistema i brutalnost ratnog sukoba su u velikoj meri doprineli retraditionalizaciji društva i povratku tzv. starim, sigurnim i oprobanim vrednostima, ali su ujedno stvorili i okvire za njihovo propitkivanje i izražavanje težnji ka prevazilaženjem postojećeg. Društvo BiH je podeljeno na tri glavne etničke grupe – Bošnjake, Srbe i Hrvate, čija je glavna *differentia specifica* religija. Kriza i opadanje privrženosti tzv. socijalističkim vrednostima (i tzv. samoupravne orijentacije) osamdesetih godina prošlog veka, uspon netrpeljivog etnonacionalizma se svom silinom obrušio na BiH kao tzv. Jugoslaviju u malom. Tokom ratnih sukoba, uz brutalno korišćenje taktika etničkog čišćenja čija je glavna žrtva civilno stanovništvo, dolazi do etničke homogenizacije koja je potom potvrđena i samom administrativnom podelom zemlje i ustavnim mehanizmima koji favorizuju kolektivna prava nauštrb individualnih, čime se podupire i pruža čvrst oslonac tradicionalnim vrednosnim obrascima. Vrednosti su s jedne strane užljebljene u okvire političkog sistema koji favorizuje zaštitu kolektivnih prava nauštrb individualnih, dok je u isto vreme prisutna težnja većine stanovništva ka priključivanju Evropskoj uniji koja pretpostavlja institucionalizaciju određenih vrednosnih paketa (tzv. evropski standardi).

Kada je reč o religioznosti, BiH spada u zemlje čije je stanovništvo izrazito religiozno sa tendencijom stalnog porasta: 97.3% stanovništva pripada nekoj veroispovesti, 85.9% sebe definiše kao religiozno, 11.7% se smatra nereligioznim, a 2.4% uverenim ateistima. Sociološka istraživanja gotovo kontinuirano ukazuju da je više reč o jako izraženom konfesionalnom identitetu nego o individualnoj religioznosti. Značajno je izraženije praktikovanje religije povodom najvećih verskih praznika kao što su Bajram, Božić, Vaskrs odnosno Uskrs, dok su elementi tzv. individualističke vrednosne orijentacije unutar religioznosti manje zastupljeni. Istraživanja pokazuju da se učenja vlastite i pogotovo učenja vere onih drugih, trećih itd. slabije poznaju. Da se religijska tradicija smatra ključnom za opstanak društva, vlastite etničke grupe, porodice, individue i sl. potvrđuje i veoma izražen animozitet prema ateistima, kao i tzv. novim oblicima religioznosti.

U isto vreme, i u BiH dolazi do tzv. procesa demokratizacije i liberalizacije, koji još uvek nisu rezultirali u demokratskoj konsolidaciji. Upravo se za demokratiju smatra ključnim postojanje određenih vrednosnih orijentacija koje treba da „udahnu“ život demokratskim formalnim procedurama. Izlazanost na izbore je najlakše merljiva dimenzija koji ukazuje na njihovo postojanje ili odsustvo. Ona je u zadnjih 20 godina u proseku oko 53%, što ukazuje na prisutnu poddelu stanovništva na participante i one koji apstiniraju od izbora. Velika većina stanovništva sebe upravo tako i percipira u istraživanjima: kao niti zainteresovane niti nezainteresovane za politiku, i više poznaje određene političare pojedince nego sistem funkcionisanja vlasti. To ukazuje na izrazitu personalizaciju političkih procesa i nedovoljnu razvijenost kognitivnih elemenata participativne političke kulture. Prisutan je sindrom autoritarizma, koji je veoma izražen i kod mlade populacije, a što se često povezuje sa nefunkcionalnošću demokratskih institucija, političkom korupcijom i traženjem izlaza u vođenju odozgo. Demokratija, takođe, kao svoju bazu pretpostavlja jako i dinamično civilno društvo. No, građani i građanke nemaju dovoljno poverenja u nevladin sektor, koji se često pogrešno izjednačava sa civilnim društvom. Više je prisutno članstvo u tzv. nepolitičkim udruženjima poput rekreativnih, sportskih i kulturnih koje su postojale i u socijalizmu. Prisutan je animozitet prema tzv. *ljudskopravaškim* nevladinim organizacijama, dok se pozitivnim smatraju organizacije koje pružaju neke oblike direktne pomoći građanima i građankama.

Kada je reč o rodnoj ravnopravnosti, ona se smatra ključnom (post)modenom vrednosnom orijentacijom. Ovde se prepliče nasleđe nekadašnjeg socijalističkog modela emancipacije žena, sa unapređenjem zakona i mehanizama za rodnu ravnopravnost u postratnom periodu. Ratna dešavanja su pospešila patrijarhalne poglede na rodne uloge, ali su ujedno otvorila prostor za aktivizam i uključenost žena u procese obnove društva, posebno izgradnje mira i pomirenja. Istraživanja stavova u bh populaciji u različitim periodima ukazuju na preovladavanje modifikovanih patrijarhalnih vrednosti: s jedne strane se učešće žena u javnoj sferi i posebno plaćenom radu percipira prihvatljivim, dok se u isto vreme zagovaraju tradicionalni obrasci u porodici, i brak i porodica smatraju najznačajnijom društvenom institucijom. Stavovi mladih o seksualnosti ukazuju na porast trendova individualizacije, uz izražene patrijarhalne stavove kada je reč o seksualnosti devojaka. Podaci ukazuju na određene pomake kada je reč o porastu svesti o problemu nasilja nad ženama, ali to nije praćeno svešću o drugim dimenzijama rodne ravnopravnosti kao što je npr. ravnomerna raspodela kućnih poslova. Takođe je veoma izražena netolerancija prema LGBT populaciji, posebno kod manje obrazovanog stanovništva iz ruralnih područja, dok žene, i visokoobrazovano stanovništvo iz urbanih područja ima nešto tolerantije stavove. To se ogleda i u samoj činjenici da je BiH poslednja zemlja u regiji u kojoj je održana Parada ponosa.

Podaci koji su ovde navedeni potvrđuju ono što je rečeno na početku – da je u BiH na delu prisutna određena raspolućenost između tradicio-

nalnih i (post)modernih vrednosti. Glavno uporište tradicionalnih obrazaca je upravo u religiji i preovladavajućim oblicima religioznosti, i religija se u identitarnom smislu poistovećuje sa etničkom pripadnošću. Političke preferencije i vrednosni obrasci se odigravaju unutar etnički segmentiranog stranačkog sistema, uz polovičnu političku participaciju na izborima i izraženu sumnju u same demokratske procese. Politika se percipira na izrazito personalan način, uz slabo razvijene kognitivne dimenzije političke kulture, s prisutnim nepoverenjem prema civilnom društvu i aktivizmu. Stavovi prema rodnoj ravnopravnosti upravo pokazuju kako se ukršta nasleđe socijalističkog sistema emancipacije žena sa novim vrednostima koji čine tzv. paket evropskih standarda. U određenim sferama se rodna ravnopravnost prihvata npr. kada je reč o učešću žena u javnoj sferi i suzbijanju rodno zasnovanog nasilja, dok se u drugim segmentima odbacuje, posebno kada je reč o LGBT populaciji.

Ključne reči: vrednosti, Bosna i Hercegovina, (post)socijalizam, (post)konfliktno društvo, tradicija, religioznost, demokratske vrednosti, rodna ravnopravnost

VALUES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Values are a complex phenomenon, as they represent dispositions of personality and an important element of people's social awareness. Values are always correlated with the experiences and legacy of the past, framework of the present, as well as tendencies and projections for the preferred future. Values are thus something inherited, lived, considered and wanted. The paper will use the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the three value orientations which, on the one hand, represent certain value systems, while simultaneously serving as predictors of values, to try to explain this dynamism and the manners in which the "old" and the "new" meet in the value mirror.

BiH is a post-socialist and post-conflict society, characterised by a dynamic change in values on the one hand, and so-called return to the traditional value patterns on the other. These factors, especially the collapse of the former system and the brutality of the war, largely contributed to retraditionalisation of the society and return to so-called old, true and tested values, while simultaneously also creating the framework for their reconsideration and research of the inclinations to overcoming the existing condition. The society of BiH is divided into three main ethnic groups – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, the main differentia specifica of which is religion. With the crisis and a decline in commitment to so-called socialist values (as well as so-called self-management orientation) during the 1980's, the rise of uncompromising ethno-nationalism pounced with all its force at BiH as so-called Yugoslavia in miniature. During the war conflicts, along with brutal use of the ethnic cleansing tactics the main casualties of which were civilians, an ethnic homogenisation occurred which was subsequently confirmed through the very administrative division of the country and constitutional mechanisms which favour collective at the expense of individual rights, thus firmly supporting traditional value patterns. On the one hand, values are constrained within a political system which favours the protection of collective rights at the expense of individual rights, while simultaneously there is an inclination in the majority of the population towards the EU accession, which in turn represents institutionalisation of certain value packages (so-called European standards).

When it comes to religiosity, BiH is among the countries with highly religious population, with the tendency of constant rise: 97.3% of the population belong to a confession, 85.9% define themselves as religious, while 2.4% are atheists. Sociological research almost continuously indicates that what we have here is rather a highly pronounced confessional identity, than individual religiosity. Significantly more pronounced is practicing religion upon the biggest religious holidays such as Eid al-Adha, Christmas, or Easter, while the elements of so-called individualist value orientation within religiosity are less present. Research shows that the learnings of one's own, and especially of

other ethnic groups' religions, are less familiar. That religious tradition is perceived as crucial for the survival of the society, one's own ethnic group, family, individual, etc. is confirmed by highly pronounced animosity towards atheists, as well as to so-called new forms of religiosity.

Simultaneously, BiH passes through the processes of democratisation and liberalisation, which have still not resulted in democratic consolidation. Democracy is the very order for which the existence of certain value orientations that needs to "give life" to democratic procedures is deemed to be crucial. Election turnout is the most easily measurable dimension which indicates their existence or absence. In the last twenty years, it has been 53% on average, which indicates the division of population to those who participate in elections, and those who abstain from it. According to polls, an overwhelming majority of the population has this very self-perception: they see themselves as neither interested nor disinterested in politics, and they are more familiar with concrete politicians than with the system in which government functions. This points to extreme personalisation of political processes and insufficient development of the cognitive elements of participative political culture. The authoritarianism syndrome is also present, and particularly highly pronounced in young population, which is often connected to the dysfunction of democratic institutions, political corruption and seeking solutions in leadership from above. Democracy also assumes a strong and dynamic civil society as its basis. However, citizens do not have enough confidence in non-governmental sector, which is often mistakenly equalled to civil society. Membership in so-called non-political associations such as recreational, sport and cultural ones, which also existed in socialism, is more frequently present. There is animosity to human rights oriented NGOs, while the organisations which provide some kind of direct aid and assistance to citizens are perceived as positive.

When it comes to gender equality, it is perceived as the crucial (post) modern value orientation. Here, the heritage of the earlier socialist model of women's emancipation is intertwined with the development of gender equality laws and mechanisms in the post-war period. War-time events have stimulated the patriarchal outlook on gender roles, but they have also opened up space for women's activism and participation in the process of the society's renewal, especially when it comes to peace building and reconciliation efforts. Attitude polls of BiH population in different periods have indicated a prevalence of modified patriarchal values: on the one hand, participation of women in the public sphere and especially paid labour, is perceived as acceptable, while at the same time, traditional family patterns are advocated for, while marriage and family are perceived as the most important social institutions. Attitudes of youth concerning sexuality indicate an increase in the trend of individualisation, with pronounced patriarchal attitudes, however, when it comes to the sexuality of girls. Data indicate certain improvements when it comes to the awareness of the

problem of violence against women, yet this is not accompanied with the awareness of some other dimensions of gender equality, such as e.g. equal division of house labour. There is also a highly pronounced intolerance to LGBT population, especially in less educated rural population, while women and educated population from urban areas have attitudes that are somewhat more tolerant. This is reflected in the fact that BiH was the last country in the region to organise a Pride Parade.

The data provided here confirm what has been said in the beginning – that in BiH we have certain schism between the traditional and (post) modern values. The main foothold of the traditional patterns is in religion and predominant forms of religiosity, where in the identity sense, religion is equalled to ethnic affiliation. Political preferences and value patterns are rolled out within the ethnically segmented party system, with but a half of the population participating in elections, where some pronounce suspicion when it comes to democratic processes themselves. Politics is perceived in a highly personal way, with poorly developed cognitive dimensions of political culture, and mistrust of civil society and activism. Attitudes to gender equality truly show the manner of intertwining between the heritage of women's emancipation from the socialist system and the new values that make the so-called package of European standards. In certain spheres, gender equality is accepted, e.g. when it comes to women's participation in the public sphere and suppression of gender-based violence, while in some other segments it is rejected, especially when it comes to LGBT population.

Keywords: values, Bosnia and Herzegovina, (post)socialism, (post)conflict society, tradition, religiosity, democratic values, gender equality

CIP - Каталогизacija у публикацији
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

316.42(497.1-89)(048)

327(048)

МЕЂУНАРОДНА научна конференција Промене (2022 ; Београд) Program ; i Knjiga sažetaka / Međunarodna naučna konferencija Promene, Beograd, 27–29. oktobar 2022. godine ; [organizator] Institut društvenih nauka = Program ; and Book of abstracts / International Scientific Conference Changes, Belgrade, 27–29. October 2022 ; [organized by] Institute of Social Sciences ; [urednik Goran Bašić]. - Beograd : Institut društvenih nauka, 2022 (Beograd : RIC grafičkog inženjerstva Tehnološko-metalurškog fakulteta). – 177 str. ; 22 cm

Uporedo srp., hrv. ili bos. tekst i engl. prevod. – Tiraž 150.

ISBN 978-86-7093-257-9

a) Међународна научна конференција Промене (2022 ; Београд)
-- Програми б) Друштвене промене -- Бивше југословенске републике -- Апстракти в) Транзиција -- Бивше југословенске републике -- Апстракти г) Друштвено-економске прилике

COBISS.SR-ID 75803145

